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1 Introduction
The price which is so high relatively to the poor man as to be almost prohibitive,
may be scarcely felt by the rich; the poor man, for instance, never tastes wine, but
the very rich man may drink as much of it as he has a fancy for, without giving
himself a thought of its cost (Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics, 1890, 8th
ed., p. 103).
We live in a globalized world marked by the flows of ideas, goods, and capital across national
borders. At the same time, we observe large differences in the distribution of income and
wealth across and within nations. The distribution of income and wealth across and within
countries determines demand patterns, which in turn shape international knowledge, trade and
investment flows, and vice versa. This dissertation explores the role of the demand side as a
fundamental determinant of these flows.
The first essay analyzes the interdependence of innovation incentives and trade patterns in
an unequal global economy. It also sets the stage for the second and third essay by providing
a theoretical framework that can be adapted to study international product cycles and foreign
direct investment. However, first I turn to the question of how differences in per capita incomes
across countries shape innovation incentives and trade patterns in the international economy
through the demand side. I build upon Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b) seminal analysis
of innovation and growth in the global economy. I extend their framework by assuming non-
homothetic consumer behavior, which allows me to study how the demand structure affects
international trade and investment incentives simultaneously. In particular, I analyze a two-
country dynamic general-equilibrium model with endogenous growth and costly international
trade. In this model arbitrage opportunities in the form of parallel trade emerge if per capita
income in one country is sufficiently higher than in the other country. The threat of parallel
imports induces some firms located in the country with higher per capita income to forgo a
larger market in order to be able to charge higher prices. In other words, households in the
relatively poor country cannot afford to purchase all goods produced in the rich country. Thus,
less resources in the rich country have to be allocated to the production sector, and more
resources can be allocated to research and development. I argue that in an equilibrium where
income inequality across countries is high, innovation incentives are relatively high, and at the
same time the extensive margin of trade, i.e. the number of different products that are traded, is
low. The model allows me to study a variety of interesting issues in the international economy,
like trade liberalizations, the design of intellectual property rights, the form of international
knowledge spillovers, as well as the effects of an increase in labor productivity in the poor
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country. As an example, consider the case of a trade liberalization. Trade costs might fall from
a level that sustains an equilibrium where all goods are traded to one where only a subset is
traded. The reason is that some firms in the rich country start excluding households from the
poor country due to the threat of parallel imports. I conclude that a decrease in trade costs
might lead to a lower extensive margin of trade but higher incentives to innovate. After the
trade liberalization, households in the poor country are unambiguously worse off relative to
households in the rich country.
In the second essay, joint with Reto Foellmi and Sandra Hanslin, we study the role of
the demand side in determining international product cycles. We present a framework that
allows us to analyze the effects of an increase in per capita income in emerging countries
(e.g. China) relative to developed countries (e.g. United States) on innovation and imitation
incentives, as well as trade patterns between those countries. In the 1960s, the American
economist Raymond Vernon (1913-1999) proposed the product cycle hypothesis to explain
trade patterns between the US and Western Europe (Vernon 1966). His theory offered an
explanation that was consistent with trade patterns observed in the data, and which other
theories struggled to explain (i.e. Leontief’s, 1953, paradox). According to the product cycle
theory all products go through the following three stages: In the first stage, a new product is
introduced in a country with a (relatively) high per capita income associated with high demand
(e.g. the US). As incomes grow abroad, demand for new products emerges in the next advanced
countries (e.g. Western Europe), and in the second stage, the product is exported. In the third
stage, the product is imitated by firms in less advanced countries, and due to relative cost
advantages, production moves there. The more advanced country now imports the product,
which it previously exported. Vernon emphasizes the role of the demand channel: "First, the
United States market consists of consumers with an average income which is higher . . . than
that in any other national market . . . . Wherever there was a chance to offer a new product
responsive to wants at high levels of income, this chance would presumably first be apparent
to someone in a position to observe the United States market" (Vernon 1966, p. 192). We
illustrate the product cycle hypothesis with six major consumer durables, like the microwave
or the dishwasher. In particular, we show that across 16 European countries and the US all
six consumer durables are introduced earlier in markets with relatively high average incomes.
Furthermore, in 1978 the US starts out as a net exporter of all six consumer durables and ends
up as a net importer in 2006. For the microwave and the washing machine we observe that US
production declines relative to the production in emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, India
and China between 1982 and 2008. Motivated by those findings, we formalize the product cycle
theory in a dynamic general-equilibrium model. A wealthy North demands and innovates new
products, while a poor South at random imitates products made in the North. This contrasts
to the first essay where both regions where at the technological frontier, developing new goods.
By introducing non-homothetic preferences the model is able to generate endogenous product
cycles as hypothesized by Vernon (1966), and observed in the data. Besides technology, the
different stages of the product cycle are now determined by the distribution of income between
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North and South. We argue that a reduction in income inequality across North and South leads
to a decline in the innovation and imitation rate. Since Northern households become poorer the
incentives to innovate in the North diminish. However, since households in the South are richer,
firms in the North want to export their products sooner so that the first stage of the product
cycle becomes shorter. At the same time, the average duration a new product is manufactured
in the North increases because imitation activity in the South is less intense. This implies that
the third stage of the cycle, when products are exported from South to North, becomes shorter.
We further discuss extensions with respect to preferences and technology.
In the first and second essay, firms have no choice but to export if they want to serve a
foreign market. However, besides international trade a globalized economy is characterized by
investment flows across national borders. The third essay studies the choice of firms between
foreign direct investment (FDI) and exports in general equilibrium. The market size hypothesis,
as formulated e.g. by Balassa (1966), argues that FDI will take place if the market is large
enough to capture economies of scale. This essay analyzes the market size hypothesis from a
demand-side perspective. I argue that in the presence of a proximity-concentration trade-off,
i.e. to take advantage of economies of scale firms want to concentrate production while at the
same time locate production close to their consumers to avoid transportation costs, a firm’s
foreign market entry mode depends on the market segment it serves. In particular, firms serving
mass markets abroad engage in FDI whereas firms selling exclusively to a few rich consumers
abroad export. This implies that the distribution of income within a country is important in
determining the country’s attractiveness for FDI. I formalize these arguments in a simple static
general-equilibrium model with two regions Home and Foreign, and low, middle and high income
classes of consumers in both regions. I think of Home as the wealthy region relative to Foreign.
Consumers have non-homothetic preferences, and need to satisfy subsistence consumption in
terms of food before they spend all additional income on differentiated consumer goods. In
equilibrium, ex-ante identical firms choose different pricing strategies depending on the market
segment (i.e. income classes) they cater to. Firms producing differentiated products for the
mass market (i.e. for middle and rich classes in both regions) engage in FDI whereas firms
serving exclusively the rich classes in both regions export. The basic intuition is that for firms
supplying the mass market economies of scale are high enough to compensate the higher fixed
costs associated with FDI. Due to the assumptions about the distribution of income across and
within regions, products sold on the mass market are priced according to the willingness to pay
of the middle class in Foreign, which is determined by their average income. This is the highest
price a firm can set if it wants to sell on the mass market. Hence, I ask how changes in the
average income of Foreign’s middle class affect the number of producers engaged in FDI, ceteris
paribus. I argue that redistributing income within Foreign towards its middle class increases
the equilibrium number of multinational producers with headquarters in Home. Furthermore, I
show that an expansion in the size of the middle class in Foreign, ceteris paribus, has ambiguous
effects on FDI activity in Foreign, depending on whether the poor or rich class shrinks. The
model is extended along various dimension like technology, preferences, and differentiated factor
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endowments. As an illustration, I use data on foreign direct investment of OECD countries.
I construct common income classes for a sizeable number of countries using inequality data,
and apply different definitions of a global middle class used in the literature. In line with the
baseline model I find a positive relationship between the average income of the middle class in
a host country and its FDI position held by OECD countries.
2 Innovation and Trade in an Unequal
Global Economy
2.1 Introduction
We observe vast differences in per capita incomes across countries and regions in the world.
For example in 2009, GDP per capita in the United States was about six times as high as GDP
per capita in China. In 2009, even average GDP per capita across all OECD countries was
about three times as high as average GDP per capita across all non-OECD countries (PWT 7.0,
PPP, 2005 USD). Instead of analyzing the sources of theses differences in per capita incomes
across countries, this chapter looks at the other side of the same coin, by providing a theoretical
framework that allows us to study the consequences of differences in per capita incomes across
countries or regions for the patterns of international trade and the incentives to innovate in the
world economy.
To this end, we extend Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b) seminal analysis of trade and
growth in a global economy by addressing the effects of income inequality across countries on
international trade and innovation. Our contribution to the literature is to introduce non-
homothetic preferences in Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b) general-equilibrium model of hori-
zontal endogenous innovation and costly international trade between two countries. This allows
us to study the channels through which the structure of the demand side affects the incentives
to innovate in an international economy, and at the same time, determines the patterns of
trade between countries. In the standard model with homothetic preferences inequality in per
capita incomes across countries has no effect on the incentives to innovate or the patterns of
international trade. The reason is that with homothetic preferences only total lifetime income
in the world economy matters for innovation and trade but not its distribution across countries.
However, with non-homothetic preferences the distribution of income across countries has im-
portant implications for the incentives to innovate and the patterns of international trade. We
show that in the presence of transportation costs, arbitrage opportunities emerge if the level
of inequality across countries is relatively high. This threat of parallel imports induces some
firms located in the rich country, i.e the country with the relatively high per capita income,
to forgo a larger market (market size effect) in order to be able to charge higher prices (price
effect). Since households in the poor country cannot afford to consume all goods produced
in the rich country less resources have to be allocated to the production sector to satisfy the
needs of households in the poor country. Hence, more resources can be allocated to the re-
search and development sector of the economy, which allows the (world) economy to grow at
a higher rate. An equivalent argument is that when incomes are concentrated in one country,
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firms can charge high markups, and therefore the incentives to innovate are high. In contrast
to the standard model, where markups are determined by the exogenously given elasticity of
substitution between goods, markups are endogenously determined by the willingness to pay
of households, and hence by the distribution of income. Furthermore, unlike in the standard
model firms cannot pass on trade costs so that markups on products sold abroad are lower
than on products sold at home. In sum, at high levels of inequality not all goods produced are
traded internationally, which is reminiscent of the Burenstam-Linder (1961) hypothesis, while
at the same time, incentives to innovate are high.
The introduction of non-homothetic preferences naturally raises a number of interesting
issues. For example, we can use our framework to discuss the design of intellectual property
rights across countries. In particular, we argue that households in the poor country might
not see eye to eye with households in the rich country on whether there should be national
or international exhaustion of patents. We show that under a policy of national exhaustion
compared to one of international exhaustion households in the rich country incur only losses
since their consumption grows at a lower rate relative to a policy of international exhaustion,
whereas households in the poor country incur an additional static gain since they can consume a
larger share of products. Whether the households in the two countries agree or disagree about
patent policy depends crucially on how poor households weigh current gains against future
losses.
Furthermore, we can analyze the consequences of a trade liberalization on trade patterns,
the incentives to innovate, and relative welfare levels. We contend that a trade liberalization
might increase the incentives to innovate, decrease trade at the extensive margin, and make
households in the poor country worse off relative to households in the rich country. If trade costs
fall from a level that sustains an equilibrium where all goods are traded to one that sustains an
equilibrium where only a subset of all goods are traded, some firms in the rich country start to
exclude households from the poor country due to the threat of parallel imports. This implies
that resources are released from the production sector, which have previously been used to
satisfy the consumption needs of households in the poor country, that can now be allocated
to the research sector. Hence, the world economy grows at a higher rate but at the same
time the extensive margin of trade falls. One can then show that poor households become
unambiguously worse off relative to rich households.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) initiated a vast literature that studies the incentives to
innovate in a global economy in general-equilibrium models with homothetic preferences. The
literature that looks at the relationship between income inequality and growth, and in particular
at the channels through which income inequality affects economic growth is much smaller. In
particular, it focuses on credit market imperfections (e.g. Galor and Zeira 1993) or political
economy mechanisms (e.g. Persson and Tabellini 1994; Alesina and Rodrik 1994) but largely
neglects demand-side effects. There are relatively few models that do consider demand-side
effects, and they can be broadly divided into two categories. On the one hand, there are
static models of international trade and non-homothetic preferences as in Foellmi et al. (2011),
Markusen (2010), Matsuyama (2000) or Mitra and Trindade (2005) that focus on the effects of
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the demand side on trade patterns. On the other hand, there are dynamic models that analyze
how the demand side shapes the incentives to innovate in closed economies like Foellmi and
Zweimüller (2006).
This model combines the static open economy setup from Foellmi et al. (2011) with the
dynamic structure of Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006). In particular, the model nests the two
models, i.e. it collapses to Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) with no consumption hierarchy in
the case of no trade costs and integrated factor markets, and to Foellmi et al. (2011) in the case
where the time horizon becomes arbitrarily small. This allows us to create a framework where
the distribution of income across countries affects trade patterns and the incentives to innovate
simultaneously. Hence, we can study the interdependence of trade and innovation in a global
economy and compare our results to Grossman and Helpman (1991b) where the distribution
of income across countries is irrelevant due to the assumption of homothetic preferences.
We proceed in our analysis as follows. We start in Section 2.2 by examining the closed
economy with a focus on the difference between non-homothetic and standard CES preferences.
Section 2.3 turns to the open economy and studies in detail the different equilibria as well as
the conditions under which they emerge. We analyze the effects of changes in income inequality
across countries on the incentives to innovate, and the patterns of international trade in Section
2.4. To illustrate the transitional dynamics, we look at the example of a labor productivity
surge in research and development in the poor country, which could be the result of a market or
education reform. Section 2.5 compares the model to Grossman and Helpman (1991b) in some
detail. We then turn to applications and extensions in Section 2.6, and analyze how the design
of intellectual property rights, trade policy, and the form of international knowledge spillovers
affects trade patterns and the innovation incentives. In the case of trade policy we also study
the welfare consequences of a trade liberalization. Last, we analyze how general our results are
with respect to the assumptions about preferences in the baseline model. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Closed Economy
In this section we first discuss in detail the closed economy equilibrium with a representative
household to gain intuition for the impact of preferences on innovation before turning to the
open economy case.
2.2.1 Distribution and Endowments
There is a total of L identical households in the economy, which trivially allows for a repre-
sentative household. Suppose that each household inelastically supplies θ efficiency units of
labor in the labor market, and holds assets a(t) (i.e. shares in firm’s profits). Hence, per capita
income in period t is given by y(t) = w(t)θ + r(t)a(t), where w(t) denotes the wage rate per
efficiency unit, and r(t) the return on assets (i.e. interest rate).
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2.2.2 Households
Preferences
The household’s utility function is defined over a continuum of differentiated and indivisible
goods j ∈ [0,∞). At any point in time only a finite subset N(t) is available in the market. All
households have the same non-homothetic instantaneous utility function given by
u
(
{c(j, t)}∞j=0
)
=
∫ ∞
j=0
v (c (j, t)) dj (2.1)
where baseline utility v (c (j, t)) is an indicator function c (j, t) ∈ {0, 1}, and we normalize
v(0) = 0 and v(1) = 1. This utility function satisfies the standard properties of positive and
non-increasing marginal utility since utility from consuming the first unit is one but utility
from consuming a second unit is zero, i.e. households are (locally) satiated. The marginal
utility from consuming an infinitesimal (in this case, zero) amount of any good j is finite, i.e.
limc(j,t)→0 u′ (·) = 1 <∞. Hence, non-negativity constraints c (j, t) ≥ 0 might become binding
for some j’s. Consequently, wealthy households will consume a different consumption bundle
than poor households. For example, suppose that at some point in time the available set of
indivisible goods consists of the following durables, a car, a washing machine, and a television
set. In that case, aﬄuent households can afford to purchase all durables whereas poor house-
holds might only afford to buy a television. Put differently, households can only choose how
many different goods they consume (extensive margin) but not how much of each good they
consume (intensive margin). In this sense, zero-one preferences are the antipode of, and no
less general than, constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences, where households can
only choose consumption along the intensive margin. In Section 2.6.5 we discuss quadratic
preferences where households have a choice along the intensive and extensive margin of con-
sumption. Last, note that all goods enter the utility function (2.1) symmetrically, i.e. there is
no consumption hierarchy. A consumption hierarchy could be incorporated in the utility func-
tion by introducing a weighting function ξ(j), which is decreasing in the index j (see Foellmi
and Zweimüller, 2006). This would imply that the marginal utility from consuming good j
is higher than from consuming good k, where j < k. Hence, households would first purchase
low-indexed goods and as their incomes grow move on to higher-indexed goods. This would
make the analysis substantially more complex without adding much insight to how inequality
across countries affects trade and growth. However, it would allow us to make a statement
about which country specializes in high-, respectively, low-indexed goods.
Household Problem
We assume that a household has a logarithmic intertemporal utility function given by
U(0) =
∫ ∞
t=0
exp(−ρt) log u
(
{c(j, t)}∞j=0
)
dt (2.2)
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where u(·) is given by (2.1), and ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate.1 The household
maximizes (2.2) subject to non-negativity constraints c(j, t) ≥ 0, ∀j, t, and its intertemporal
budget constraint ∫ ∞
t=0
exp (R(t)) e(t)dt ≤ a(0) +
∫ ∞
t=0
exp (R(t))w(t)θdt (2.3)
where p(j, t) denotes the price of good j at time t, a(0) initial wealth of the household, R(t) =∫ t
s=0 r(s)ds the cumulative interest rate, and e(t) =
∫∞
0 p(j, t)c(j, t)dj consumption expendi-
tures. We imposed a no-Ponzi game condition of the following form limt→∞ exp (R(t)) a(t) ≥ 0
on the intertemporal budget constraint. The first-order conditions (including complementary
slackness conditions) to the household’s optimization problem are given by
e−ρt
u′(·)
u(·) − Λ exp (R(t)) p(j, t) + µ(j, t) = 0 (2.4)
µ(j, t)c(j, t) = 0, µ(j, t) ≥ 0, c(j, t) ≥ 0 (2.5)∫ ∞
t=0
exp (R(t)) e(t)dt = a(0) +
∫ ∞
t=0
exp (R(t))w(t)θdt (2.6)
lim
t→∞ exp (R(t))λ(t)a(t) = 0 (2.7)
where Λ denotes the (present value) Lagrange multiplier on the intertemporal budget constraint,
and µ(j, t) the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraints. Note that the current
value Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint is given by λ(t) = Λ exp (−R(t) + ρt). Due
to the transversality condition the intertemporal budget constraint will always be binding in
optimum, i.e. preferences exhibit global non-satiation. We distinguish the following cases:
(i) Non-negativity constraint is binding, i.e. c(j, t) = 0. This implies by (2.5) that µ(j, t) ≥ 0.
Hence, the first-order condition (2.4) can be written as follows
exp(−ρt)u
′(·)
u(·) ≤ Λ exp (−R(t)) p(j, t) (2.8)
where the left-hand side denotes the marginal utility gain from consuming good j and
the right-hand side denotes the marginal utility cost from consuming good j.
(ii) Non-negativity constraint is not binding, i.e. c(j, t) > 0. This implies by (2.5) that
µ(j, t) = 0. Therefore, the first-order condition (2.4) can be written as follows
exp(−ρt)u
′(·)
u(·) = Λ exp (−R(t)) p(j, t). (2.9)
1Notice that logarithmic preferences are the special case of constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) prefer-
ences of the following form u(·)1−σ/(1 − σ), where σ denoting the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution goes to 1. Since the focus of our analysis lies on the consequences of inequality across countries on
intra-temporal instead of inter-temporal consumption decisions we choose analytical convenience over generality
and let σ → 1.
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From equations (2.8) and (2.9) we can derive the household’s Marshallian demand function for
good j as
c (j, t) =
0, p(j, t) > z(j, t)1, p(j, t) ≤ z(j, t) (2.10)
where z(j, t) ≡ [u(·)Λ exp (−R(t) + ρt)]−1 denotes the household’s willingness to pay for some
good j. Intuitively, households compare the marginal utility gain of consuming 1 unit of good
j, i.e. exp(−ρt)u′(·)/u(·), with its associated marginal utility cost, i.e. Λ exp (−R(t)) p(j, t). If
the marginal utility gain exceeds or is equal to the marginal utility cost households purchase
1 unit of good j, otherwise they don’t. In equilibrium u(·)−1 = N(t)−1 will hold, where N(t)
denotes the number (measure) of differentiated goods of which the household consumes one
unit each. We see that the willingness to pay depends negatively on the Lagrange multiplier Λ,
which can be interpreted as the marginal utility of lifetime wealth. The wealthier a household,
the lower its marginal utility of wealth Λ, and therefore, holding everything else constant,
the higher its willingness to pay z(j, t). In other words, if a household becomes wealthier its
willingness to pay for a given good will increase if it cannot expand its consumption to new
goods, i.e. increase N(t). This is the case because households have no choice about how much
they want to consume of each good (intensive margin). Furthermore, the more different goods
a household consumes, i.e. the higher N(t), the lower its (marginal) willingness to pay for a
given good j, ceteris paribus.
Summing over individual household demands (2.10) yields aggregate or market demand for
good j
C(p(j, t)) =
0, p(j, t) > z(j, t)L, p(j, t) ≤ z(j, t). (2.11)
The step function in Figure 2.1 below depicts aggregate demand for good j. From Figure 2.1 we
can derive the price elasticity of aggregate demand ε ≡ −C ′(p(j, t))p(j, t)/C(p(j, t)) as follows.
On the one hand, if firm j increases its price p(j, t) to a price above z(j, t) its demand drops to
zero, implying that aggregate demand is infinitely price elastic for p(j, t) > z(j, t), i.e. the price
elasticity ε → ∞. On the other hand, if firm j increases its price to any price below or equal
to z(j, t) its demand remains unchanged. Hence, aggregate demand is perfectly inelastic for
p(j, t) < z(j, t), i.e. the price elasticity ε → 0. In other words, for price changes below z(j, t)
households always consume 1 unit of good j regardless of its price, which is an implication of
local satiation in households’ preferences.
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Figure 2.1: Aggregate demand for good j in period t
2.2.3 Firms
Technology
Firms have access to the following technology. A firm must hire F (t) = F/N (t) units of
labor in the labor market up-front to do research and development (R&D) for a new product,
where F > 0 is a positive constant. Each firm will develop and produce only one unique
good. Firms raise the necessary capital to finance their R&D projects by issuing shares in the
capital market. Remember that N (t) denotes the stock of products, or knowledge imbedded
in these products, which have been developed in the economy up to time t. This implies that
there are intertemporal knowledge spillovers. As in Romer (1990) ideas are non-excludable
and non-rival. In other words, the more products have been developed in the past the more
productive is labor in the research lab ("standing on the shoulders of giants"). Once a new
product has been developed the production of 1 unit of output requires b (t) = b/N (t) units
of labor to produce, with b > 0. We assume that intertemporal spillovers carry over to the
production sector. Finally, new products are protected by patents which grant the innovating
firms perpetual monopolies.
Firm Problem
Firm j maximizes operating profits
pi(j, t) = [p(j, t)− w(t)b(t)]C(p(j, t)) (2.12)
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subject to its aggregate demand C(p(j, t)) given by (2.11). The first-order condition is given
by
p(j, t)− w(t)b(t)
p(j, t)
=
1
ε
(2.13)
where the left-hand side denotes the Lerner index, and the right-hand side denotes the inverse
of the price elasticity of aggregate demand. It follows that the markup, i.e. the ratio of price
p(j, t) to marginal cost w(t)b(t), is determined byM≡ (1− 1ε)−1. We make two observations.
First, the monopolist always operates in a price region where the price elasticity of aggregate
demand ε exceeds 1. In the region where the elasticity is less than 1, the monopolist’s revenue
and his profits are increasing in price and decreasing in quantity (see e.g. Tirole 1988). Second,
the markupM is decreasing in the price elasticity of aggregate demand ε.
From the first-order condition (2.13) of firm j we can derive the optimal price as follows.
Suppose firm j sets a price p(j, t) larger than z(j, t). In that case, aggregate demand for good
j becomes zero, i.e. the price elasticity of aggregate demand ε goes to infinity. Thus, the
markupM converges to 1, and firm j does not earn any (economic) profits needed to recoup
the fixed cost w(t)F (t), paid up-front for product development. Hence, firm j would never
increase its price above the willingness to pay z(j, t) and run losses. Consider the case where
firm j sets a price p(j, t) below z(j, t). In that price region the monopolist does not operate
because aggregate demand is perfectly inelastic, i.e. the price elasticity ε is zero. Thus, the
highest price firm j can set is equal to the willingness to pay z(j, t). This is the price at which
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. We conclude that the profit-maximizing price for firm
j is given by
p (j, t) = z (j, t) . (2.14)
With CES preferences the markupM is exogenously determined by the elasticity of substitution
between goods whereas in the case of zero-one preferences the markup is endogenously given
by M = z(j, t)/w(t)b(t). Given marginal cost, the markup increases if the willingness to pay
of households increases. This implies that the higher the willingness to pay, the lower the price
elasticity of demand, ceteris paribus.
2.2.4 Equilibrium
Goods Market
In equilibrium, a finite set N(t) of differentiated goods is available on the market. From optimal
prices (2.14) follow optimal quantities in equilibrium. Since all firms face the same demand
curve (2.1) and have the same cost structure, they all charge the same price p(t) = z(t) equal
to the willingness to pay of households, and supply the same quantity given by
C(t) = L, ∀t. (2.15)
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From the first-order condition (2.9) follows that optimal consumption expenditures grow at the
following rate
e˙(t)
e(t)
= r(t)− ρ (2.16)
where u′(·)/u(·) = 1/N(t) since c(t) = 1 for all j’s consumed in equilibrium. The Euler
equation says that nominal consumption expenditures of the household e(t) = z(t)N(t)c(t),
where c(t) = 1, grows at a positive rate if the marginal utility gain from postponing consumption
r(t) outweighs its marginal utility cost ρ. Notice that the intensive margin of consumption is
constant over time, i.e. c(t) = 1 for all t.
Labor Market
The labor market clears in every period. Because labor is mobile across sectors, i.e. all house-
holds can work in the production or the R&D sector, there is one wage rate at which the labor
market clears. In other words, the following arbitrage argument applies. If the wage rate in the
production sector is higher than in the R&D sector all workers flock to the production sector,
and vice versa. This rises the marginal product of labor in the R&D sector. Hence, wages in
the R&D sector increase such that workers move back. The movement of workers across sectors
goes on until wages are equalized across sectors. Hence, the wage rate is determined by relative
labor demand from the production to the R&D sector. Labor market clearing is determined by
Lθ = N˙(t)F (t) +
∫ N(t)
j=0
b(t)X(j, t)dj = g(t)F + bL
Lθ = g(t)F + bL (2.17)
where g(t) = N˙(t)/N(t). The left-hand side of (2.17) denotes exogenous aggregate labor
supply, and the right-hand side aggregate labor demand from the R&D and production sector.
Labor demand from the production sector is determined only by technology parameter b and
population size L due to the constant intensive margin of consumption, i.e. c(j, t) = 1 for all
j, t. In particular, this implies that equilibrium labor demand from the production sector is
independent of prices p(t), and hence the willingness to pay z(t).
We see that the economy faces the following fundamental trade-off between consumption
today and tomorrow. Higher consumption today requires a larger share of labor allocated to
the production sector in the economy. However, this implies that a lower share of labor can
be allocated to the research sector and therefore less new products are developed. Hence,
consumption tomorrow is lower.
Capital Market
We assume perfect capital markets. On perfect capital markets, the present discounted value
of profits equals the stock market value of the firm. Since all firms make identical profits the
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present discounted value of profits is determined by
v(t) =
∫ ∞
τ=t
exp (−R(τ))pi(τ)dτ (2.18)
where equilibrium profits in period t are determined by pi(t) = [z(t)− w(t)b(t)]L. Differenti-
ating (2.18) with respect to time t yields the familiar arbitrage condition
pi(t) + v˙(t) = r(t)v(t) (2.19)
which says that the return on an investment of size v(t) in any firm, i.e. the dividend pi(t) paid
plus capital gains/losses v˙(t), must equal the return on an investment of size v(t) in risk-less
bonds. We assume that there is free entry into product development. There is firm-entry as
long as the value of a firm v(t) is equal to or exceeds the fixed cost of product development
w(t)F (t). Hence, in an equilibrium with positive growth free entry implies the following zero-
profit condition
v(t) = w(t)F (t). (2.20)
Capital market clearing requires that savings equal investment, i.e. aggregate asset holdings
A(t) = La (t) must equal the stock market value of firms
∫ N(t)
j=0 v (t) dj = N(t)v(t). The interest
rate r(t) adjusts such that the capital market clears in every period t.
2.2.5 Steady State
We consider a steady state in which all variables grow at the same constant rate g > 0. Hence,
prices, quantities, profits, the interest rate, and the shares of labor allocated to production and
R&D are constant in the steady state.
Equations (2.15)-(2.20) completely characterize the steady state. We choose the marginal
cost of production as the numeraire w(t)b(t) = 1. The equations can be reduced to the labor
market clearing condition and the zero-profit condition in the endogenous variables g and z:
Lθ = gF + bL (2.21)
(z − 1)L
g + ρ
=
F
b
. (2.22)
Remember that because the intensive margin of consumption is constant the share of labor
allocated to the production sector is determined entirely by technology and population size in
equilibrium, and the residual share of labor is allocated to R&D. Hence, the solution for the
growth rate of the economy g is pinned down by the labor market clearing condition
g =
1
F/bL
(
θ
b
− 1
)
> 0 ⇔ θ > b. (2.23)
In other words, the growth rate g is determined such that labor demand and labor supply
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equalize, i.e. the labor market clears. It follows that equilibrium prices z = (Lθ + Fρ)/bL and
markups adjust such that the zero-profit condition holds, i.e. are consistent with free entry
into product development.
2.2.6 Discussion
In this discussion we focus on the consequences of endogenous markups in our model. This
highlights the difference to the standard model of Grossman and Helpman (1991b) with CES
preferences where markups are exogenously determined.
We start by observing that the growth rate is independent of the preference parameter ρ.
In the steady state, an increase in ρ has too opposing effects on the growth rate g, which cancel
each other. On the one hand, an increase in ρ leads to an increase in the interest rate r. This
tends to decrease the growth rate g through its negative effect on the present discounted value
of profits. On the other hand, an increase in ρ leads to an increase in markups and prices
z, which tends to increase profits and therefore the growth rate g. In the steady state, these
two effects offset each other. To understand the intuition behind this result consider a ceteris
paribus increase in the time preference rate ρ, i.e. households become more impatient. In other
words, households prefer even more to consume today instead of tomorrow. As in standard
models of endogenous growth, if households are less willing to save the interest rate r needed
to equate savings with investments must increase. In the model with CES preferences where
markups are exogenously determined by the elasticity of substitution between goods, a change
in ρ leaves markups and prices unchanged. The increase in r then leads to a lower present
discounted value of profits, and hence a lower incentive to innovate. However, in this model,
markups are endogenously determined by the willingness to pay of households. If households
become more impatient their willingness to pay for goods today relative to tomorrow increases
such that markups and prices rise. This effect exactly offsets the effect through the interest
rate.
2.3 Open Economy
In this section, we turn to the case of the open economy. Suppose that there are two countries
or regions indexed by i = {R,P}. We allow goods to be traded across countries at iceberg
trade costs τ ≥ 1. This implies that to ensure one unit of a good arrives at its destination,
τ ≥ 1 units of that good have to be shipped.
2.3.1 Distribution and Endowments
There is a total of L households in the two countries. A fraction β of the total population
lives in country P whereas the rest 1 − β lives in country R. Each household in country i
inelastically supplies θi efficiency units of labor in their domestic labor market. In particular,
we assume that labor is immobile across countries but is mobile across sectors within a country.
We further assume that each household holds only domestic assets, i.e. there is a perfect home
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bias in their portfolios. Hence, inequality in the endogenously determined personal income
distribution across countries originates from differences in labor and capital incomes across
countries. We will assume that households in country R are wealthier than households in
country P . Therefore, we sometimes refer to country R as the rich, and country P as the poor
country.
There exists an institution which levies a lump-sum tax TR(t) > 0 in the rich country in each
period and redistributes the tax revenues as lump-sum benefits TP (t) > 0 to households in the
poor country. We impose that the institution runs a balanced budget in each period, i.e. total
tax revenues (1−β)LTR(t) equal total tax spending βLTP (t). Hence, we can choose the level of
TP (t) = T (t) as our exogenous variable, which implies that TR(t) = βT (t)/(1−β). We assume
that over time transfers grow at the same constant rate g as incomes, i.e. T (t) = T (0)egt.
This assumption is necessary to generate a steady state in which the distribution of income
across countries is stationary. Changes in lump-sum transfers will allow us to study ceteris
paribus changes in inequality across countries, i.e. without changing relative country sizes,
labor endowments or technology at the same time. We measure income inequality across
countries in the steady state according to the Gini coefficient.
2.3.2 Households
All households maximize intertemporal utility (2.2), where instantaneous utility u(·) is given
by (2.1), subject to their intertemporal budget constraint (2.3) and non-negativity constraints
ci(j, t) ≥ 0. All households have the same preferences regardless of their country of residence.
The resulting market demand for good j is given by
X(p(j, t)) =

0, p(j, t) > zR(j, t)
(1− β)L, zP (j, t) < p(j, t) ≤ zR(j, t)
L, p(j, t) ≤ zP (j, t)
(2.24)
where zi(j, t) denotes the willingness to pay of households in country i for good j. Note that
because households in country R are wealthier than households in country P their marginal
utility of wealth λR(t) is lower. This implies that they have a higher willingness to pay for
good j, i.e. zR(j, t) > zP (j, t), holding the set of goods consumed Ni(t) constant. Furthermore,
wealthy households have a relatively low price elasticity of demand. Figure 2.2 shows market
demand (2.24) for good j.
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Figure 2.2: Aggregate demand for good j in period t
2.3.3 Firms
Technology
Firms located in country i have access to the following technology, which we allow to differ
across countries. A firm must hire F i (t) = F i/N (t) units of labor in the domestic labor market
up-front to do research and development (R&D) for a new product. Each firm will develop and
produce only one unique good. Firms raise the necessary capital to finance their R&D projects
by issuing shares in their domestic capital market. Note thatN (t) denotes the stock of products
which have been developed in the world economy up to time t, i.e. N(t) =
∑
iN
i(t). This
implies that there are international and intertemporal knowledge spillovers like in Grossman
and Helpman (1991b). Coe and Helpman (1995) find empirical evidence for the existence of
international R&D spillovers. Their estimates suggest that foreign R&D has beneficial effects
on domestic productivity, and that these effects are stronger the more open an economy is
to foreign trade. In Section 2.6.4 we relax this assumption, and look at the consequences of
imperfect international knowledge spillovers.2 Once a new product has been developed the
2As in Grossman and Helpman (1991b), trade, i.e. the integration of product markets, introduces competition
among innovators across countries. This implies that firms in both countries have an incentive to develop new
products that are unique in the world. Therefore, trade eliminates duplication of research and development
across countries. To see this, suppose that a firm in country i, with access to the technology described above,
develops a product that already exists in country k 6= i. Ex-post price competition between the entrant and
the incumbent would result in a limit price equal to the highest marginal cost, at that point the firm with the
relatively higher marginal cost drops out of the market. Hence, the monopoly profits a firm earns from capturing
an existing market, i.e. copying an existing product, are strictly lower than the monopoly profits from opening
up a new market, i.e. developing a novel product. In other words, the strategy of imitating an existing product
is always strictly dominated by the strategy to develop a novel product.
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production of 1 unit of output requires bi (t) = bi/N (t) units of domestic labor to produce.
New products are protected by internationally exhausted patents which grant the developing
firms a perpetual monopoly. Notice that internationally exhausted patents imply that parallel
imports are legal. In Section 2.6.1 we take a closer look at the design of international property
rights, and their effects on the incentives to innovate and trade patterns. Furthermore, we
abstract from foreign direct investment or licensing of technology to foreign firms.
Firm Problem
Firm j maximizes profits (2.12) subject to its aggregate demand (2.24) and subject to a price
setting restriction implied by the international exhaustion of patents, i.e. the threat of parallel
imports. The profit-maximizing behavior of firm j is stated in Proposition 2.1 below.
Proposition 2.1. In the case, where (i) the willingness to pay of households in the rich country,
zR(j, t) falls short of the willingness to pay of households in the poor country zP (j, t) times
trade costs τ , firms can perfectly price discriminate across countries. In the case, where (ii) the
willingness to pay in the rich country zR(j, t) exceeds or is equal to the one in the poor country
zP (j, t) times trade costs τ , the price-setting power of firms is limited.
Proof. Let us first prove case (ii) of the proposition. Suppose that zR(j, t) ≥ τzP (j, t) with
τ > 1. Firm j located in country R would like to choose prices in the rich and poor country
such that its profits
piR (j, t) =
[
pRR (j, t)− wR(t)bR(t)
]
(1− β)L+ [pRP (j, t)− τwR(t)bR(t)]βL (2.25)
are maximized, where wR(t) denotes the wage rate in the rich country, pRR(j, t) the price of
good j in the rich country, and pRP (j, t) the price in the poor country. The first term in
(2.25) denotes profits earned on the domestic market and the second term profits earned from
serving the foreign market. We assume pRP (j, t) ≥ τwR(t)bR(t). Otherwise, firm j in the rich
country would make a loss on each unit it exports to the poor country and would therefore
never export in the first place. Recall our discussion in Section 2.2.3 about optimal price
setting of monopolistic firms. In the export market firm j would like to set a price equal to
the willingness to pay of households in the poor country, and in the domestic market a price
equal to the willingness to pay of households in the rich country. Suppose, firm j would set
a price in the domestic market equal to zR(j, t) and in the export market equal to zP (j, t).
Since zR(j, t) ≥ τzP (j, t) arbitrageurs could make positive profits by buying good j on the grey
market in the poor country at low prices zP (j, t), and importing it back to the rich country
at cost τ , where they could sell it at a price marginally lower than zR(j, t). This threat forces
firm j to set a limit price equal to τzP (j, t) in the rich country if it doesn’t want to loose its
domestic demand to arbitrageurs. The same argument holds for firm j producing in the poor
country and exporting to the rich country. Hence, if zR(j, t) ≥ τzP (j, t) the firm’s price setting
power is limited by the threat of parallel imports, i.e. the price setting restriction imposed by
internationally exhausted patents becomes binding. The proof of part (i) is straightforward.
Chapter 2 19
If zR(j, t) < τzP (j, t), the arbitrage described above is not profitable, and therefore firms can
perfectly price discriminate across countries. Consider the special case of no trade cost, i.e.
τ = 1. Since zR(j, t) > zP (j, t) at any point in time, firm j engaged in international sales is
always restricted in its price setting power due to the threat of parallel imports. Hence, firm
j exporting its good is forced to set a limit price of zP (j, t) in the rich country, and case (i)
never occurs.
2.3.4 Equilibrium
Based on Proposition 2.1 we make the following proposition, which determines the structure of
the equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2. Proposition 2.1 implies that in case (ii) not all firms producing in the rich
country export to the poor country, and in case (i) all firms export in equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that in case (ii) all firms would sell in the rich country at prices τzP (t). Since
τzP (t) < zR(t) for all goods j this implies that households in the rich country would not
exhaust their budget constraints. Hence, their willingness to pay for an additional good would
be infinitely high. This would induce some firms producing in the rich country to sell their
goods exclusively in their domestic market. Since these firms don’t export they are not subject
to the threat from parallel imports, and can set prices equal to the willingness to pay of rich
households. In equilibrium, there exist two types of firms producing in the rich country, the
ones that export, and the ones that don’t, where both types of firms must earn the same profits.
Since firms manufacturing in the poor country have to incur transportation costs if they export,
it is never a dominant strategy for these firms to sell exclusively in the rich country. In case
(i), the price setting restriction does not bind and no firm has an incentive to sell exclusively
in the rich country, given exporting is profitable in the first place.
Let us refer to case (i) as a full -trade equilibrium, and case (ii) as a part-trade equilibrium.
In other words, if income inequality across countries is high for a given level of trade costs,
or trade costs are low for a given level of inequality, only part of all goods produced in the
rich country will be traded, and the economy is in a part-trade equilibrium. Note that the
equilibrium structure is identical to the static model in Foellmi et al. (2011). For a comparison
of the equilibrium structure to the standard model see Section 2.5 below.
Parallel Imports
The model suggests that parallel imports and price discrimination across countries on the
basis of differences in per capita incomes are important characteristics in the open economy.
First, both casual observation and anecdotal evidence suggest that parallel imports might
be important in reality. Maskus and Chen (2004) state that it is difficult to measure how
important parallel imports are since they are generally not recorded. However, according to
them, survey evidence suggests that they can capture a sizable share of markets for specific
products where parallel trade is allowed. Furthermore, there are numerous case studies which
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suggest that parallel imports are far from irrelevant in reality. For example, the consultancy
KPMG (2003, 2008), estimated the size of the IT grey market at about eight per cent of total
global IT sales. In the Economist (1998), among other examples, the car maker Honda claims
to have lost as much as a quarter of its British sales to parallel imports in 1998, and the British
supermarket chain Tesco has been enjoined from selling Levi’s jeans cheaper than authorized
sellers. Furthermore, Simonovska (2010) provides empirical evidence that per capita incomes
and prices of homogeneous tradable goods are positively related.
2.3.5 Full-trade Equilibrium
In this section, we discuss case (i) implied by Proposition 2.2. In a full-trade equilibrium,
all households in both countries consume all goods available on the world market. However,
households in the rich country pay higher prices for the same consumption bundle. In other
words, firms fully skim the higher willingness to pay of rich households.
Goods Markets
In equilibrium, a finite setN(t) = NP (t)+NR(t) of differentiated goods is available on the world
market, where N i(t) denotes the set of differentiated goods produced in country i. Proposition
2.2 implies that in a full-trade equilibrium all goods sold in country i command the same prices,
equal to the willingness to pay zi(t) of households in country i, regardless of where they are
produced. Hence, all firms supply the following quantities in equilibrium
C(t) = L, ∀t. (2.26)
From the first-order condition (2.9) follows the Euler equation for households in country i
e˙i(t)
ei(t)
= ri(t)− ρ (2.27)
where ei(t) = Ni(t)zi(t) denotes nominal consumption expenditures, Ni(t) the set of goods
consumed, and ri(t) the interest rate in country i. In equilibrium, we have Ni(t) = N(t) for all
households in both countries.
Labor Markets
Remember that labor is immobile across countries but mobile across production and R&D
sectors within countries. Labor market clearing in the rich country is determined by
(1− β)LθR = gR(t) [1−m (t)]FR + [1−m (t)] bR (1− β)L+ [1−m (t)] τbRβL (2.28)
where gR(t) ≡ N˙R(t)/NR(t), and m(t) ≡ NP (t)/N(t) such that 1 − m(t) = NR(t)/N(t)
denotes the production share of the poor and rich country, respectively. The left-hand side
denotes aggregate labor supply in the rich country, whereas on the right-hand side, the first
term denotes labor demand from the R&D sector, and the second and third term labor demand
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from the production sector supplying domestic and export markets. Similarly, in the poor
country, labor market clearing is given by
βLθP = g
P (t)m(t)FP +m(t)bPβL+m(t)τbP (1− β)L (2.29)
where gP (t) ≡ N˙P (t)/NP (t).
Capital Markets
We assume that capital is immobile across countries. Capital markets in each country are
perfect such that the present discounted value of profits vi(t) equals the stock market value of
domestic firms. Since all firms within country i have the same demand and cost functions they
all make identical profits pii(t). Free entry into product development in country i implies the
following zero-profit condition
vi(t) = w
i(t)F i(t). (2.30)
Capital market clearing in country i requires that domestic savings equal domestic investment,
i.e. aggregate asset holdings Ai(t) must equal the stock market value of firms N i(t)vi(t). The
interest rate ri(t) adjusts such that the capital market in country i clears in every period.
Balance of Payments
We assume that the balance of payments is balanced period by period. For details see Appendix
2.A.1. Since we assume that capital is immobile across countries, i.e. foreign ownership of
domestic assets is not allowed, the capital account, which keeps track of the net change in
national ownership of assets, is always balanced. Hence, the current account must also be
balanced in every period.3 In other words, we require that the sum of the balance of trade plus
net transfer payments is zero in every period. Hence, the balance of payments is given by
[
βLNR(t)zP (t)− (1− β)LNP (t)zR(t)
]− βLTP (t) = 0 (2.31)
where the first term in brackets on the left-hand side denotes the balance of trade and the
second term net transfer payments. If there is a progressive transfer TP (t) > 0 it must be that
the balance of trade is negative for the poor country, i.e. the value of its imports exceeds the
value of its exports. The poor country then runs a permanent trade deficit financed by transfers
from the rich country.
Steady State
We consider a steady state in which all variables in both countries grow at the common constant
rate g > 0. In each country prices, quantities, profits, the interest rate, and the share of labor
3The current account is the sum of the balance of trade, net factor payments and net transfer payments.
Since capital and labor are not mobile across countries net factor payments are zero.
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allocated to production and R&D are constant in the steady state. Interest rates equalize
across countries since incomes grow at the same rate in each country. Equations (2.26)-(2.31)
completely determine the full-trade steady state. We choose the marginal cost of production
for firms located in the poor country as the numeraire and set wP (t)bP (t) = 1 for all t. For
completeness all equations describing the steady state are stated in Appendix 2.A.1.
The steady state growth rate g and the production share of the poor country m are deter-
mined by the intersection of the labor market clearing conditions (2.28) and (2.29). We label
the labor market condition in the rich country RR-curve:
(1− β)LθR = g (1−m)FR + (1−m) bR (1− β)L+ (1−m) τbRβL.
The labor market condition in the poor country is labelled RP-curve:
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL+mτbP (1− β)L.
Figure 2.3 depicts the graphical solution of the steady state. To guarantee that a unique
equilibrium exists we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.1. − β(θP /b
P )
β+τ(1−β) <
(1−β)(θR/bR−1)−τβ
(1−β)+τβ .
Proposition 2.3. Given Assumption 2.1 holds, a unique steady state with a positive growth
rate g > 0 and production share of the poor country 0 < m < 1 exists.
Proof. The RP-curve is a decreasing convex function, and the RR-curve is an increasing concave
function in the (m, g)-space. If Assumption 2.1 holds, the y-axis intercepts are such that
RP (m)|g=0 > RR(m)|g=0.
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Figure 2.3: Steady state full-trade equilibrium
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2.3.6 Part-trade Equilibrium
This section discusses case (ii) implied by Proposition 2.2. Households in the rich country con-
sume all goods available on the world market whereas households in the poor country consume
only a subset of all goods available. Firms cannot perfectly price discriminate across countries
due to the imminent threat of parallel imports. Some firms located in the rich country don’t
export, i.e. they forgo a larger market in order to be able to charge higher prices (unconstrained
price-setting), whereas all firms located in the poor country export (constrained price-setting).
Note that we keep all the assumptions made in the full-trade equilibrium concerning the eco-
nomic environment.
Goods Markets
In equilibrium, a finite set N(t) = NR(t) + NP (t) of differentiated goods is available on the
market in the rich country whereas only a subset NP (t) < N(t) is available on the market in
the poor country.
Proposition 2.2 implies that in a part-trade equilibrium goods are priced as follows. All
goods sold in the poor country command the same prices equal to the willingness to pay of
households in the poor country zP (t). In the rich country, all goods that are not exported are
priced at the willingness to pay of households in the rich country zR(t), whereas all goods that
are sold in the rich and poor country, regardless of where they are produced, command prices
equal to trade costs times the willingness to pay of households in the poor country τzP (t).
Hence, all firms located in the rich country that don’t export supply the following quantities
in equilibrium
C(t) = (1− β)L, ∀t. (2.32)
All firms that engage in international trade, regardless of their location, supply the following
quantities in equilibrium
C(t) = L ∀t. (2.33)
From the first-order condition (2.9) follows the evolution of optimal consumption expenditures
ei(t) for households in country i
e˙i(t)
ei(t)
= ri(t)− ρ. (2.34)
Labor Markets
Labor market clearing in the part-trade equilibrium is determined as follows. In the rich
country, labor market clearing is given by
(1− β)LθR = gR(t) [1−m(t)]FR + [1−m(t)] bR(1− β)L+ [n(t)−m(t)] τbRβL (2.35)
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where n(t) ≡ NP (t)/N(t) denotes the consumption of a household in the poor relative to the
rich country. The share of exporting firms in the rich country is defined by q(t) ≡ NRM (t)/NR(t),
and can be written as q(t) = [n(t) −m(t)]/[1 −m(t)]. We can interpret q(t) as the extensive
margin of trade. Labor market clearing in the poor country is determined by
βLθP = g
P (t)m(t)FP +m(t)bPβL+m(t)τbP (1− β)L (2.36)
which is identical to the full-trade equilibrium.
Capital Markets
Proposition 2.2 implies that in a part-trade equilibrium firms located in the rich country must
be indifferent whether to export or not. In other words, profits of firms that export piR,M (t)
must equal profits of firms that don’t export piR,E(t). Due to free entry into R&D in country i
the present discounted value of profits vi(t) must equal R&D cost wi(t)F i(t). Capital market
clearing in country i requires that domestic savings equal domestic investment.
Balance of Payments
We require the balance of payments to balance period by period
[
βLNRM (t)zP (t)− (1− β)LNP (t)τzP (t)
]− βLTP = 0 (2.37)
where the term in brackets denotes the balance of trade and the second term net transfer
payments.
Steady State
We consider a steady state in which all variables in both countries grow at the same constant
rate g > 0. This implies that in each country prices, quantities, profits, the interest rate,
and the share of labor allocated to production and R&D are constant, as well as the share of
exporters in the rich country. Equations (2.32)-(2.37) characterize the steady state. We keep
the marginal cost of production for firms in the poor country as the numeraire. All equations
describing the steady state are stated in Appendix 2.A.2.
The steady state growth rate g and the production share of the poor country m are de-
termined by the intersection of the labor market clearing conditions (2.35) and (2.36). The
RR-curve is given by:
(1− β)LθR = g (1−m)FR + (1−m) bR(1− β)L+mτ2bR(1− β)L (2.38)
+
τbRβLT [β + τ(1− β)]
(g + ρ) (FP /bPL) + [β + τ(1− β)]
where we used the balance of payment condition and the zero-profit condition in the poor
country to solve for the share of exporting firms in the rich country q as a function of m and
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g. The RP-curve is identical to the full-trade equilibrium, and determined by:
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL+mτbP (1− β)L. (2.39)
Assumption 2.2. If the following assumptions hold, the RR-curve has a negative slope in the
(m,g)-space:
(
FPρ/bPL
)
+ [β + τ(1− β)] > (1− β) (τ2 − 1) , and 1 < θR/bR < τ2.
If the following assumption holds, the intercept of the RR-curve with the y-axis lies above the
intercept of the RP-curve with the y-axis in the (m,g)-space:
β
(
θP /b
P
)
[β + τ(1− β)] <
(
θR/b
R − 1)
(τ2 − 1) +
τbRβLT [β + τ(1− β)]
(FPρ/bPL) + [β + τ(1− β)] .
Proposition 2.4. Given Assumption 2.2 holds, a unique steady state with a positive growth
rate 0 < g < ξ, where ξ =
(
τ2 − 1) bR(1 − β)L/FR, and production share of the poor country
0 < m < 1 exists.
Proof. If Assumption 2.2 holds, the RP-curve is a decreasing, convex function, and the RR-
curve is a decreasing, concave function in the (m, g)-space, with y-axis intercepts RR(m)|g=0 >
RP (m)|g=0.
The graphical solution of the steady state is shown in Figure 2.4. The analytical study of
the steady state is algebraically complex, so that in the following we will study the properties
of the full- and part-trade steady state by simulating the model and looking at small changes
in parameters.
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Figure 2.4: Steady state part-trade equilibrium
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2.4 Comparative Statics and Transitional Dynamics
In this section we discuss how changes in the distribution of income across countries, and a
market or education reform in the poor country that makes labor in the domestic research
sector more productive affects the trade patterns and the incentives to innovate. We use the
example of a market reform to discuss how the global economy adjusts to a new steady state
after a change in the poor country’s labor productivity in the research sector occurred.
2.4.1 Change in Income Inequality across Countries
This section discusses the consequences of a change in global, i.e. between-country, inequality
for the incentives to innovate and the patterns of international trade. We start our analysis by
simulating a full-trade steady state and make regressive transfers, i.e. transfers from the poor
country to the rich country, until the economy is in a part-trade steady state. In Appendix
2.A.3 we specify the parameter values used in our simulation and show the simulation results
in Figures A.1-A.4. The results are summarized below. Note, that in this section we compare
steady states. We will turn to the transitional dynamics in the next section.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: An increase in inequality through a regressive
transfer has a positive effect on the growth rate g, and the terms of trade for the poor country,
a negative effect on the production share of the poor country m, the share of exporting firms
in the rich country q, and the consumption share of households in the poor country n, and has
no effect on the relative wage rate.
The intuition is the following. As long as the economy is still in a full-trade steady state
after the regressive transfer, i.e. zR < τzP holds, households in the poor country can still
afford to buy one unit of all goods available on the world market. Hence, the incentives to
innovate have not changed. In other words, the resource constraints are not affected since
there is no intensive margin of consumption. Relative prices zR/zP , i.e. the terms of trade,
increase but as long as zR/zP < τ holds no firm in the rich country has an incentive not to
export. However, if the economy switches to a part-trade steady state after the regressive
transfer, i.e. zR ≥ τzP holds, households in the poor country are too poor to afford all goods
available on the world market, and relative consumption n falls, ceteris paribus. Some firms
in the rich country have an incentive not to export to the poor country so that q decreases.
Hence, in the production sector of the rich country resources are set free that can be reallocated
to R&D in the rich country. Innovation incentives in the rich country increase. This implies
that more new products are being developed in the rich country than in the poor country such
that the production share of the poor country m declines. This absorbs additional resources in
the production sector of the rich country, which tends to decrease growth, while at the same
time, releases resources from the production sector to the R&D sector in the poor country,
which tends to increase growth. In our simulations, the positive effects on the growth rate g
dominate. Alternatively, one could argue as follows. An increase in inequality across countries,
ceteris paribus, increases the willingness to pay of households in the rich relative to the poor
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country. Hence, the price elasticity of demand of households in the rich country decreases so
that firms can charge higher markups on marginal costs and earn higher profits from selling to
them. At the same time, households in the poor country become more price sensitive so that
markups and profits earned from selling to them decrease. As long as the inequality does not
increase too much, and the economy remains in a full-trade steady state, these two effects offset
each other. Thus, profits and therefore the incentives to innovate are not affected. However,
if inequality increases sufficiently, the economy ends up in a part-trade steady state where
households in the poor country can no longer afford to buy all products available (n decreases).
In that case, firms that choose not to export can charge higher markups if inequality increases,
and therefore earn higher profits. Arbitrage in the rich country implies that profits for firms that
do export must increase as well so that firms pursuing either strategy earn the same profits in
equilibrium. Remember that the marginal willingness to pay of households in the poor country
increases, ceteris paribus, as they consume less differentiated products. Hence, the incentives to
innovate increase as inequality across countries increases. As inequality increases, less and less
firms in the rich country have an incentive to export (q falls), and due to a home market effect
makes relatively more firms locate in the rich country (m decreases). Note that markups on
domestically sold goods are higher than on exported goods since trade costs cannot be passed
on to consumers.
As inequality increases the terms of trade zR/zP move in favor of the poor country until
the economy is in a part-trade steady state when the terms of trade are pinned down by
trade costs τ > 1 because the price setting restriction zR > τzP is binding. The intuition is
straightforward. As households in the rich country become relatively richer they can pay higher
prices zR whereas households in the poor country become poorer and can pay lower prices zP .
Hence, firms located in the poor country get relatively higher prices for their export goods.
Remember that as long as the economy is in a full-trade steady state households in the rich
and poor country always buy the same consumption basket but households in the rich country
pay higher prices for that same basket as firms can fully skim their willingness to pay. Hence, a
regressive transfer increases (decreases) the willingness to pay of households in the rich (poor)
country and therefore increases (decreases) prices, holding the number of differentiated goods
purchased constant.
Since technologies and population sizes do not change because of a regressive transfer and
are still identical across countries, relative wages are always equalized regardless of whether the
economy is in a full- or part-trade steady state (see Appendix 2.A.1 and 2.A.2)
In sum, an increase in (lifetime) income inequality across countries leads to an increase in the
world growth rate g, and at the same time, to a decrease in the number of differentiated goods
that are traded between countries. In other words, the extensive margin of trade depends
negatively on inequality across countries. Among others, Bernasconi (2013) finds evidence
for the extensive (and intensive) margin of trade, i.e. the higher the overlap of the income
distributions of two countries, the more product categories (extensive margin) they trade with
each other. We are not aware of an empirical study that looks at the effect of cross-country
income inequality on (global) economic growth. The empirical studies we are aware of analyze
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the relationship between income inequality within countries and growth. The results from these
studies are inconclusive. Some, like Barro (2000), find a negative relationship between income
inequality within countries and growth for poor countries and a positive relationship for rich
countries. Others, like Perotti (1996), find a negative relationship.
2.4.2 Change in Technology
In this section, we discuss the effects of a decline in the labor requirement to create a new
product in the poor country FP . One could think of this case as a market reform, i.e. easier
access to product and/or financial markets, or an education reform in the poor country that
makes labor in the research and development sector relatively more productive. The results of
the numerical simulation are summarized below. The parameter values used in the simulation
and Figures A.4-A.6 that show the simulated effects of a decline in FP are given in Appendix
2.A.4.
We find the following: An increase in labor productivity in R&D in the poor country, i.e. a
decrease in FP , leads to an endogenous decrease in inequality across countries. At high levels of
FP , such that the economy is in a part-trade equilibrium, a reduction of FP leads to a decrease
in the growth rate g, whereas at low levels of FP , such that the economy is in a full-trade
equilibrium, a reduction of FP leads to an increase in g. The production share of the poor
country increases, whereas the relative wage rate and the terms of trade decrease as FP falls.
Two effects are driving these results. First, if labor is more productive in R&D in the poor
country the cost of innovation, ceteris paribus, falls so that the incentives to innovate increase.
Second, as labor in R&D becomes more productive in the poor country inequality across coun-
tries endogenously decreases. This has a negative effect on the incentives to innovate because
households in the poor country can afford to buy more products, which absorbs more resources
in the production sector of the rich country, ceteris paribus. In a part-trade equilibrium the
second effect outweighs the first effect so that an increase in the labor productivity in the R&D
sector of the poor country has a negative effect on the growth rate g. As long as the econ-
omy is in a full-trade equilibrium, only the first effect is present. Because households in the
poor country consume all goods available inequality has no effect on the incentives to innovate.
Hence, the increase in labor productivity 1/FP has a positive effect on the growth rate g.
Since the innovation cost decreases as FP falls, relatively more new products are developed
in the poor country so thatm increases, ceteris paribus. As FP falls and labor in the poor coun-
try becomes relatively more productive the relative wage rate wR(t)/wP (t) falls. Furthermore,
as households in the rich country become relatively less rich, i.e. inequality across countries
decreases, the terms of trade fall.
In sum, we get a "U-shape" relationship between labor productivity in R&D of the poor
country, which we can think of as a measure of market development in the poor country, and
the growth rate of the global economy.
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2.4.3 Transitional Dynamics
We illustrate transitional dynamics with the example of a change in technology in the poor
country discussed in the previous section. To this end, we discuss the transition for the case
of no transfer system, i.e. T (t) = 0 for all t. This is convenient since it allows us to solve
analytically and graphically for the transitional dynamics. In the full-trade equilibrium transi-
tional dynamics are governed by equations (2.26)-(2.31) and in the part-trade equilibrium by
equations (2.32)-(2.37). The labor market clearing conditions (2.28)-(2.29) for the full-trade
equilibrium and (2.35)-(2.36) together with the balance of payments (2.37) for the part-trade
equilibrium describe a system of autonomous and homogeneous linear first-order differential
equations we can write as follows
N˙R(t) = ΦRkN
R(t) + ΨRkN
P (t) (2.40)
N˙P (t) = ΦPk N
P (t) + ΨPk N
R(t) (2.41)
for k = {full, part}. The definition of the constants ΦRk , ΨRk , ΦPk and ΨPk , and the analytical
solution to this system are given in Appendix 2.A.5. Here, we analyze the transitional dynamics
in the phase diagram. In the steady state, the set of differentiated goods in both countries
grows at a constant common rate g > 0. For notational convenience we drop subscript k. From
equation (2.40) follows µ ≡ (g − ΦR) /ΨR > 0 where µ ≡ NP (t)/NR(t) > 0 in steady state.
Note that parameter values must be such that µ(t) > 0 for all t. Hence, we see that
N˙R(t)
NR(t)

> g, if µ(t) > µ
= g, if µ(t) = µ
< g, if µ(t) < µ.
Similarly, from equation (2.41) follows µ ≡ ΨP / (g − ΦP ) > 0. Therefore, we observe that
N˙P (t)
NP (t)

< g, if µ(t) > µ
= g, if µ(t) = µ
> g, if µ(t) < µ.
Obviously, the steady state growth rate g is determined by
(
g − ΦR) (g − ΦP ) = ΨRΨP . In
sum, if µ(t) < µ, the set of differentiated goods in the rich country NR(t) grows at a lower
rate than the steady state growth rate g while the set of differentiated goods in the poor
country NP (t) grows at a higher rate than g. Hence, the ratio µ(t) = NP (t)/NR(t) converges
monotonically to its steady state value µ, and vice versa, if µ(t) > µ. The balance of payments
condition in the full-trade steady state defines a critical level of µ˜ ≡ β/(1 − β)τ > 0, where
µ˜ satisfies zR/zP = β/(1 − β)µ˜ = τ . Hence, for µ(t) > µ˜ the dynamics of the economy are
governed by the dynamics in a full-trade equilibrium, and vice versa.
Now, we can illustrate the transitional dynamics with the help of the example discussed
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in Section 2.4.2. In Figure 2.5 we analyze the effect of an exogenous decrease in the labor
requirement to develop new products in the poor country FP , i.e. labor in the R&D sector
becomes more productive, which shocks the economy out of its part-trade steady state. We
assume that the new level of FP sustains a full-trade steady state with a higher ratio of firms
located in the poor to the rich country µ(t). During the transition from the part- to the full-trade
steady state the ratio µpart monotonically increases until it reaches µfull. As long as µ(t) ≤ µ˜ <
µfull the economy is in a part-trade equilibrium, and as µ˜ < µ(t) ≤ µfull the economy is in a
full-trade equilibrium. Hence, during the transition households in the poor country must invest
relatively more in the development of new products than households in the rich country, i.e.
aggregate consumption expenditures of households in the poor country EP (t) = βLeP (t) must
grow at a lower rate during the transition than consumption expenditures of households in the
rich country ER(t) = (1− β)LeR(t). In other words, relatively more resources are temporarily
invested in R&D in the poor relative to the rich country. Regardless of whether the economy
ends up in full- or part-trade steady state with a higher or lower (world) growth rate, a market
reform in the poor country triggers temporarily more investment in R&D in the poor country.
! !! ! !
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Figure 2.5: Phase diagram
2.5 Comparison to Standard Model
This section compares the baseline model to the standard model in Grossman and Helpman
(1991b). First, we argue that a part-trade equilibrium cannot emerge in the standard model
with CES preferences. Second, we replicate two experiments of Grossman and Helpman (1991b)
Chapter 2 31
regarding the diffusion of knowledge and product market integration in the context of a full-
trade equilibrium.
As Grossman and Helpman (1991b) we too find that the diffusion of knowledge across
countries unambiguously leads to a higher world growth rate compared to the closed economy.
In particular, the increase in the growth rate relative to closed economy is only due to the
diffusion of knowledge and not due to the integration of product markets. The integration
of product markets still leads to the elimination of any duplicity in research efforts across
countries. However, the integration of product markets compared to only the costless diffusion
of knowledge across countries without product market integration has different effects. The
reason is that unlike in the standard model firms cannot pass through trade costs in our model.
This implies that the growth rate in the case of pure knowledge diffusion is higher than in
the case of product market integration, whereas in the standard model there is no difference
between product market integration and costless knowledge diffusion due to constant markups.
2.5.1 Equilibrium Structure
We compare the equilibrium structure to the standard case of CES preferences. In the standard
model discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1991b) case (ii), a part-trade equilibrium, can
never occur. The reason is the following. In the case of CES preferences the marginal utility
from consuming an infinitesimal quantity of good j is infinitely high. Therefore, all households
will always consume all goods available even in the presence of finite trade costs τ . In other
words, the restriction in Proposition 2.1 that the price charged in the rich country cannot
exceed the price charged in the poor country times trade costs is never binding. We conclude
that the introduction of non-homothetic preferences of the zero-one form implies a different
equilibrium structure, where the degree of inequality across countries determines the incentives
to innovate and trade patterns, simultaneously.
2.5.2 Diffusion of Knowledge and Product Market Integration
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) study the question how international trade can act as an
engine of growth through the diffusion of knowledge across borders. They point out three
channels through which a country’s relationship with other countries may affect its incentives to
innovate. First, international exchange might include the exchange of technological knowledge.
Second, international competition induces firms in each country to develop new products that
are unique in both countries. Third, international integration might increase the market size
for firms. They notice that the integration of economies has two opposing effects, which cancel
each other in equilibrium. On the one hand, it increases profit opportunities by enlarging the
market size of every firm. On the other hand, it reduces profit opportunities by intensifying
competition. In the case of zero-one preferences there is also the effect that firms cannot pass
through trade costs to consumers. In the next two sections we replicate part of Grossman and
Helpman’s (1991b) analysis. We focus on the case of a full-trade equilibrium to be as close
as possible to the equilibrium structure in the standard model. Furthermore, we will assume
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symmetric technology across countries, i.e. FR = F b = F and bR = bP = b, and denote each
country’s population size by L. However, we still assume θR ≥ θP .
Diffusion of Knowledge
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) start their discussion with a look at the diffusion of knowledge
across two countries that might differ only with respect to their endowments with efficiency
units of labor. They consider opening up communication channels between countries, which
enables the costless transmission of knowledge, without integrating their product markets.
However, R&D that is common in both countries contributes only once to the total knowledge
stock. They focus on the special case of international diffusion where the knowledge stock in
both countries is given by NR(t) + ψNP (t), where ψ is the fraction of goods available in the
poor country that is not available in the rich country. In other words, new products developed
in the rich country are always unique whereas a fraction (1− ψ) of new products developed in
the poor country replicates goods that are already available in the rich country. In the steady
state, the labor market clearing conditions in the rich and poor country are then determined
by
LθR = g
R F
1 + ψN
P (t)
NR(t)
+ L
b
1 + ψN
P (t)
NR(t)
LθP = g
P F
NR(t)
NP (t)
+ ψ
+ L
b
NR(t)
NP (t)
+ ψ
.
The labor market conditions imply that both countries grow at the same rate gR = gP = g
because in the steady state the ratio NR(t)/NP (t) must be constant, and is determined by
θR/θP . Hence, the growth rate in both countries is given by
g =
1
F/bL
(
θR + ψθP
b
− 1
)
> 0 ⇔ θR + ψθP > b.
We conclude that the diffusion of knowledge across countries unambiguously leads to a higher
growth rate compared to the closed economy case where country i grows at the constant rate
gi = (θi/b− 1) /(F/bL). It is obvious that the smaller the overlap of research, i.e. the higher
ψ, the higher the growth rate g. This is identical to Grossman and Helpman (1991b).
Product Market Integration
In the open economy equilibrium with full-trade, the production share of each country is de-
termined by relative endowments with efficiency units of labor, i.e. m = θP / (θR + θP ), and
the growth rate is given by
g =
1
F/bL
(
θR + θP
b
− (1 + τ)
)
> 0 ⇔ θR + θP > (1 + τ) b.
Chapter 2 33
Remember that the integration of product markets leads to competition among innovators
across countries that eliminates the duplicity of new products. We observe that the growth
rate g in the full-trade equilibrium is lower than in the equilibrium with international knowledge
spillovers if there is no duplication of new products (i.e. ψ = 1). The reason is that in the case
of zero-one preferences firms cannot pass through trade costs to households. Thus, profits and
markups are lower in the case of product market integration compared to the case of costless
knowledge diffusion. This contrasts to the case with CES preferences where firms can fully pass
through trade costs. In contrast to Grossman and Helpman (1991b) there is the additional effect
of the trade cost pass-through, which dominates the offsetting effects of a larger market and
more intense competition.
However, the growth rate in the open economy is still larger than in the closed economy.
Integrating product markets leads to higher growth compared to the closed economy if and
only if θR ≥ θP > τb, in which case we have g > gR ≥ gP . The condition θP > τb must hold in
a trade equilibrium. A trade equilibrium exists, if and only if each firm’s profits from trading
exceed its profits from not trading. One can show that for a firm located in the rich country
profits under trade exceed those under autarky if and only if θP > τb. Since θR ≥ θP the
condition automatically holds for firms located in the poor country. Intuitively, the increase in
market size must, ceteris paribus, more than compensate for the decrease in profits per unit
sold brought about by the increase in marginal cost through trade cost, so that profits of each
firm and therefore innovation incentives increase.
2.6 Applications and Extensions
In this section we discuss applications in the form of policy changes and their welfare conse-
quences as well as extensions like alternate assumptions about knowledge spillovers and prefer-
ences. Instead of working out general cases we concentrate on some special cases that highlight
interesting points. All of the issues addressed in this section arise naturally through the intro-
duction of non-homothetic preferences.
2.6.1 Intellectual Property Rights Policy
We use our model to study how the design of intellectual property rights determines the in-
centives to innovate and trade patterns. So far, we have assumed that there is international
exhaustion of patents, in other words, parallel imports cannot be legally prevented. Now
suppose that policymakers in both countries simultaneously choose to introduce national ex-
haustion of patents so that parallel imports can be legally prevented.4 In that case the price
setting restriction is never binding regardless of the level of inequality across countries or trade
4Suppose that the rich country does not allow parallel imports but the poor country does. This implies that
the price setting restriction is never binding, and all firms located in the rich country always export. Consider
the opposite case where the rich country allows parallel imports but the poor country does not. In that case,
some firms in the rich country might have an incentive not to export. Note that in both cases, the policy of the
poor country does not affect the incentives to export of firms in the rich country.
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costs. Hence, the economy is always in a full-trade equilibrium. Since monopolistic firms can
fully price discriminate across countries it is never a dominant strategy for a firm located in
the rich country to sell exclusively on its domestic market as long as households in the poor
country are not too poor, i.e. zP ≥ τwRbR. This implies that more resources are absorbed
in production, relative to a part-trade equilibrium under international exhaustion, so that less
resources can be allocated to research and development. We conclude that national exhaustion
of patents would depress growth but would encourage international trade at the extensive mar-
gin. Households in the poor country suffer a dynamic loss as incomes grow at a lower g but
experience a static gain because they consume a larger share n of products, whereas households
in the rich country only suffer a dynamic loss. Since households in the rich country suffer only
losses they would almost surely favor international exhaustion of patents. Whether households
in the poor country favor international or national exhaustion depends on their time preference
rate, i.e. how much they discount future losses against current gains.
The design of property rights and its effects on the incentives to innovate have been a hot
topic for some time in the public (e.g. trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights
TRIPS) and academic debate. This is especially true for pharmaceutical products in the US
where prices of identical drugs differ substantially from those in Canada or Mexico. A recent
example from the academic literature is Grossman and Lai (2008) who find that the innova-
tion rate is faster in a world with international exhaustion of patents compared to national
exhaustion. In their model, parallel imports are induced by different national price controls, in
contrast to our model where the extent of income inequality across countries induces parallel
imports. Grossman and Lai (2008) argue that a switch from national to international exhaus-
tion of patents changes innovation incentives because the government follows different motives
in its price regulation with and without parallel imports.
2.6.2 Trade Policy
Our model can be applied to study the effects of trade liberalization in the form of a reduction
of tariffs induced for example by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Suppose
that such a policy liberalizing trade is put in place. We can interpret a decrease in trade costs
τ > 1 as a reduction in tariffs. Note that τ captures all possible barriers to trade in goods, e.g.
efficiency of the transportation sector, or non-tariff barriers to trade. Note that with zero-one
preferences trade costs are borne by firms whereas with CES preferences firms pass them on to
consumers. A decrease in trade costs increases profits and therefore the incentives to innovate,
ceteris paribus. If the fall in trade costs implies that the price setting restriction for firms
becomes binding the economy ends up in a part-trade steady state. We know that, ceteris
paribus, in a part-trade steady state the incentives to innovate are higher than in a full-trade
steady state. The equivalent argument is that a decrease in trade costs releases resources from
the production sector that can be allocated to research and development (in both countries).
If trade costs fall sufficiently the economy might end up in a part-trade equilibrium. The
intuition is that at low trade costs the price setting restriction may be binding for firms, for
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a given degree of inequality across countries. In that case, further resources are released from
the production sector since households in the poor country can no longer afford to consume
all goods produced in the rich country. Either way, the growth rate of the global economy
increases if trade costs fall. We conclude that trade liberalization has a positive effect on the
growth rate and might have a negative effect on the extensive margin of trade. Our results
are in line with the empirical evidence, which suggests a negative relationship between trade
restrictions and economic growth. A critical survey of the empirical literature can be found in
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001). In contrast, in the standard model with CES preferences trade
costs have no effect on the incentives to innovate because they are passed on to consumers (see
additionally Feenstra 2004).
2.6.3 Welfare
We focus our welfare analysis on the effect of a trade liberalization on relative welfare levels.
The advantage of that analysis is that we can shut down transfers, i.e. T (t) = 0 for all t, and
trace the transitional dynamics analytically. First, in equilibrium the difference in welfare levels
between households in the rich and the poor country, i.e. ∆V (0) ≡ VR(0)− VP (0), is given by
∆V (0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt log
(
NR(t)
NP (t)
)
dt.
Remember, in a full-trade equilibrium NR(t) = NP (t) = N(t) for all t, whereas in a part trade
equilibrium NP (t) < NR(t) for all t. In order to analyze the effect of a change in trade policy
on welfare consider a decrease of τ , as discussed in Section 2.6.2, from a level that sustains a
full-trade equilibrium to one that sustains a part-trade equilibrium. First, note that there is a
critical µ˜ > 0, where (1−β)µ˜/β ≡ τcrit and τcrit ≡ zR/zP , at which point the economy switches
from a full- to a part-trade equilibrium. First, in a steady state with high trade costs τ we have
a relatively high µ > µ˜ whereas in a steady state with low trade costs µ < µ˜ is also low. In a
part-trade equilibrium relatively more firms enter in the rich than in the poor country because
in the rich country resources are released from the production sector that can be allocated to
the research sector due to the fact that households in the poor country can no longer afford to
purchase all products produced in the rich country. Hence, during the transition µ(t) falls from
a level above µ˜ to one below. As long as µ(t) > µ˜, the economy is in a full-trade equilibrium,
and ∆V (0) is equal to zero since NR(t) = NP (t). Eventually, as µ(t) < µ˜ the economy switches
to a part-trade equilibrium, and the difference in welfare can be written as (using the balance
of payments condition in the part-trade equilibrium)
∆V (0) =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt logB
(
1 +
1
µ(t)
)
dt > 0
where B ≡ β/[β + τ(1− β)]. We know that µ(t) falls until it has reached its new steady state
value µ < µ˜. This implies that ∆V (0) becomes positive as the economy switches from a full-
to a part-trade equilibrium, increases during the transition until the economy has reached the
36 Innovation and Trade
new steady state, and stays constant at a positive value from then on. Hence, we conclude
that households in the poor country unambiguously loose relative to households in the rich
country from a trade liberalization in the form of a decrease in trade costs τ . Intuitively,
households across countries share a common growth rate in and out of the steady state of their
corresponding consumption sets regardless of whether the economy is in a full- or part-trade
equilibrium, and differ only with respect to the sizes of their consumption sets Ni if the economy
is in a part-trade equilibrium.5 Therefore, households in the poor country only experience a
relative loss in the sense that the set of goods they consume NP (t) falls relative to the set of
goods consumed by households in the rich country NR(t) as the economy moves from a full-
to a part-trade equilibrium. In sum, households in the poor country might be opposed to
a trade liberalization if trade costs decrease so much that firms can no longer perfectly price
discriminate across countries and some firms in the rich country decide to no longer serve them.
2.6.4 Knowledge Spillovers: Learning-by-importing
Remember that Coe and Helpman’s (1995) estimates suggest that foreign R&D has a more
beneficial effect on domestic productivity the more open an economy is to foreign trade. We
pick this idea up and look at the case when intertemporal knowledge spillovers in research and
development only originate from domestically produced goods and imported goods. In our
model the extent of international knowledge spillovers is endogenously determined by trade
patterns, which in turn are determined by income inequality across countries. Technology in
country i = {R,P} is now as follows. To develop a new product F i(t) = F/Ni(t) units of labor
are required, and to produce 1 unit of output it needs b(t) = b/N(t) units of labor. For simplicity
we assume that technology is symmetric across countries except for the extent of international
knowledge spillovers in R&D. Furthermore, we assume that each country’s population size is
given by L. First, suppose that inequality across countries is low for a given level of trade
costs so that the economy is in a full-trade equilibrium, i.e. NR(t) = NP (t) = N(t). Both
countries import all goods produced in the other country so that there are perfect international
knowledge spillovers. In that case, the world growth rate in the steady state is given by
g =
1
F/bL
(
θR + θP
b
− (1 + τ)
)
> 0 ⇔ θR + θP > (1 + τ)b.
Now, consider the case where inequality across countries is high (or trade costs are low) so that
the economy is in a part-trade equilibrium. Hence, NP (t) = NP (t) + NRM (t) < NR(t) = N(t)
so that NP (t)/N(t) = n < 1. To solve for the steady state, we only have to modify the resource
constraint of the poor country as follows
βLθP = g
(m
n
)
F +m (1 + τ) bL.
5However, note that consumption expenditures evolve differently across countries during the transition. Since
µ = NP /NR falls over time it must be that aggregate consumption expenditures in the rich country grow at a
lower rate than in the poor country, i.e. investment in the rich country exceeds investment in the poor country.
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Due to our choice of numeraire, i.e. wP (t)bP (t) = 1, the rest of the equations for the part-trade
equilibrium in Appendix 2.A.2 continue to apply. First, note that if there are no transfers
T = 0 the growth rate is determined by the resource constraints in the poor and rich countries.
In the general case with T 6= 0 one can show with the help of numerical simulations that an
increase in inequality across countries through a regressive transfer increases the steady state
growth rate g. Intuitively, if households in the poor country become even poorer they can
afford to purchase less products as before. Hence, labor in the R&D sector of the poor country
becomes, ceteris paribus, less productive, which increases the cost of innovation in the poor
country. At the same time, households in the rich country become even richer, which increases
the incentives to innovate in the rich country. In our simulations, the positive effect on growth
in the rich country still dominates so that the global growth rate g increases.
Limit Case: No Learning-by-importing
If there are no international knowledge spillovers, there might be uneven growth across coun-
tries. In the full-trade steady state, the rich, respectively, poor country grows at the rate
gR =
1
FR/bRL
(
(1− β)θR
bR
− [(1− β) + τβ]
)
⇔ (1− β)θR > [(1− β) + τβ]bR
gP =
1
FP /bPL
(
βθP
bP
− [β + τ(1− β)]
)
⇔ βθP > [β + τ(1− β)]bP .
In the case, where technology is symmetric, gR > gP if and only if (1 − β)θR − βθP > 1 − τ .
This implies that if all households have the same endowments with efficiency units of labor
θR = θP = θ a sufficient condition for gR > gP is β < 0.5. In other words, the relatively larger
country in terms of population size grows at the higher rate due to the home market effect.
Furthermore, if β = 0.5 a necessary and sufficient condition for gR > gP is θR > θP . Intuitively,
the country with the relatively higher labor endowment grows at the higher rate due to the
increasing-returns-to-scale technology. We see that the distribution of income across countries
still has no effect on the incentives to innovate. In the part-trade steady state, the balance of
payments requires that m = NP (t)/N(t) is constant. However, this implies that the growth
rate in both countries must be the same, i.e. gR = gP = g. Hence, the world growth rate g is
determined by the resource constraint in the poor country
g =
1
FP /bPL
(
βθP
bP
− [β + τ(1− β)]
)
⇔ βθP > [β + τ(1− β)]bP .
The resource constraint in the rich country (1 − β)LθR = gFR + bR(1 − β)L + qτbRβL then
pins down the number of firms located in the rich country that export q. In other words,
the number of exporting firms in the rich country adjusts such that given the world growth
rate determined in the poor country, the labor market in the rich country clears. Apparently,
a regressive transfer, which increases inequality, has now no effect on the growth rate g. A
regressive transfer only results in an adjustment of the balance of payments, i.e. the willing-
ness to pay of households in the poor country zP decreases and/or the production share of
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the poor country m increases, such that q remains consistent with labor market clearing in
the rich country. We conclude that in the part-trade steady state the incentives to innovate
are determined by technology and endowments in the two countries and are independent of
the distribution of income across countries if there are no international knowledge spillovers.
However, inequality across countries still has an effect on innovation incentives and trade in the
sense that if inequality increases sufficiently the economy switches from a full- to a part-trade
steady state. This implies that a sufficiently high increase in inequality might now lead to a
decrease in the average growth rate if and only if gR > gP . We further get convergence in
growth rates but divergence in consumption levels.
2.6.5 Quadratic Preferences
We briefly discuss the case where households can adjust their consumption along the extensive
and intensive margin. The households’ quasi-homothetic utility function takes the following
form
u
(
{c(j, t)}∞j=0
)
=
∫ ∞
j=0
(
sc (j, t)− 1
2
c (j, t)2
)
dj (2.42)
where s > 0 denotes a local saturation level. The utility function has the following (standard)
properties, u′ (·) = s − c (j, t) > 0, u′′ (c (j, t)) = −1 < 0, and limc(j,t)→0 u′ (·) = s < ∞, which
implies that marginal utility is bounded from above. Therefore, non-negativity constraints
c (j, t) ≥ 0 might become binding for some j’s. Thus, households in the poor country might
not be able to afford all products made in the rich country. It is straightforward to show that
if income inequality across countries is sufficiently high the price setting restriction imposed by
the threat of parallel imports becomes binding for firms located in the rich country. Some firms
producing in the rich country don’t export to the poor country. Hence, a part-trade equilibrium
can emerge even if households have not only a choice about how many different goods they
consume but also about how much of each good they consume.
We restrict our discussion to the effect of income inequality across countries on innovation
incentives and trade patterns. We make the same experiment as in Section 2.4.1, and simulate
a change in income inequality across countries by making regressive transfers, starting out in
a full-trade steady state, and ending up in a part-trade steady state. The equations describing
the steady state can be found in Appendix 2.A.6. The results are summarized as follows: An
increase in inequality through a regressive transfer has a positive effect on the growth rate, the
terms of trade for the poor country, and a negative effect on the production share of the poor
country, the share of exporting firms, and the consumption share of households in the poor
country.
We compare these results with the baseline model. Since the results and their intuition are
similar, we keep the discussion relatively short. Given that the rich consume all goods available
they can only increase their consumption by increasing the amount of each good they purchase.
However, since they are satiated at one point, the price elasticity of demand for those goods
decreases. Hence, markups rise, and the incentive to innovate tends to increase. At the same
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time, households in the poor country become poorer and decrease the consumption of each
good they purchase, ceteris paribus. The price elasticity of demand tends to increase, markups
to fall, so that the incentive to innovate decreases. The economy is in a full-trade equilibrium
as long as households in the poor country become not too poor such that they also decrease
the number of goods they purchase relative to the number of goods that are available on the
market, else the economy is in a part-trade equilibrium. In both cases, simulations show that
the effect of the households in the rich country on the incentives to innovate dominate, so that
we see more innovation in a steady state with higher inequality across countries. This effect
is even stronger in a part-trade equilibrium when households in the rich country are very rich,
and pay very high markups. The intuition for the movement of the terms of trade in favor
of the poor country, for the decrease in the share of exporting firms in the rich country, and
the fall in the production share of the poor country is the same as in our baseline model (see
discussion in Section 2.4.1).
It is worth noting two things that are different to the baseline model. First, since there
is an intensive margin of consumption the incentives to innovate in the full-trade equilibrium
change as inequality across countries changes. Second, the extensive and intensive margin of
trade is higher in a full-trade equilibrium than in a part-trade equilibrium.
In sum, the introduction of quadratic preferences does not change the basic results and
intuition of the baseline model. The more similar countries are the lower the incentives to
innovate, and the higher the extensive and intensive margins of trade.
2.7 Conclusion
We look at the consequences of inequality in per capita incomes across countries on the incen-
tives to innovate in the global economy and the patterns of trade between countries. To this
end, we introduce non-homothetic preferences in the standard model of Grossman and Helpman
(1991b). We show that if income inequality across countries is high, some firms located in the
rich country have an incentive to sell exclusively in the domestic market. In order to circumvent
the threat of parallel imports and be able to charge high prices they choose to forgo a larger
market. At the same time, this means that not all goods produced in the world economy are
traded. Since households in the poor country cannot afford to buy all goods produced in the
rich country, relatively more resources in the rich country can be allocated to research and
development. In sum, at high levels of inequality across countries the incentives to innovate
are high whereas the extensive margin of trade is low.
We apply the model to various questions that arise naturally in the international context,
and discuss several extensions. First, we apply the model to the question of intellectual property
rights in an international context. We show that households in the rich and poor country might
not see eye to eye about the design of intellectual property rights. Whether they agree or
disagree depends crucially on how much households in the poor country weigh future losses in
consumption against present gains. Second, we take a closer look at trade policy, and argue that
a reduction in trade costs might increase the incentives to innovate but decrease the extensive
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margin of trade. Such a change in trade policy might make households in the poor country
unambiguously worse off relative to households in the rich country if trade costs fall sufficiently
such that the economy moves from a full- to a part-trade equilibrium. We extend the model by
making the degree of international knowledge spillovers endogenous. In particular, we assume
that knowledge spillovers in the research sector depend on the set of products consumed in
a given country. This implies that firms benefit only from knowledge created abroad if these
products are imported. We show that the results from the baseline model are robust, i.e.
inequality across countries still leads to an increase in the growth rate and a decrease in the
extensive margin of trade. We also consider an extreme case by shutting down international
knowledge spillovers completely. We show that countries grow at different rates in a full-trade
equilibrium, and converge to a common growth rate, which is equal to the growth rate of the
poor country, in a part-trade equilibrium. In this limit case an increase in inequality might lead
to a decrease in the average growth rate in the economy as well as the extensive margin of trade.
Last, we show that the relationship between inequality, trade patterns, and the growth rate is
robust to the introduction of preferences where households have a choice along the extensive
and intensive margin of consumption.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Full-trade Equilibrium
Balance of Payments
Note that due to Walras’ law the balance of payments is implied by the budget constraints,
labor market clearing conditions, and the zero-profit conditions.
Let us start with the aggregate flow budget constraint in the poor country in the full-trade
equilibrium
A˙P (t) = r
P (t)AP (t) + w
P (t)βLθP − βLN(t)zP (t) + βLTP (t).
If we choose the marginal cost of production for firms located in the poor country as numeraire,
i.e. wP (t)bP (t) = 1, we can write the flow budget constraint as follows
N˙P (t)
NP (t)
FP
bP
= rP (t)
FP
bP
+
N(t)
NP (t)
βLθP
bP
− βL N(t)
NP (t)
zP (t) +
N(t)
NP (t)
βLTP (t)
N(t)
where capital market clearing in country P implies that AP (t) = NP (t)FP /bP .
Next, the labor market clearing condition in the poor country is determined by (2.29) and
can be written as
N˙P (t)
NP (t)
FP
bP
=
N(t)
NP (t)
βLθP
bP
− βL− τ(1− β)L.
We can rewrite the zero-profit condition in the poor country as
rP (t)
FP
bP
= [zP (t)− 1]βL+ [zR(t)− τ ] (1− β)L.
Substituting the labor market clearing and the zero-profit condition into the flow budget con-
straint yields the balance of payments
βLθP
m(t)bP
− βL− τ(1− β)L = [zP (t)− 1]βL+ [zR(t)− τ ] (1− β)L
+
βLθP
m(t)bP
− βLzP
m(t)
+
1
m(t)
βLTP (t)
N(t)
[1−m(t)]βLzP (t) = m(t)(1− β)LzR(t) + βLTP (t)
N(t)
NR(t)βLzP (t) = N
P (t)(1− β)LzR(t) + βLTP (t)
where m(t) ≡ NP (t)/N(t). Alternatively, we could have derived the balance of payments from
the aggregate flow budget constraint, the labor market clearing condition, and the zero-profit
condition in the rich country.
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Steady State
The following equations determine the full-trade steady state
g = r − ρ
(1− β)LθR = g (1−m)FR + (1−m) bR (1− β)L+ (1−m) τbRβL
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL+mτbP (1− β)L
ωRFR =
(
zR − ωRbR
)
(1− β)L+ (zP − τωRbR)βL
r
FP
bP
=
(zP − 1)βL+ (zR − τ) (1− β)L
r
(1−m)βLzP = m(1− β)LzR + βLT
where ωR ≡ wR(t)/N(t) and T ≡ TP (t)/N(t).
Prices and Relative Wages in Steady State
We can solve for prices zR and zP as functions of the endogenous variables g and m as follows
zR =
1−m
1− β
{
FP
bPL
(g + ρ) + [β + τ(1− β)]
}
− β
1− βT
zP =
m
β
{
FP
bPL
(g + ρ) + [β + τ(1− β)]
}
+ T.
We see that there is a positive relationship between prices (or the willingness to pay) and the
growth rate g for a given production share of the poor countrym. Furthermore, the relationship
between zR and m is negative, and between zP and m positive, ceteris paribus. For the case of
identical technologies across countries, i.e. FR = FP = F and bR = bP = b, we can formulate
the following proposition
Proposition 2.5. The larger country has ceteris paribus the higher wage rate.
Proof. In general, we can write the (relative) wage rate ωR in the rich country as follows
ωRbR =
FP
bP
[(1− β)zR + βzP ]
FR
bR
[(1− β)zR + βzP ] + FPbP [(1− β) + τβ]− F
R
bR
[β + τ(1− β)] .
Imposing symmetric technologies across countries, we can write
ωRb =
[(1− β)zR + βzP ]
[(1− β)zR + βzP ] + (1− τ)(1− 2β) .
It is straightforward to see that if technologies and population sizes are identical, i.e. β = 1/2,
across countries wage rates equalize, i.e. ωRb = 1 (remember our choice of numeraire ωP b = 1).
If β < 1/2 the second term in the denominator is negative (remember that τ > 1) so that the
numerator is larger than the denominator, and therefore ωRbR > 1. In other words, as in the
standard model with CES preferences the larger country has the higher wage rate as a result
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of the home market effect (see e.g. Krugman 1980). If τ = 1 there is no home market effect,
and we see that wages equalize across countries.
2.A.2 Part-trade equilibrium
Steady State
The following equations determine the part-trade steady state
g = r − ρ
(1− β)LθR = g (1−m)FR + (1−m) bR(1− β)L+ q (1−m) τbRβL
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL+mτbP (1− β)L(
zR − ωRbR
)
(1− β)L = (τzP − ωRbR) (1− β)L+ (zP − τωRbR)βL
ωRFR =
(
zR − ωRbR
)
(1− β)L
r
FP
bP
=
(zP − 1)βL+ (τzP − τ) (1− β)L
r
βLq (1−m) zP = (1− β)LmτzP + βLT
where ωR ≡ wR(t)/N(t) and T ≡ TP (t)/N(t).
Prices and relative wages in steady state
We can solve for prices as a function of the endogenous variable g as follows
zR =
[
1 +
g + ρ
(1− β)L
]
ωRbR
zP = 1 +
FP
bPL
g + ρ
[β + τ(1− β)]
where the wage rate ωRbR is determined below. As in the full-trade steady state, if technologies
are identical across countries, we propose the following:
Proposition 2.6. The larger country has the higher wage rate, holding everything else constant.
Proof. In general, we can write the (relative) wage rate ωR as follows
ωRbR =
FP
bP
(g + ρ) + [β + τ(1− β)]L
FR
bR
(g + ρ) + [(1− β) + τβ]L.
Imposing symmetric technologies across countries implies that
ωRb =
F
b (g + ρ) + [β + τ(1− β)]L
F
b (g + ρ) + [(1− β) + τβ]L
.
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It is easy to see that if population sizes are identical in both countries, i.e. β = 1/2, wage rates
equalize, i.e. ωRb = 1 (due to our choice of numeraire). If β < 1/2 it is straightforward to show
that ωRb > 1, and vice versa for β > 1/2. This is identical to the full-trade equilibrium.
2.A.3 Inequality Simulations
To simulate the effects of a change in between-country income inequality we choose the following
parameter values L = 1, β = 0.5, θR = 2.5, θP = 2, FR = FP = 7, bR = bP = 1, ρ = 0.04,
τ = 1.6, and T ∈ (−0.65, 0.15) varying. Note that since technologies and population sizes are
identical across countries wage rates equalize. We assume identical technology and population
size across countries to isolate the effects of inequality. We measure inequality with the Gini
coefficient, which we construct from the Lorenz curve (see Ray 1998). Note, that relative
lifetime incomes in per capita terms can be written in the steady state as
yR(t)
yP (t)
=
wR(t)θR + ρaR(t)− TR(t)
wP (t)θP + ρaP (t) + TP (t)
.
Obviously, if the poor country’s income share equals its population share β the Lorenz curve
lies on the 45 degree line of perfect equality, and the Gini coefficient is zero.
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Figure A.1: Effect of inequality on growth rate in full-trade equilibrium (left-hand side) and in
part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
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Figure A.2: Effect of inequality on terms of trade in full-trade equilibrium (left-hand side), and
on relative consumption poor to rich n in part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
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Figure A.3: Effect of inequality on production share m in part-trade equilibrium (left-hand
side), and on the share of exporting firms q in part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
2.A.4 Technology Simulations
We simulate an increase in relative labor productivity in R&D in the poor country by choosing
the following parameter values L = 1, β = 0.5, θR = 2.5, θP = 2, FR = 10, bR = 1, bP = 1,
ρ = 0.04, τ = 1.6, T = 0, and FP ∈ (11, 25) varying. Note that since technologies are no longer
identical across countries wage rates do not equalize.
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Figure A.4: Effect of labor productivity in R&D on growth rate in full-trade equilibrium (left-
hand side) and in part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
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Figure A.5: Effect of labor productivity in R&D on production share of poor country in full-
trade equilibrium (left-hand side) and in part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
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Figure A.6: Effect of labor productivity in R&D on relative wages in full-trade equilibrium
(left-hand side) and in part-trade equilibrium (right-hand side)
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2.A.5 Transition
It is straightforward to solve the system of linear differential equations given in the text (see
e.g. Acemoglu 2008). We write the system in matrix form and define the 2 × 2 matrix Q as
follows (for ease of notation we drop the subscript k)
Q ≡
[
ΦR ΨR
ΨP ΦP
]
Note that the constants ΦRk , Ψ
R
k , Φ
P
k and Ψ
P
k are defined as follows. In the full-trade equilibrium,
we have ΦRfull ≡
[
(1− β)LθR − [(1− β) + τβ] bRL
]
/FR, ΨRfull ≡ (1− β)LθR/FR > 0, ΦPfull ≡[
βLθP − [β + τ(1− β)] bPL
]
/FP , and ΨPfull ≡ βLθP /FP > 0. Whereas in the part-trade
equilibrium, we have ΦRpart ≡ (1−β)L
(
θR − bR
)
/FR > 0, ΨRpart ≡ (1−β)L
(
θR − τ2bR
)
/FR >
0, ΦPpart ≡
[
βLθP − [β + τ(1− β)] bPL
]
/FP , and ΨPpart ≡ βLθP /FP > 0, where ΦRpart > 0 and
ΨRpart > 0 follows from Proposition 2.4.
The matrix Q can be decomposed as follows, Q = PζP−1, where P is a matrix whose
columns correspond to the eigenvectors of Q and ζ is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues
of Q on its diagonal. By the definition of an eigenvalue, det(Q− ζI) = 0, the eigenvalues of Q
are determined by the following quadratic equation
ζ2 − (ΦR + ΦP ) ζ + (ΦRΦP −ΨRΨP ) = 0
with the solutions given by
ζ1,2 =
(
ΦR + ΦP
)±√(ΦR + ΦP )2 − 4 (ΦRΦP −ΨRΨP )
2
By the definition of an eigenvector, (Q− ζ1I) v1 = 0, the eigenvector v1 associated with the
eigenvalue ζ1 is determined by following system of linearly dependent equations[(
ΦR − ζ1
)
v11 + Ψ
Rv12
ΨP v11 +
(
ΦP − ζ1
)
v12
]
=
[
0
0
]
By normalizing v12 = 1, respectively, v22 = 1, it follows that the eigenvector v1, respectively v2,
is given by
v1 =
[
ζ1−ΦP
ΨP
1
]
, v2 =
[
ζ2−ΦP
ΨP
1
]
Hence, the matrices P and ζ are
P =
[
v11 v
2
1
v12 v
2
2
]
=
[
v11 v
2
1
1 1
]
, ζ =
[
ζ1 0
0 ζ2
]
The system of equations is decoupled by canonical variables decomposition. The decoupled
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(transformed) system is easily solved, and retransformed. The solution is then given by[
NR(t)
NP (t)
]
=
[
v11c1 exp(ζ1t) + v
2
1c2 exp(ζ2t)
c1 exp(ζ1t) + c2 exp(ζ2t)
]
with the constants of integration, c1 and c2 determined by
c1 =
NP (0)v21 −NR(0)
v21 − v11
, c2 =
NR(0)−NP (0)v11
v21 − v11
where NR(0) > 0 and NP (0) > 0 are given. From this solution the dynamics of all other
variables can be obtained.
2.A.6 Quadratic Preferences
This appendix states the systems of equations describing the full- and part-trade steady states
under the assumption of quadratic preferences. We keep all assumptions about the economic
environment and technology.
Full-trade Steady State
The following system of 6 equations in the 6 unknowns g, r, λR, λP , ωR, m characterizes
the full-trade steady state. Note that λi denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the optimization
problem for a household in country i. We chose wP (t)bP (t) = 1 as the numeraire.
The Euler equation for both countries is determined by
g = r − ρ.
The resource constraints for the rich country, and the poor country, respectively, are given by
(1− β)LθR = g (1−m)FR + (1−m) bR(1− β)L1
2
(
s− λRωRbR
)
+ (1−m) τbRβL1
2
(
s− λP τωRbR
)
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL
1
2
(s− λP ) +mτbP (1− β)L1
2
(s− λRτ) .
Free entry in both regions implies the following zero-profit conditions
ωRFR =
1
r
[(
s− λRωRbR
)2
(1− β)L
4λR
+
(
s− λP τωRbR
)2
βL
4λP
]
FP
bP
=
1
r
[
(s− λP )2 βL
4λP
+
(s− λRτ)2 (1− β)L
4λR
]
.
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The balance of payments is determined by
0 = (1−m) 1
4
(
τωRbR +
s
λP
)
β
(
s− λP τωRbR
)
− m1
4
(
τ +
s
λR
)
(1− β) (s− λRτ)
− βT
where T ≡ TP (t)/N(t).
Part-trade Steady State
The following system of 7 equations in the 7 unknowns g, r, m, q, ωR, λP , and λR describe the
part-trade steady state.
The Euler equation for the rich and poor country is given by
g = r − ρ.
Labor market clearing in the rich and poor country, respectively, implies
(1− β)LθR = g(1−m)FRq(1−m)bRL
[
(1− β)
[
s− λRτ 1
2
(
τωRbR +
s
λP
)]
+ τβ
1
2
(
s− λP τωRbR
)]
+ (1− q)(1−m)bR(1− β)L1
2
(
s− λRωRbR
)
βLθP = gmF
P +mbPβL
1
2
(s− λP ) +mτbP (1− β)L
[
s− λRτ 1
2
(
1 +
s
λP
)]
.
The zero-profit conditions for firms in the rich and poor country, respectively, are given by
ωRbR =
1
r
[(
s− λRωRFR
)2
(1− β)L
4λR
]
FP
bP
=
1
r
(s− λP )2 βL
4λP
+
τ (s− λP )
[
s− λRτ 12
(
1 + sλP
)]
(1− β)L
2λP
 .
Arbitrage opportunities imply that firms located in the rich country that serve only the house-
holds in the rich country and firms serving all households in both countries must earn equal
profits(
s− λRωRbR
)2
(1− β)
4λR
=
[
τ
2
(
τωRbR +
s
λP
)
− ωRbR
]
(1− β)
[
s− λRτ
2
(
τωRbR +
s
λP
)]
+
(
s− λP τωRbR
)2
β
4λP
.
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The balance of payments requires that
0 = q (1−m) 1
4
(
τωRbR +
s
λP
)
β
(
s− λP τωRbR
)
− mτ 1
2
(
1 +
s
λP
)
(1− β)
[
s− λRτ 1
2
(
1 +
s
λP
)]
− βT.
3 A Dynamic North-South Model
with Demand-Induced Product Cycles
Joint with Reto Foellmi and Sandra Hanslin
3.1 Introduction
In his seminal article Vernon (1966) explained international trade patterns with product cycles.
He hypothesized that new goods would be introduced in countries with high per capita incomes
(catering to the needs of such a market), after a while demand for these goods emerges abroad
(as incomes grow) and they are exported. Later on, goods are imitated by less advanced
countries, which have a relative cost advantage, such that the production moves there. Hence,
goods that were once exported by rich countries are eventually imported by them. In a follow-up
paper, Vernon (1979) explicitly emphasized the role of the demand side in shaping the typical
product cycle:
In the early part of the post-war period, the US economy was the repository of
a storehouse of innovations not yet exploited abroad, innovations that responded
to the labour-scarce high-income conditions of the US market. As the years went
on, other countries eventually achieved the income levels and acquired the rela-
tive labour costs that had prevailed earlier in the United States. As these countries
tracked the terrain already traversed by the US economy, they developed an increas-
ing demand for the products that had previously been generated in response to US
needs. That circumstance provided the consequences characteristically associated
with the product cycle sequence . . . (Vernon 1979, p. 260).
It has been several decades since Vernon stressed the importance of the demand side for
product cycles.1 However, this is the first contribution to the literature, we are aware of,
that provides a demand-based dynamic model which is able to generate the three stages of
the product cycle described by Vernon (1966): (1) a product is exclusively produced and
consumed in the North, (2) a product is produced in North and exported to South and (3)
a product is imitated and exported from South to North. This chapter describes a dynamic
general-equilibrium model of two regions, a wealthy North, and a poor South. Households
have non-homothetic preferences over differentiated products such that consumption patterns
differ across regions. In particular, households in North can afford to consume more and
1Two early studies of the product cycle that deserve mention can be found in Wells (1966) and Hirsch (1967),
both doctoral students of Vernon at Harvard University.
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newer products than households in South. Monopolistic firms in North innovate new products
(horizontal innovations) whereas competitive firms in South randomly target Northern products
for imitation. Trading products across regions is costless (the implications of this simplifying
assumption are discussed in Section 3.4.4). In the steady state, products go on average through
the following cycle. A new product is developed and introduced in North. Only after a certain
time have households in South become rich enough to afford a "new" product that is produced
in North. This demand lag is endogenously determined and depends, ceteris paribus, positively
on the degree of inequality across regions and negatively on the innovation rate.2 In other
words, if Southern households, relative to Northern households, are poor the demand lag is
long. Similarly, if incomes grow at a low rate the demand lag is long too. At this stage of the
product cycle North is exporting the product. As time elapses further South eventually masters
the technology to manufacture the product itself. Southern firms chose at random Northern
products to imitate that have not yet been copied. They must invest resources in order to reverse
engineer the production process of the chosen product. Once they have invested the necessary
resources, they enter into price competition with the innovating firm in North. Because they
have a cost advantage due to lower wages, they can underbid the Northern innovator and
capture the whole market. Hence, South becomes an exporter of that product. The average
time span a product is being manufactured in North is determined endogenously. In sum, we
get on average a product cycle as described by Vernon (1966): At the stage of a new product,
products are manufactured and consumed in North, at the mature stage they are exported to
South, and eventually, at the stage of the standardized product they are manufactured in South
and exported to North.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2, we distinguish our
contribution from the existing literature. Section 3.3 presents suggestive evidence for the prod-
uct cycle described in the introductory Section 3.1 by studying six major consumer durables.
In Section 3.4, we introduce the model and solve for the steady state, and transitional dynam-
ics. Comparative statics results of changes in Southern productivity, and changes in inequality
across regions are discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 extends the model towards hierarchic
preferences, and learning-by-doing. Eventually, Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
The theory of Vernon (1966) grew out of dissatisfaction with classical trade theories, which
explain trade between countries with differences in relative factor endowments (Heckscher-
Ohlin) or differences in relative productivities (Ricardo). On the one hand, these theories
missed characteristics like countries’ per capita incomes (Burenstam-Linder 1961) that are
thought to be important determinants of international trade (see e.g. Markusen 1986; Fieler
2Our use of the term "demand lag" differs from Posner (1961). He thinks of the demand lag as the delay
in the acceptance of foreign goods in the domestic market, i.e. foreign goods might not be considered perfect
substitutes for home-produced goods until some time elapses. We define the demand lag as the time it takes in
the poor South for incomes to grow sufficiently such that households there can afford to buy goods produced in
North, abstracting from differences in tastes.
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2011), and on the other hand, struggled to explain observed trade flows (Leontief 1953, 1956).
Since Vernon put forward his verbal theory of the product cycle, a number of economists have
both formalized the product cycle theory in theoretical models as well as put it to empirical
tests.
One of the first to study product cycles in a theoretical model was Krugman (1979). In
his model, an advanced North introduces new products at a constant exogenous rate, i.e.
the product space expands, and a less advanced South copies these goods also at a constant
exogenous rate. Higher per capita income in North depends on quasi rents from the Northern
monopoly in new goods, i.e. North must continually innovate to maintain its relative and
absolute position. Later, Grossman and Helpman (1991a) extended Krugman’s (1979) model,
and endogenized innovation and imitation rates. In their model, long-run growth is faster the
larger the resource base of the South and the more productive its resources in learning the
production process. The reason is that profits during the monopoly phase are higher when a
smaller number of Northern firms compete for resources in the manufacturing sector, which
outweighs the effect of a higher risk-adjusted interest rate since profits accrue on average for
a shorter period of time. Both models focus on the supply-side aspect of the product cycle
theory, i.e. how the diffusion of technology and the determination of relative wages depend on
technology and preference parameters of the model (for a more recent example see Acemoglu
et al. 2012). However, in both models, demand patterns in North and South are identical
because agents have homothetic constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) preferences. In other
words, the consumption basket demanded in North is simply an inflated clone of the one in
South. "This is clearly at odds with the fact, stressed by Vernon, that new goods are not
typically consumed in the South until later in the cycle" (Stokey 1991, p. 63). Hence, Stokey
(1991) focuses on the demand side. In her static model with vertically differentiated goods
North manufactures high-quality products whereas South manufactures low-quality products.
Since agents have non-homothetic preferences all of the products manufactured in the North
are consumed domestically but only the lower-quality products are exported. Stokey (1991) is
interested in the effect of population size and productivity changes on relative wages, production
and trade patterns, respectively, and the terms of trade. Kugler and Zweimüller (2005) build a
dynamic North-South model where households have non-homothetic preferences. Their model
is close to our setup. However, the model in Kugler and Zweimüller (2005) is not a full-fledged
general-equilibrium model since interest rates are exogenously determined. Furthermore, the
focus of their analysis is on the cross-sectional composition of aggregate demand rather than
on product cycles.
Our model differs from the existing literature in the following ways. In contrast to e.g.
Stokey (1991) or Flam and Helpman (1987) we focus on horizontal instead of vertical innova-
tions. In addition, we differ from Stokey (1991), Matsuyama (2000) or Falkinger (1990) who
build static Ricardian trade models where agents have (hierarchic) non-homothetic preferences
by developing a dynamic general-equilibrium model with monopolistic competition. We model
the demand side as Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006), whereas the supply-side is borrowed from
Grossman and Helpman (1991a). Incorporating non-homothetic preferences into these types
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of models enables us to formalize the product cycle hypothesis and analyze the effects of the
demand side on the product cycle.
3.3 Motivation
3.3.1 Empirical and Anecdotal Evidence
There have been many attempts to test the product cycle hypothesis empirically. Among the
first who found evidence for the product cycle theory were Wells (1969) for consumer durables
and Hirsch (1967) for electronic products. Hirsch (1975) and Mullor-Sebastian (1983) find
that industrial product groups behave according to the product cycle theory. More recently,
Feenstra and Rose (2000) find evidence for product cycles by ranking goods (and countries)
according to the year they are first exported (export) to the United States. In particular,
they show that less sophisticated goods like furniture are imported early by the US, and that
advanced countries like Canada, UK, Germany, Japan and France start to export early to the
US. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between real GDP per capita and the country
ranking, i.e. high-income countries tend to have a low ranking, which means that they start
exporting early to the US (i.e. are more advanced).
Besides empirical evidence there is anecdotal evidence for the product cycle hypothesis,
e.g. products like color televisions, computer games, or electric can openers seem to follow or
have followed Vernon’s product cycle. A typical example that is currently in an early stage
of the life-cycle is the Tesla Roadster (the first all electrical sports car) which is produced
by Tesla Motors Inc. in California, USA. It was exclusively available in the US for around
two years before it became available in some Western European countries, Hong Kong, Japan
and Australia. The product cycle theory predicts that demand abroad further increases as
incomes grow, and eventually the car is being imitated and production is moving abroad where
manufacturing costs are comparatively lower. In the following section, we are going to illustrate
the product life-cycle with 6 major consumer durables of the 20th century such as the microwave
oven, dishwasher, freezer, washing machine, dryer and VCR.
3.3.2 The Product Cycle of 6 Major Consumer Durables
Instead of attempting to empirically test the product cycle hypothesis, we take a different
route and provide suggestive evidence by looking at three distinct features characterizing the
product cycle described by Vernon (1966) that should be observed in the data.3 First, new
products are not introduced in all countries simultaneously, with the lag of introduction varying
negatively with GDP per capita. Second, as the production of goods migrates from North to
South, North should start out as a net exporter of a given product, and over time become a net
importer of that good. Third, production of a given good should be high in developed relative
to developing countries early in the product cycle, and low later on. We interpret the patterns
3A conclusive analysis would require time series data on production and consumption at the product level
across a large sample of countries - the gathering and analysis of such data is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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found in the data for these 6 consumer durables as suggestive evidence for the type of product
cycles Vernon (1966) had in mind. In particular, we believe they are representative for the type
of final consumer goods that the product cycle hypothesis is relevant. It is obvious that the
theory does not apply to trade in e.g. agricultural commodities or natural resources.
We study 6 major consumer durables introduced in the 20th century, i.e. dishwasher, dryer,
freezer, microwave oven, VCR, and washing machine. For each consumer durable we know the
year of introduction in 16 European countries, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
and United Kingdom. The dates of introduction for these consumer durables were kindly
provided by Tellis et al. (2003).4 Trade data are U.S. import and export data at the 5 digit
SITC level from 1972-2006, which are provided by the Center for International Data at UC
Davis (Feenstra 1996, 1997). GDP data are taken from Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.0, see
Heston et al. (2012). Production data are obtained from the Industrial Commodity Production
Statistics Database (United Nations Statistics Division 2012). Internet research reveals that
all of these products were first introduced in the United States: the electric dishwasher was
introduced in 1950 (Hobart Corp.), the automatic electric clothes dryer in 1949 (Hamilton
Manufacturing Corp., General Electric), the domestic deep freezer in 1949 (General Electric),
the countertop microwave oven in 1967 (Amana Corp.), the VCR in 1965 (Sony, Ampex, RCA),
and the automatic electric washing machine in 1947 (Bendix, General Electric).
Demand Lags
Table 3.1 shows the year of introduction, defined by Tellis et al. (2003) as the first year com-
mercial sales for the corresponding product were registered, of the 6 consumer durables, and
GDP per capita (PWT 7.0, PPP, 2005 USD) in the year the product was introduced in the
United States. For example, the countertop microwave oven was first introduced in the US in
1967, and last introduced in Greece and Portugal in 1982. GDP per capita in 1967 was USD
19,522 in the US, whereas in 1967 Greece had a GDP per capita of USD 9,742 and Portugal
one of USD 5,937.5 We observe that the year of introduction varies across countries. It appears
that on average, products were first introduced in countries with a high GDP per capita like the
US and UK, and last introduced in countries with a low GDP per capita like Greece, Portugal
and Spain. This is also suggested by Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the year
of introduction and GDP per capita in that year, shown at the bottom of Table 3.1.
Let us look closer at the microwave oven, which we consider a typical household appliance.
In 1946, Percy Spencer, an American engineer, while working on radar technology for the U.S.
defense company Raytheon Corporation accidentally discovered that microwaves are capable
of heating food extremely quickly. The story goes that a candy bar in Spencer’s pocket melted
during an experiment. Spencer realized the commercial potential, especially for a high-income
4Unfortunately, we don’t have data on the diffusion of the 6 consumer durables.
5Note that PWT 7.0 provides data from 1950-2009. Hence, we use data on GDP per capita in 1950 to
approximate GDP per capita in the years 1947 and 1949.
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Year GDP pc Year GDP pc Year GDP pc Year GDP pc Year GDP pc Year GDP pc
Austria 1962 6296 1965 6296 1953 6296 1974 13575 1977 12651 1962 6296
Belgium 1960 7992 1966 7992 1956 7992 1974 13602 1975 12820 1955 7992
Denmark 1960 9366 1965 9366 1954 9366 1974 15980 1977 15145 1958 9366
Finland 1964 6192 1973 6192 1961 6192 1975 11590 1978 11203 1960 6192
France 1959 7107 1963 7107 1960 7107 1975 13578 1974 12522 1954 7107
Germany 1960 6251 1966 6251 1956 6251 1969 14348 1974 14377 1952 6251
Greece 1966 2576 1990 2576 1972 2576 1982 9742 na na 1964 2576
Ireland 1965 5880 1963 5880 1958 5880 1976 8789 na na 1966 5880
Italy 1961 5361 1968 5361 1965 5361 1975 12305 1976 11015 1957 5361
Netherlands 1960 9961 1968 9961 1960 9961 1971 16356 na na 1960 9961
Norway 1961 9434 1970 9434 1957 9434 1976 16366 1977 14966 1960 9434
Portugal 1966 2614 1973 2614 1956 2614 1982 5937 na na 1956 2614
Spain na na 1973 3796 1972 3796 1973 10215 1977 9321 1964 3796
Sweden 1959 10301 1969 10301 1953 10301 1973 17043 1977 16380 1958 10301
Switzerland na na 1966 13712 na na 1973 22880 1978 22056 na na
United Kingdom 1958 10447 1960 10447 1954 10447 1971 14886 1974 14365 1954 10447
United States 1950 13119 1949 13119 1949 13119 1967 19522 1965 18364 1947 13119
Spearman's corr coeff
Source: Tellis et al. (2003), PWT 7.0
Washing Machine
-0.858 -0.545 -0.675 -0.651 -0.011 -0.463
Country Dishwasher Dryer Freezer Microwave Oven VCR
Table 3.1: Introduction of 6 major consumer durables across European countries
market like the US, of his discovery, and Raytheon filed for patents. In 1947, Raytheon produced
the first commercial microwave oven named "Radarange", which was sold to restaurants etc.
Twenty years later, in 1967, Amana, a division of Raytheon, introduced the first domestic
countertop microwave oven, marking the beginning of the use of microwave ovens in American
kitchens (see e.g. Osepchuk 1984).
Figure 3.1 below shows the relationship between the demand lag in years of the countertop
microwave oven relative to the US across the 16 European countries, and their GDP per capita
relative to the United States in 1967 (PPP, 2005), the year the microwave oven was introduced
in the US. We observe that on average the lower a countries’ GDP per capita relative to the US
in 1967, the longer the time span until households in a country start purchasing the microwave
oven. For example, the Netherlands had a GDP per capita in 1967 that was about 20 percent
lower than the US and households started consuming microwave ovens 4 years later than the
US. By comparison, Portugal’s GDP per capita in 1967 was about 30 percent of that in the US
and households began purchasing microwave ovens 15 years later. Note that countries below
the line of fit have a higher average growth rate between 1950-1990 than countries above the
line of fit (calculations based on PWT 7.0). Switzerland is an extreme outlier in the sense that
even though its GDP per capita in 1967 was higher than the US GDP per capita, households
first purchased the microwave oven 6 years later than households in the US.
The graphs for the other consumer durables look similar. For each country Figure 3.1 also
plots the average of GDP per capita relative to the US in the year of introduction across all
6 consumer durables against the average lag in years in the introduction of these consumer
durables. We conclude from Figure 3.1 that there is a negative correlation, suggesting that
on average, in countries where households enjoy a high income, these consumer durables are
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Figure 3.1: Relationship between GDP per capita and demand lag for the microwave oven
(left-hand side) and across all 6 consumer durables (right-hand side)
purchased sooner.6 Again, we notice that Switzerland is an extreme outlier that might be
explained by its lacking integration into the European market at that time, its relatively highly
regulated domestic market or its small population size. Hence, we also take into account (rela-
tive) population size, and for each product category j as well as across all product categories,
estimate the following model by OLS:
log (∆ij) = β0 + β1 log
(
GDPpcij
GDPpcUS
)
+ β2 log
(
Popij
PopUS
)
+ εij .
In other words, we regress the introduction lag ∆ (in logs) in each of the 6 product categories
j on the (log of) GDP per capita in country i relative to the GDP per capita of the US and the
(log of) population size of country i relative to the population size of the US, both in the year
the US introduced the product category. The coefficient β1 shows the importance of (relative)
GDP per capita, holding relative population sizes constant. We expect β1 to be negative. Table
3.2 below illustrates that (relative) GDP per capita has a negative effect on the introduction
lag of all 6 products, controlling for (relative) population sizes.
Export Performance
We now turn to the export performance of the United States in these product categories. In
particular, we look at the value of US exports (Xjt) in product category j at time t relative to
the value of US exports plus imports (Ijt) in category j at time t, i.e. x˜jt ≡ Xjt/(Xjt + Ijt).
We note that if x˜jt ∈ (0, 0.5) the US is a net importer in product category j at time t, and if
x˜jt ∈ (0.5, 1) the US is a net exporter. The product cycle hypothesis offers an explanation for
a falling export ratio x˜jt in the data. The US should start out as a net exporter and become a
net importer over time in a given product category. Again, in Figure 3.2, we take a look at the
6We expected GDP per capita to be more important for product take-off (i.e. when a certain threshold of
sales has been reached) than for the time of introduction. However, it seems that firms base their decisions to
launch new products (and form their expectations about future sales performance) as much on the general level
of development in a country (e.g. high average income level) as on the existence of a small group of rich people.
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Table 3.2: Correlation between (log) relative GDP per capita and (log) introduction lag ∆
log(∆mean) log(∆dish) log(∆dryer) log(∆freeze) log(∆micro) log(∆vcr) log(∆wash)
log(rel GDPpc) -0.428 -0.399 -0.427 -0.702 -0.848 -0.124 -0.249
(-3.95) (-9.75) (-3.61) (-2.49) (-2.88) (-0.88) (-1.45)
log(rel pop) -0.109 -0.107 -0.098 0.094 -0.221 -0.108 -0.235
(-2.41) (-6.03) (-1.77) (0.75) (-2.48) (-3.86) (-3.09)
adj. R2 0.546 0.911 0.460 0.262 0.460 0.547 0.399
#obs 16 14 16 15 16 12 15
Notes: t-values in parentheses
export performance of the United States in the product category of microwave ovens, as well
as across all 6 consumer durables, both across the 16 European countries.
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6 consumer durables across 16 European countries
Figure 3.2: US export ratio in microwave ovens across 16 European countries (left-hand side)
and across all 6 consumer durables (right-hand side)
We observe that the US starts out as a net exporter of microwave ovens at the beginning of
the sample period in 1978 and ends up as a net importer at the end of 2006, switching around
1983/84. A possible interpretation for the decline in the export ratio is that firms in the 16
European countries mastered the technology to produce microwave ovens, and due to lower
production costs were able to compete with US firms in their home markets as well as in the
US market. In other words, US firms became less competitive in their export markets and/or
European firms became more competitive in the US market, such that US exports relative to
U.S. imports decreased. The export performance in the other products is similar, except for
the domestic deep freezer where the export ratio x˜jt follows an inverse U-shape over 1978-2006.
The right-hand side panel in Figure 3.2 shows the export performance of the U.S. in the 16
European countries aggregated over the 6 product categories. We see that the value of US
exports relative to its imports also declines across all 6 consumer durables combined.
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Production Patterns
Eventually, for the microwave oven and the washing machine we study production data for the
United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
Argentina during the time period of 1982-2008. The United Nations Commodity Statistics
Yearbook (United Nations Statistics Division 2012) collects data on production of industrial
commodities by country.7 Unfortunately, we don’t have historical data on the production of the
microwave oven in China and India. Figure 3.3 plots the number of units (in millions) relative
to US production for the microwave oven (left-hand side) and the washing machine (right-hand
side) over the time period of 1982 to 2008.
We make the following observations. First, U.S. production of both consumer durables is
declining from the 1980s until 2008 relative to emerging countries like e.g. Brazil, Russia, India
and China. Second, while emerging countries are catching up, the production of developed
countries like the UK and Japan only moderately increases or even decreases. The relative
increase in production of the washing machine is especially strong for China. However, also
Indian production of washing machines is catching up slowly. Again, this is consistent with
the product cycle hypothesis, which suggests that the production of microwave ovens and the
washing machine should move from developed countries to developing countries as firms in
these countries acquire the technology to produce microwave ovens and have lower production
costs. Data limitations prevent us from investigating the production patterns for the rest of
the consumer durables discussed above.
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Figure 3.3: Production of microwave oven and washing machine relative to US
7The data is collected through annual questionnaires sent to national statistical authorities. The data
reported by the United Nations Commodity Statistics Yearbook reflect volume (and value) of production sold
during the survey period, which is defined as the production carried out at some time, which has been sold
(invoiced) during the reference period.
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3.4 Model
3.4.1 Distribution and Endowments
The economy consists of two regions i ∈ {N,S}, an industrialized North (N) and a less devel-
oped South (S). The population size of the economy is L, a fraction β lives in the South and a
fraction (1− β) in the North. We assume that each household regardless of its residence inelas-
tically supplies one unit of labor on the local labor market. This implies that aggregate labor
supply in the South is given by βL, and by (1− β)L in the North. Furthermore, suppose that
each household holds domestic and foreign assets. Hence, income inequality is endogenously
determined and originates from differences in labor and capital incomes across countries.
In order to study ceteris paribus effects of income inequality across countries we introduce
a transfer system (e.g. foreign aid) between North and South so that each household in the
North pays/receives a lump-sum tax/benefit TN (t), respectively TS(t). The transfer system
must run a balanced budget in each period so that (1 − β)LTN (t) = βLTS(t), and transfers
grow at the same rate as incomes. We will take TS(t) as the exogenous variable so that through
the balanced budget condition TN (t) is endogenously determined.
3.4.2 Preferences
There is a continuum of differentiated products in the economy indexed by j ∈ [0,∞), where
only a subset N(t) is available on the market at each point in time. We assume differentiated
products to be indivisible, and model consumption as a binary decision. Hence, households
consume either 1 unit of product j at time t, or they don’t consume that product at all.
Instantaneous utility is non-homothetic and takes the following form
u
(
{c (j, t)}N(t)j=0
)
=
∫ N(t)
0
c (j, t) dj (3.1)
where c(j, t) is an indicator function that takes the value one if product j is consumed at time
t, and zero otherwise. The indicator function c(j, t) will be specific to the income group, i.e.
the region. The specification of the instantaneous utility function contrasts with the constant-
elasticity-of-substitution (CES) form as follows. With zero-one preferences households can
only choose consumption along the extensive margin, i.e. choose how many different products
they want to purchase, whereas with CES preferences they can only choose consumption along
the intensive margin, i.e. how many units of each product they want to buy. In that sense,
our preferences are no less special or general than CES preferences.8 Furthermore, note that
8For the sake of illustration, suppose that the whole product set available to households consists of the six
consumer durables in Section 3.3. With the preferences specified in (3.1) wealthy households in the North would
consume one unit of all consumer durables available whereas poor households in the South could not afford to
consume all goods available, and for example could only purchase one washing machine and one freezer (some
of the "older" goods available). With CES preferences Northern and Southern households would both consume
all six consumer durables available. However, Northern households would purchase e.g. five units of each good
whereas Southern households could only buy one unit each.
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preferences in (3.1) are symmetric, i.e. no product is intrinsically better or worse than any
other product. In other words, there is no explicit consumption hierarchy. This allows us to
order products in ascending order from old to new, such that product j is developed before
product j′, where j′ > j.9
The household’s intertemporal objective function is given by
U(0) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−ρt) log u
(
{c (j, t)}N(t)j=0
)
dt (3.2)
where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate. Note that intertemporal preferences given by
(3.2) are homothetic. Households maximize their lifetime utility (3.2) subject to non-negativity
constraints c(j, t) ≥ 0 for all j, t, and to their lifetime budget constraint∫ ∞
0
∫ N(t)
0
p(j, t)c(j, t)dj exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt ≤ a(0)+
∫ ∞
0
(w(t) + T (t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt
where r(t) denotes the risk-free interest rate, a(0) initial wealth, and w(t) the market clearing
wage rate. The solution to the household problem has been relegated to Appendix 3.A.1. From
the maximum principle conditions we derive the individual Marshallian demand function for
product j:
c (j, t) =
1 p (j, t) ≤ z (j, t)0 p (j, t) > z (j, t) (3.3)
where z (j, t) ≡ [u (·)λ(t)]−1 denotes the willingness to pay. Figure 3.4 below shows the indi-
vidual demand curve (3.3) for product j. The costate variable, which can be interpreted as
marginal utility of wealth at time t, is denoted by λ(t). Households purchase one unit of a
product if the price of that product does not exceed their willingness to pay. Since preferences
are symmetric over all products the willingness to pay is identical for all products j. However,
the willingness to pay depends on λ(t), i.e. on the shadow price of (lifetime) income. Hence,
consumption patterns differ across regions since by our distributional assumptions (lifetime)
incomes are different across regions. Wealthy households in the North, with a lower equilibrium
value of λ(t), consume a larger set of products than poor households in the South.
9 Note that the same ordering would emerge if we assumed instantaneous utility to take the following form
u (c (j, t)) =
∫
j−ηc (j, t) dj. The power function j−η implies that (instantaneous) marginal utility is falling in
the index j, i.e. higher indexed goods yield lower marginal utility than lower indexed goods. The parameter
η ∈ (0, 1) determines the "steepness" of the hierarchy, i.e. how fast marginal utility falls in index j. With these
preferences households start consuming low-indexed goods (as they yield higher marginal utility) and expand
consumption towards high-indexed goods until their income is used up. To keep the model simple, we will
assume that such a hierarchy in consumption latently exists rather than explicitly modeling it. For a detailed
discussion see Section 3.6.1.
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Figure 3.4: Individual demand
3.4.3 Technology and Trade Integration
Innovation Technology in North
New products are designed and developed in high-income countries.10 Each firm in the North
is a single-product firm, which has access to the same innovation technology. The creation of a
new product requires FN (t) = FN/N(t) units of labor, once this set-up cost has been incurred,
the firm has access to a linear technology that requires bN (t) = bN/N(t) units of labor to
produce one unit of output, with FN , bN > 0 being positive constants. Innovations obey an
important spillover because they imply technical progress. We assume that the knowledge stock
of this economy equals the number of known designs N(t). The labor coefficients are inversely
related to the stock of knowledge. New products are protected by infinite patents but face a
positive probability of being copied by a Southern firm (patent infringement). We assume that
firms in the North cannot license technology to Southern firms, or set up manufacturing plants
in the South (i.e. engage in foreign direct investment).
Imitation Technology in South and Transportation Costs
As in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) we assume that each new product, which has been
developed in the North at time t, faces the same positive probability of being imitated by a
Southern firm at some time T˜ > t. At the time the product is developed date T˜ is unknown.
In other words, T˜ is a random variable that represents the age of a product at the time of
imitation. A Southern firm selects at random one of the existing products in the North, which
10 In principle, one could think that both North and South have access to the innovation technology but
that the South is sufficiently unproductive at developing new products compared to the North such that in
equilibrium no innovation takes place in the South. Since it is difficult to measure research productivity, for
illustration’s sake, consider research input. World Bank (2012) data on research and development spending of
low/middle and high income countries show that high income countries on average spent about 2.5 times as
much on R&D in percent of their GDP than low and middle income countries during the period 2000-2007.
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has not yet been copied, for imitation. We assume that firms in the South benefit in reverse
engineering and production from the total stock of knowledge (i.e. there are international
knowledge spillovers). Imitation of a selected product requires FS(t) = FS/N(t) units of
labor, with FS > 0. Investing FS(t) allows a Southern firm to learn the production process
of the randomly chosen product with probability one. Hence, there is complete certainty for a
Southern imitator that reverse engineering succeeds. Subsequent production of the copied good
requires bS(t) = bS/N(t) units of labor per unit. Finally, we assume that product markets are
fully integrated and trade costs are zero.
3.4.4 Equilibrium
Depending on parameter values, two decentralized equilibria can emerge: (i) households in the
South are too poor to afford any Northern products or (ii) they can afford at least some Northern
products. In case (i) no trade equilibrium exists. Hence, we focus on the interesting case (ii),
and assume in the following that households in the South can afford some Northern products. In
proving the existence of the equilibrium, we will derive the necessary assumption on parameters.
Let us denote the set of all products available in the economy as N(t) = NN (t) +NS(t), where
NN (t) denotes the subset of products that have not yet been imitated by the South, and NS(t)
the subset of products that have been copied by the South.
World Demand
In the equilibrium we consider households in the North consume all products available in the
market NN (t) = N(t), whereas households in the South consume only a subset of all products
NS(t) ⊂ N(t), which includes all products manufactured in the South and some but not all
Northern products. World demand for product j can be derived by horizontally aggregating
individual demand (3.3) across regions. It is determined by:
C (j, t) =

0, p (j, t) > zN (j, t)
(1− β)L, zS (j, t) < p (j, t) ≤ zN (j, t)
L, p (j, t) ≤ zS (j, t)
(3.4)
where zi (j, t), with i ∈ {N,S}, denotes the willingness to pay of households in the North,
and South, respectively. Since the willingness to pay is the same for all products j, aggregate
demand is the same for all products. World demand (3.4) is depicted in Figure 3.5 below.
If the price of a product exceeds the willingness to pay of Northern households, there is no
demand for that product. With a price between the willingness to pay of Southern and Northern
households only the latter purchase the product. If the price falls short of the willingness to pay
of households in the South everyone purchases it. Figure 3.5 is drawn under the assumption
that the willingness to pay of Southern households exceeds marginal costs bN (t)wN (t), which
holds true in the equilibrium of interest.
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Figure 3.5: World demand
Aggregate Supply
Let us first consider the problem of a monopolistic firm j located in the North. Firm j maximizes
operating profits
piN (j, t) =
[
p(j, t)− wN (t)bN (t)]C(j, t) (3.5)
subject to aggregate demand (3.4) by choosing a price p(j, t) such that marginal revenue equals
marginal cost. From Figure 3.5 and the discussion in the previous section it follows that there
are two candidates for the price that maximizes profits (3.5). Firm j either sets a high price
equal to the willingness to pay of Northern households zN (j, t) and sells exclusively to domestic
households, or it sets a low price equal to the willingness to pay of Southern households zS(j, t)
and serves both markets.
We assume that firms cannot price discriminate across regions. As there are no trade costs,
arbitrageurs would take advantage of any price differential between North and South.11 Thus,
exporters set the same price in both regions. This implies that in equilibrium not all Northern
firms export. To see this, suppose that at every point in time all Northern firms would set
prices equal to the willingness to pay of Southern households and sell to everyone. In that
case, households in the North would not exhaust their budgets, i.e. the shadow price of their
(lifetime) income would become zero. That would imply an infinitely large willingness to pay
11The threat of arbitrage opportunities imposes a price setting restriction on firms. If there are no trade costs
the price setting restriction is always binding. However, in the presence of iceberg trade costs the price setting
restriction might not be binding. In particular, if the difference in per capita incomes between North and South
were sufficiently low, all newly invented products in the North would be exported to the South right away.
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for an additional product. Consequently, Northern firms had an incentive to deviate from
selling to everyone and sell exclusively in the North. Hence, a situation where all Northern
firms serve all households cannot be an equilibrium. Also, by the same argument, a situation
where all Northern firms sell exclusively to Northern households cannot be an equilibrium as
the willingness to pay of Southern households for a Northern product would become infinitely
large.
In an equilibrium, where some Northern firms serve all households in both regions and
others serve exclusively the domestic region, firms must be indifferent between selling only to
Northern households and selling to all households at any point in time. Hence, the following
arbitrage condition must hold
[
zN (j, t)− wN (t)bN (t)
]
(1− β)L = [zS (j, t)− wN (t)bN (t)]L. (3.6)
In the aggregate, a measure n of firms sells in the North and South whereas (1− n) firms sell
only in the North. Due to symmetric preferences, however, the behavior of a single firm is
indeterminate. Because we are free to order the different goods, we may think of the following
firm behavior at the micro level that generates the described outcome at the macro level: After
developing a new product each firm starts marketing its product solely in the North and after a
certain period of time has elapsed, i.e. the time it takes for incomes in the South to have grown
sufficiently, begins exporting. In that case, there are at any point in time new products that are
sold exclusively in the domestic market and older products that are exported as well. Section
3.6 discusses two possible extensions where the product cycle at the firm level is determinate.
We argue that while the model would become substantially more complex the basic structure
and intuition of the baseline model is preserved.
The Northern firm, which develops product j at time t, faces a positive probability that its
product will be copied by a Southern firm. After a product has been imitated, the Southern
firm maximizes operating profits
piS(j, t) =
[
p(j, t)− wS(t)bS(t)]C(j, t)
where C(j, t) = L is given by (3.4). After the firm in the South has copied the Northern
product j it enters into a price competition with the Northern firm currently producing j (the
innovating firm). This forces the Southern firm to set a limit price equal to the marginal costs
of the competing firm in the North. Hence, optimal prices of Southern products are equal to
wN (t)bN (t).12
12 The wide-gap case discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) where Southern firms can set the monopoly
price cannot occur here since zS(t) > wN (t)bN (t) > wS(t)bS(t) in equilibrium as otherwise, no firm in the North
would export to the South. Our case is similar to their narrow-gap case where Southern firms charge prices
marginally below the marginal cost of Northern firms.
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Labor Markets
Labor is immobile across regions but regional labor markets are assumed to be perfect. In
particular, in the North labor is completely mobile between production and R&D, and in
the South between production and reverse engineering. Labor market clearing in the North
demands that
(1− β)L = g(t)FN + bNL [n(t)−m(t)] + (1− β) bNL [1− n(t)] (3.7)
where we defined g(t) ≡ N˙(t)/N(t), and the share of goods consumed and produced in the
South, respectively, as n(t) ≡ NS(t)/N(t) and m(t) ≡ NS(t)/N(t). The first term in (3.7) on
the right-hand side denotes labor demand from the R&D sector, the second term labor demand
from the production of older Northern products consumed by all households in both regions,
and the third term labor demand from the production of newer Northern products exclusively
consumed by Northern households.
Similarly, labor market clearing in the South requires
βL = gS(t)m(t)FS +m(t)bSL (3.8)
where we defined gS(t) ≡ N˙S(t)/NS(t). The right-hand side in (3.8) denotes labor demand from
reverse engineering, and production of imitated products which are consumed by all households
in both regions.
Capital Markets
We assume that international capital markets are perfect, hence, interest rates equalize across
regions. The expected present discounted value of profits of product j that was introduced
at time t is determined by equation (3.9) below, given the instantaneous rate of imitation
µ(t) ≡ N˙S(t)/NN (t). We make the standard assumption of free entry into product development
in the North. Hence, the expected value of product j must equal R&D costs wN (t)F (t),
vN (j, t) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
(r(τ) + µ(τ)) dτ
)
piN (j, s) ds = wN (t)FN (t). (3.9)
Note that profits are discounted using the risk-adjusted interest rate r(τ) +µ(τ), where r(τ) is
the risk-free interest rate and µ(τ) the risk premium. Since we assume capital markets to be
perfect, households can diversify away the idiosyncratic risk of a Northern firm of being copied
by holding a portfolio of shares in all Northern firms.
Free entry also prevails in the reverse engineering sector in the South, which is not an
uncertain activity, so that their present discounted value of profits vS(j, t) must equal the
imitation cost wS(t)FS(t),
vS (j, t) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
(
−
∫ s
t
r(τ)dτ
)
piS (j, s) ds = wS(t)FS(t). (3.10)
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Asset Holdings and Balance of Payments
The balance of payments in present value terms is determined by
0 =
∫ ∞
0
{[
(1− β)LNS(t)ωNbN − βL (NS(t)−NS(t)) zS(t)]
+ βLTS(t)} exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt (3.11)
where the first term in brackets on the right-hand side denotes the trade balance and the
second term net transfer payments. We assume that net foreign assets (portfolio investments)
are zero.13 Note that if TS(t) > 0 for all t, the South runs a (permanent) trade deficit, i.e. the
value of its exports falls short of the value of its imports.
3.4.5 Steady State
The economy is in a steady state if Northern firms introduce new products at a constant
rate g and Southern firms imitate at a constant rate µ. In steady state, shares of resources
devoted to R&D and production are constant, and the fraction of Northern products that have
not yet been imitated is constant. Furthermore, prices of Northern and Southern products and
therefore, profits of Northern firms are constant. Let us choose the marginal costs of production
of Northern firms as the numeraire, and set wN (t)bN (t) = 1 for all t.
First, we turn to the first-order conditions of the household’s maximization problem. It
follows that the optimal evolution of consumption of Northern and Southern households, i.e.
the Euler equation, in steady state is given by
g = r − ρ (3.12)
which implies equal growth rates in North and South. Households budget constraints in steady
state are given in Appendix 3.A.3.
Now, consider the equilibrium in the labor markets. The resource constraint in the South
(3.8) becomes
βL = gmFS +mbSL. (3.13)
A higher fraction of products that have been imitated m implies that there is more imitation
activity in the South so that on average Northern products are copied sooner, ceteris paribus.
This tends to depress innovation activity in the North implying a lower g. The resource con-
straint of the North (3.7) can be written as follows in the steady state
(1− β)L = gFN + LbN (n−m) + (1− β)LbN (1− n) (3.14)
13 Because of equal interest rates, consumption growth is identical across regions in steady state. Hence, net
foreign assets will remain zero forever. If net foreign assets are non-zero, TS is to be interpreted as sum of
transfer and interest payments. For a formal derivation see Appendix 3.A.4.
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where n denotes the "consumption gap" between South and North. Note that a higher share
of the South in total production m releases resources from the production sector in the North
that can be reallocated to the R&D sector, ceteris paribus. This allows the North to introduce
new products at a higher rate g. Furthermore, a higher consumption share of the South n
induces a reallocation from the R&D sector to the production sector in the North to satisfy the
additional demand for existing Northern products by the South, thereby depressing innovation
in the North, ceteris paribus.
Next, a fixed inter-sectoral allocation of labor implies that prices of Northern products must
be constant in steady state. We denote the price of a new product that is sold exclusively to
Northern households as zN . Since all firms face the same demand curve and have the same cost
structure, zN is identical for all new products j ∈ (NS(t), N(t)]. From the arbitrage condition
(3.6) follows that prices for all old Northern goods j ∈ (NS(t), NS(t)], which are sold to all
households, are also constant and determined by zS = β + (1− β) zN . Moreover, this implies
that profits are constant over time. Prices of Southern products wN (t)bN (t) are equal to 1 due
to our choice of numeraire. This is consistent with the steady state, else demand for Southern
labor would change over time.
Let us consider the average life cycle in steady state of some product j, which is introduced
at time t. At the time of introduction product j is sold at price zN exclusively to Northern
households. At time t + ∆, where N(t) = NS(t + ∆) = NS(t) exp (g∆), the Northern firm
producing good j lowers the price to β + (1− β) zN and exports it to the South. Therefore,
the average demand lag equals ∆ = − log(n)/g > 0, decreasing in the consumption share n
and the innovation rate g. We consider the case where T˜ > t + ∆ for all t. In other words,
on average Northern products are exported to the South for some time before they are copied
by a Southern firm.14 Notice that in steady state T˜ follows an exponential distribution. Thus,
the average time span product j is being produced in the North is determined by 1/µ. Hence,
our assumption above implies that the demand lag is shorter than the time span product j is
being manufactured in the North, i.e. 1/µ > ∆. Due to lower production costs in the South,
Southern firms can set a price marginally below 1, the marginal costs of Northern firms. Hence,
the Northern firm stops producing product j and the product is now exported to the North.
Of course, this discussion is only relevant for the average product. By the random nature of
imitation there will be some products that are imitated before households in the South become
rich enough to afford them. Hence, those products will skip the export stage. The average life
cycle of product j in terms of sales volume is depicted in Figure 3.6 below.
From the definition of the imitation rate µ = N˙S(t)/NN (t) we can express the production
share of the South in the total number of differentiated products as
m =
µ
g + µ
(3.15)
which must be constant in the steady state. Next, the zero-profit condition (3.9) together with
14Note that in the other case with T˜ ≤ t+ ∆, goods would on average skip the export stage. We consider the
case in the text to be the interesting one.
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the arbitrage condition (3.6) in the North implies that in the steady state the value of a firm
is equal to the expected present discounted value of its future profits
[zN − 1] (1− β)L
r + µ
=
FN
bN
. (3.16)
Similarly, in the South the zero-profit condition (3.10) yields[
1− ωSbS]L
r
= ωSFS (3.17)
where ωS(t) ≡ wS(t)/N(t) is constant since wages in the South grow at rate g. Last, in steady
state, the balance of payments (3.11) becomes
(n−m) [β + (1− β)zN ]β = m(1− β) + βT (3.18)
where T ≡ TS(t)/N(t). Note that due to Walras’ law the balance of payments is implied by
the budget constraints, the zero-profit conditions and the resource constraints.
Equations (3.12)-(3.18) in the unknowns g, µ, n, m, r, zN , and ωS fully characterize the
steady state. We can reduce this system to 2 equations in 2 unknowns m and g. The first
equation, the RS-curve, describes a steady state relationship between g andm that is consistent
with labor market clearing in the South:
m =
βL
gFS + bSL
. (3.19)
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The second equation, the NA-curve, describes a steady state relationship between g and m that
is consistent with labor market clearing in the North, balance of payments, free entry in the
North, and the no arbitrage condition(
1 + ρ
FN
bNL
+
g
1−m
FN
bNL
)(
(1− β)
(
1
bN
− 1 +m
)
− g F
N
bNL
)
= m(1− β) + βT. (3.20)
To guarantee that the NA-curve defined by (3.20) has a positive x-axis intercept in the (m, g)
space we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1.
(
1 + ρ F
N
bNL
)
(1− β) ( 1
bN
− 1) ≥ βT .
Proposition 3.1. Given Assumption 1 holds, a steady state equilibrium with positive growth
rate g and a constant share of imitated products m exists.
Proof. The RS-curve (3.19) is downward sloping in the (m, g)-space. To determine the shape
of the NA-curve we rewrite (3.20) as NA(m, g) = 0. The left hand side of this equation is
a quadratic function in g with inverted U-shape. If Assumption 1 holds, NA(m, g) has a
negative and a positive solution for g. Thus, NAg(m, g) < 0 at the relevant solution. Fur-
ther, differentiation shows that NAm(m, g) = g(1−m)2
FN
bNL
(
(1− β) ( 1
bN
− 1 +m)− g FN
bNL
)
+(
ρ F
N
bNL
+ g1−m
FN
bNL
)
(1− β) > 0. Hence, the NA-curve has a positive slope and positive inter-
cept with the x-axis and a negative intercept with the y-axis in the (m, g)-space. Figure 3.7
below depicts the graphical solution of the steady state.15
3.4.6 Transitional Dynamics
The transitional dynamics are easy to characterize. The full derivation of the transitional
dynamics including a phase plane illustrating the dynamics is given in Appendix 3.A.2. If we
replace g with gS at the axis in Figure 3.7 above, the RS-curve now determined by equation
(3.8), representing the Southern full employment condition only, must hold also outside the
steady state. Hence, along a transition path, m and gS move along the RS-curve. The NA-
curve (3.20), instead, is a steady state condition. Appendix 3.A.2 further demonstrates that
the steady state is sattle-path stable. When the number of industries in the South is below
its steady state value, m(0) < m, then m˙/m = gS − g > 0, i.e. the growth rate of imitation
is higher than the growth rate of innovation during the transition process. Thus, m converges
monotonically to its steady state value.
15Note that the m|g=0 implied by NA|g=0 is given by m = −
[(
1 + ρ F
N
bNL
)
(1− β) ( 1
bN
− 1)− βT] /ρ(1 −
β) F
N
bNL
< 0 due to Assumption 3.1. Furthermore, evaluating the NA-curve at m→ 1 yields
1 + ρ
FN
bNL
+
g
1−m
FN
bNL
=
(1− β) + βT
(1− β) 1
bN
− g FN
bNL
where the left-hand side goes to infinity as m → 1 for any 0 < g < ∞. Hence, the right-hand side goes to
infinity as g → (1− β)L/FN .
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Figure 3.7: Steady state
3.5 Comparative Statics
In this section we explore the steady state implications on the growth rate and the length of the
product cycle for the following changes: An increase in imitation productivity in the South and
an exogenous change in inequality across regions. We simulate comparative statics results. The
simulation results are depicted in Appendix 3.A.5. Note that the wage rate of North relative to
South is determined by wN (t)/wS(t) =
(
ωSbN
)−1, where ωS = (bS + (ρ+g)FS/L)−1 is pinned
down by (3.17). Using the zero-profit condition (3.16) and the arbitrage condition in the North,
we get an expression for the terms of trade of the North, zS = 1 + [ρ+ g/(1−m)]FN/bNL.
3.5.1 Increase in Southern Labor Productivity
Proposition 3.2. An increase in Southern productivity, i.e. a decrease in bS or FS, results in
a higher growth rate g, Southern imitation share m and imitation rate µ. Hence, the average
time span a product is being manufactured in the North 1/µ becomes shorter. While the terms
of trade move in favor of the North (zS increases), two opposing effects move relative wages
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and the consumption share. Higher Southern productivity tends to increase Southern relative
wages while the higher growth rate g tends to decrease them. A higher imitation rate expands
the Southern consumption share whereas the higher growth rate dampens it.
Proof. A decrease in bS shifts the RS-curve upwards, whereas a decrease in FS rotates the
RS-curve upwards, both leaving the NA-curve unaffected. Hence, both a decrease in bS and
FS lead to a higher growth rate g and Southern imitation and consumption share m. The
imitation rate increases, as µ depends positively on g and m. According to the Northern zero
profit condition (3.16) zN and zS increase. Using the Southern zero profit condition (3.17) we
see that ωS increases with higher productivity in the South but decreases in g. This implies
that relative wages wN (t)/wS(t) decrease due to the direct productivity effect and increase
because of a higher growth rate. Using the Northern resource constraint, we see that a higher
g reduces n while the higher m raises n.
Intuitively, a reduction in FS or bS triggers more imitation because it is cheaper to produce
imitated goods. An increase in µ leads to a higher risk-adjusted interest rate and hence to
a lower present discounted value of profits earned from innovation, reducing the incentives to
innovate. At the same time, households in the South become relatively richer (ωS increases).
Their willingness to pay increases and hence Northern terms of trade zS improve. Moreover,
they can afford to purchase a broader range of products (n rises). Higher Northern prices raises
profits from developing new products and therefore, the incentives to innovate increase. This
latter effect dominates such that the innovation rate g rises. However, the imitation rate µ
increases more than the innovation rate g, leading to an increase in the fraction of imitated
goods m in equilibrium. The increase in Southern labor productivity tends to directly increase
the wage rate ωS , holding g constant. However, there is also an indirect effect through the
increase in g, which leads to an increase in the interest rate r and therefore, to a decrease
in the present discounted value of profits. The indirect effect induces less firms to enter the
market in the South, which tends to depress labor demand in the South and hence the wage
rate ωS . In our simulations the direct effect dominates such that the Northern relative wage
rate wN (t)/wS(t) decreases. As Southern households grow richer, not only their willingness
to pay for Northern products increases but also the range of consumed goods. This increases
the consumption share of the South. At the same time, a higher innovation rate dampens the
consumption share. In our simulations the first effect dominates, i.e. the consumption share
increases.
Effect on the Product Life-cycle
The time length ∆ where products are exclusively sold in the North becomes shorter due to
two reasons: households in the South are relatively richer (n rises) and the overall growth rate
g is higher. Since the imitation rate µ increases, the average time span a product is being
manufactured in the North 1/µ becomes shorter as well. The third stage during which the
North imports a product clearly increases. The time period during which the North exports a
product (1/µ−∆) decreases according to our simulations.
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Limit Case: Costless Reverse Engineering
Suppose, less realistically, that reverse engineering is costless, i.e. FS → 0. As FS → 0 the
RA-curve rotates upwards and becomes a horizontal line at = β/bS < 1. Since the NA-curve is
independent of FS , the growth rate g and the Southern imitation share m increase as FS → 0.
The intuition is that if imitation becomes costless, the South can take over the maximal share
of production from the North. This releases resources in the North that can be allocated to
the research and development of new products. At the same time, the imitation activity is at
its maximum in the South (only restricted through limited resources), which means that the
risk-adjusted interest rate peaks, depressing the present discounted value of profits earned from
creating new products. In equilibrium, the first effect dominates the second one, and g reaches
a maximum.
3.5.2 Changes in Income Inequality across Regions
Proposition 3.3. An increase in T , i.e. lowering world income inequality, leads to a new
steady state where the growth rate g is lower and the share of imitated and consumed products,
m and n, are higher. Northern relative wages deteriorate. There are opposing effects on the
terms of trade and on the three stages of the product life cycle.
Proof. An increase in T leads to an upward shift of the NA-curve since NA|g=0 is a positive
function of T . Notice that g implied by the NA-curve as m→ 1 is given by g = (1− β)L/FN ,
independent of T . As the RS-curve is unaffected by a change in T , the new steady state has a
lower g and higher m. Using the Northern resource constraint, we see that a lower g together
with a higher m increases n. Since ωS is a decreasing function of g, Northern relative wages
wN (t)/wS(t) =
(
ωSbN
)−1 are lower. A lower g tends to decrease the terms of trade zS , whereas
a higher m tends to increase them.
A higher transfer leads to higher incomes in the South and lower incomes in the North,
ceteris paribus. Lower incomes in the North depress the incentives to develop a new product,
which decreases the innovation rate g. As Southern resources are fixed, the fraction of imitated
products increase. At the same time, higher incomes in the South translate into a higher
willingness to pay for older products produced in the North. This implies that profits of
innovating firms in the North from selling only to Northern households fall short of profits from
selling to all households, creating a disequilibrium in the North. This induces some Northern
firms to start exporting. As Southern households consume more products, i.e. NS(t) increases,
their marginal willingness to pay, ceteris paribus, decreases until the equilibrium in the North
is restored. In the new equilibrium, households in the South consume a higher fraction of all
products n, and their (marginal) willingness to pay is lower. In our simulations, the North’s
export prices zS decrease, and as the North’s import prices are equal to one, the terms of trade
move in favor of the South.16
16Totally differentiating the Northern zero-profit condition (3.16) and the definition of the imitation rate
(3.15) shows that dzN > 0 and dµ < 0 if and only if β/
(
β − bSm) > m/(1 −m) > bSL/FS , where β/bS > m
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Effect on the Product Life-cycle
There are two opposing effects on the the first stage of the product cycle (the demand lag ∆).
On the one hand, households in the South are richer so that the Northern firm producing the
latest product would like to export sooner (effect of higher n). On the other hand, even though
the level of income for Southern households is higher, their income grows at a lower rate. This
induces the Northern producer of the latest product to export later (effect of lower g). The
simulations show that the first effect dominates so that the first stage, where new products are
exclusively sold in the North, becomes shorter. There are two opposing effects on the second
stage of the product cycle. On the one hand, the imitation rate µ decreases because of a lower
growth rate g. On the other hand, the higher share of imitation increases µ. In our simulations
the effect of a lower growth rate dominates. Hence, the average time span a product is being
manufactured in the North 1/µ becomes longer so that the third stage during which the North
imports a product decreases. Moreover, the time period during which the North exports a
product (1/µ−∆) becomes longer.
3.5.3 Comparison to CES Utility Case
An important advantage of the non-homothetic utility function assumption is the possibility
to analyze the effect of the demand side on the average time span of the three product cycle
stages. With CES preferences there is no first stage where the product is exclusively produced
and consumed in the North as all consumers consume all goods. This is a main difference
of this chapter compared to Grossman and Helpman (1991a). Besides being able to discuss
effects on the first stage, the model presented in this paper is similar to the narrow-gap case in
Grossman and Helpman (1991a). In the following, we are going to elaborate some differences
and similarities in the comparative statics results.
A change in Southern productivity has similar effects. An improvement in Southern pro-
ductivity in imitation leads in both models to higher growth and imitation rates. Relative wage
rates move in favor of the South. In Grossman and Helpman (1991a) the Northern terms of
trade are connected to the change in relative wage rates (prices are a constant markup over
marginal costs), and hence deteriorate. In this paper, the terms of trade depend on the will-
ingness to pay of households and hence move in favor of the North. As Southern relative wages
increase, Southern households’ willingness to pay for Northern products increase.
Next, we have a closer look at changes in inequality. In Grossman and Helpman (1991a),
a transfer from rich North to poor South has no effects on innovation incentives because of
CES preferences. Instead, let us compare country size effects for which we provide simulation
results in Appendix 3.A.5. In Grossman and Helpman (1991a), an increase of the Southern
labor force leads to an acceleration of innovation and imitation. Moreover, relative Southern
wage rates increase. In our paper, the effect of a larger Southern population share leads also to
a higher imitation rate. The innovation rate, however, decreases if South is not too productive
in producing and imitating. This can be easily seen using the two equilibrium conditions, the
and we used that along the RS-curve dm/dg < 0. Sufficient conditions are m < 0.5 and bSL/FS < 1.
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RS-curve and NA-curve. Both curves shift upwards with an increase in β. However, the RS-
curve shifts up more than the NA-curve, and hence the positive effect on g becomes larger, the
smaller bS is. A higher population share in the South implies a higher production share in the
South which releases resources in the North for innovation. This channel tends to dominate
with a higher productivity in the production sector of the South. Northern relative wage rates
decrease here, too. Northern terms of trade, however, increase as the Southern willingness to
pay for Northern products increases with the rise in relative wages.
3.6 Extensions
Due to our assumption of symmetric preferences and identical cost structures the product cycle
of product j is indeterminate. In order to show that the product cycle we impose in our baseline
model emerges from more complex models, without changing the basic channels through which
the income distribution operates, we discuss two extensions. It is straightforward to either
change the assumptions about preferences or about technology such that the indeterminacy
vanishes.
3.6.1 Hierarchic Preferences
Following Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006), we assume that households have the following non-
homothetic preferences
u(c(j, t)) =
∫ N(t)
j=0
j−γc(j, t)dj
where the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) determines the “steepness” of the hierarchy, i.e. how fast
marginal utility falls in the index j. One can view low-indexed products as satisfying more
basic needs relative to higher-indexed products. It is straightforward to derive the willingness
to pay for good j, which is given by z(j, t) ≡ j−γ [u(·)λ(t)]−1, and decreases in the index j.
In other words, households demand, and therefore Northern firms develop, products along the
hierarchy, starting with low-indexed products and gradually moving up the hierarchy ladder.
This implies that profit-maximizing prices for Northern products, and hence profits decrease in
the index j, given all firms have the same cost structure.
We continue to assume that Southern households can afford to consume some products
manufactured in the North. Which Northern firms do not export and which firms do? First,
suppose that no firm in the North exports. In that case Southern households would not ex-
haust their budget constraints and their willingness to pay would become infinitely large. This
implies that prices for the lowest-indexed products, which have not yet been imitated by the
South, become infinitely high. Hence, the firms producing the lowest-indexed products have an
incentive to start exporting their products. Second, consider the case where all Northern firms
export. In that case, Northern households would not exhaust their budget constraints, and
their willingness to pay for an additional product would become infinitely high. This implies
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that new firms enter the market along the consumption hierarchy, manufacturing products that
Southern households cannot afford, and that are therefore not exported.
We keep our assumptions about technology in the North. However, instead of assuming
that Southern firms target Northern products at random for imitation, we assume that patents
expire at time T˜ < ∞, where T˜ is now deterministic. Random imitation would imply that
there might be "holes" in the hierarchy of products. Southern firms must still invest a fixed
amount of resources, e.g. building local production facilities, reverse engineering or learning the
production process, in order to manufacture products, whose patents have expired, at constant
marginal costs. The fixed cost implies that it is never a dominant strategy for a Southern firm
to copy a product, which has already been imitated by another Southern firm. After the patent
expires the Southern firm imitating the product enters into price competition with the original
Northern innovator, which leads to a limit price equal to marginal costs of the Northern firm,
and the exit of the Northern firm.
In sum, this model would generate the following deterministic product cycle in a steady
state. At some time t ≥ 0, the Northern firm j introduces the lowest-indexed product that has
not yet been invented. It starts selling its product to Northern households at the price zN (j, t)
since only they can afford to purchase new products that satisfy relatively non-essential needs.
The price zN (j, t) increases at rate γg until after ∆ periods, which is still determined by
N(t) = NS(t) exp (g∆), the Northern firm finds it attractive to lower the price to zS(j, t) and
starts exporting its product.17 The price zS(j, t) increases at rate γg until after T˜ > t + ∆
periods the patent expires, a Southern firm copies the product and price competition drives
the Northern firm out of the market. The price drops to the marginal cost of production
of Northern firms, and stays constant from then on. Hence, such a model would eliminate
the indeterminacy of the product cycle. However, the analysis would be substantially more
complicated without presumably adding much additional insight.
3.6.2 Learning-by-doing
In the following, we keep our assumptions from the basic model about preferences (Section
3.4.2) and technology in South (Section 3.4.3). However, we follow Matsuyama (2002) and
assume that there is passive learning-by-doing (i.e. externality of the manufacturing process)
in the production sector of the North. In particular, we assume that producing one unit of
output requires bN (j, t) = bN (Q(j, t)) /N(t) units of labor, where bN (·) is a decreasing function
of the discounted cumulative output determined by
Q(j, t) = δ
∫ t
−∞
C(j, s) exp (δ (s− t)) ds
17This follows from taking the time derivate of the willingness to pay for the most recently innovated product
N(t), which is given in the steady state by z˙N (N(t), t)/zN (N(t), t) = r − ρ − g. In a steady state where the
allocation of resources in the North is constant across sectors the price of the newest product must be constant,
i.e. r = ρ + g. In the steady state n = NS(t)/N(t) must be constant too, so that the price of any product j
evolves over time as follows z˙i(j, t)/zi(j, t) = r − ρ − (1 − γ)g for i ∈ {N,S}. Hence, using r = ρ + g yields
z˙i(j, t)/zi(j, t) = γg. Note that the firm selling the newest product must be indifferent in equilibrium whether
to export or not, i.e. [zN (NS(t), t)− 1] (1− β) = [zS (NS(t), t)− 1], where zN (NS(t), t) = n−γzN (N(t), t).
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where δ > 0 can be interpreted as both the speed of learning as well as the rate of depreciation
of the learning experience. Again, C(j, t) ∈ {0, (1− β)L,L} denotes market demand. Due to
depreciation the cumulative learning experience Q(j, t) is bounded from above by C(j, t), and
can therefore not exceed L. We continue to assume that the creation of a new product requires
FN (t) units of labor. As in the previous section, we assume that patents expire after T˜ < ∞
periods.
Again, consider a situation where Southern households can afford to purchase some of the
products made in the North. Prices of Northern and Southern products are still determined as
before. Our assumptions about technology imply that profits of Northern firms increase with
production experience, ceteris paribus. In other words, firms which have been in the market
for a longer time earn higher profits since their marginal costs are lower. In equilibrium, at
any point in time some firms export and some sell exclusively to Northern households. Hence,
there must be some threshold value Q (NS(t), t), implicitly defined by[
zN (NS(t), t)− wN (t)b
N (Q (NS(t), t))
N(t)
]
(1− β) =
[
zS (NS(t), t)− wN (t)b
N (Q (NS(t), t))
N(t)
]
,
at which a Northern firm is indifferent between exporting or not. Below this threshold value the
profits from excluding Southern households exceed the profits from exporting, and vice versa.
In other words, below the threshold value Q (NS(t), t) the price effect dominates the market
size effect, and vice versa.
Hence, this model would imply that products go through the following cycle in steady state.
A new product introduced by a Northern firm is first sold at high prices zN only in the domestic
market since this firm has a relatively low productivity level at which the price effect dominates
the market size effect. The Northern firm finds it optimal to lower the price to zS and start
exporting its product after ∆ periods (still determined as before) since incomes in the South
grow and the Northern firm becomes more productive. At time T˜ > t + ∆ the patent of the
product expires, and it is imitated by a Southern firm. Price competition implies that the limit
price drops to marginal costs of Northern firms, and the Northern firm exits the market. From
then onwards the product is imported by the North from the South.
3.7 Conclusion
Vernon’s (1966) celebrated product cycle theory hypothesizes that new products go through
the following stages. In the first stage, new products are developed and introduced in high-
income countries. Later in the cycle, incomes in the poorer countries have grown sufficiently
such that demand for these products appears there. Thus, products that were only consumed
in high-income countries before are now exported. In the third stage, production moves from
high-income countries to low-income countries because they have learned the technology to
produce these goods and are able to produce them at lower costs.
In this chapter we provide suggestive evidence for the different stages of the product cycle
hypothesis. We show that 6 major consumer durables appear to have gone (or still go) through
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a "typical" product cycle. In particular, new products are not introduced simultaneously across
countries and the lag in introduction depends negatively on relative GDP per capita, i.e. relative
to the first country where a product is introduced. In other words, new products are introduced
in aﬄuent countries before they are introduced in less prosperous countries.
The chapter contributes to the literature by building a dynamic general-equilibrium model
that is able to generate the three stages of the product cycle described by Vernon (1966). In this
model, a wealthy North develops new products, which a poor South randomly attempts to copy.
Besides technology, the incentives to innovate and imitate are determined by the distribution
of income across regions. In other words, the demand side is an important determinant of the
product cycle stages. Aside from analyzing changes in Southern labor productivity, we elaborate
the effects of a redistribution of income between North and South such that inequality across
regions decreases. We show that a decrease in inequality across regions leads to a decline
in the innovation rate and hence a slowdown of imitation activity in the South (for a given
share of the South in total production). Since Southern households are wealthier after the
redistribution of income, they can afford to purchase a higher share of goods available in the
world market (in particular, they can afford more newer goods produced in the North). Since
Southern households are wealthier (even though their incomes grow at a lower rate), firms in
the North want to export their products sooner. Therefore, the first stage of the cycle becomes
shorter. At the same time the average duration new products are manufactured in the North
increases because imitation activity in the South has slowed down. Firms in the South master
the technology to produce a good later so that on average it takes longer for the production
to move there (because of the cost advantage). Hence, the second stage of the product cycle
where new goods are exported by the North to the South becomes longer. Therefore, the third
stage of the cycle where the products are imitated and exported to the North becomes shorter.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Household Problem
Households maximize logarithmic intertemporal utility, where consumption c (j, t) is its control,
and asset holdings a(t) its (endogenous) state variable
max
{c(j,t)}∞t=0
U(0) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−ρt) log u
(
{c (j, t)}N(t)j=0
)
dt
where ρ > 0 denotes the time preference rate, subject to the non-negativity constraint c(j, t) ≥
0, and the flow budget constraint
a˙(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) + T (t)− e(t)
with a(0) ≥ 0, c (j, t) ∈ {0, 1}, and e(t) = ∫ N(t)0 p(j, t)c(j, t)dj. Furthermore, households face a
no-Ponzi game condition of the following form
lim
t→∞ exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
a(t) = 0
where r(t) denotes the risk-free interest rate.
Households take the time paths of the interest rate, the wage rate, prices for all goods j, as
well as the set of differentiated products in the economy {r(t), w(t), p(j, t), N(t)}∞t=0 as given.
The current value Hamiltonian is given by
H (t, c(j), a, λ, µ) = log u (·) + λ(t) [r(t)a(t) + w(t) + T (t)− e(t)] +
∞∑
j
ξ(j, t)c(j, t)
where λ(t) denotes the costate variable on the flow budget constraint and ξ(j, t) the one on the
non-negativity constraints. The maximum principle conditions are
max
{c(j,t)}N(t)j=0
H (t, c(j), a, λ, µ) for all t ∈ [0,∞] , j ∈ [0, N(t)] :
u (·)−1 − λ(t)p(j, t) = 0, c (j, t) = 1
u (·)−1 − λ(t)p(j, t) ≤ 0, c (j, t) = 0
λ(t)r(t) = −λ˙(t) + ρλ(t)
a˙(t) = r(t)a(t) + w(t) + T (t)− e(t)
lim
t→∞ exp (−ρt)λ(t)a(t) = 0.
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3.A.2 Derivation of Transitional Dynamics
Using the resource constraint of the South, the relationship between g and gS , the resource
constraint of the North to substitute for g, and the balance of payments to substitute for n
(assuming that it is balanced period by period), we obtain the m˙ - schedule
m˙
m
=
(
1
FN/bNL
){
λβzN
β + (1− β)zN −
[
(1− β)
(
1
bN
− 1
)
+m− F
(
β/bS
m
− 1
)]}
where λ = λN/λS which is constant and equal to its steady state value, and F =
FN/bNL
FS/bSL
. The
m˙ = 0 locus is determined by
βλzN
β + (1− β)zN = (1− β)
(
1
bN
− 1
)
+m− F
(
β/bS
m
− 1
)
.
It is straightforward to show that dzN/dm > 0, zN (m) → −∞ as m → 0, and zN (m) equals
a positive constant larger than one as m→ β/bS if and only if (1− β) (1/bN − 1)+ β/bS > λ
(this simply requires inequality between North and South to be sufficiently high). Thus, the
m˙ = 0 locus is increasing in the (zN ,m)-space. We deduce the following dynamics for m:
m˙
m

> 0, zN < z
∗
N
= 0, zN = z
∗
N
< 0, zN > z
∗
N
where z∗N denotes the steady state value.
The z˙N - schedule is obtained by using the balance of payments, the Northern and Southern
resource constraints, the definition of the hazard rate, the Euler equation, and the North’s zero-
profit condition
z˙N
zN
=
(
1
FN/bNL
){
(zN − 1) (1− β) + λβzN
β + (1− β)zN
−
[
(1− β)
(
1
bN
− 1
)
+m+
ρFN
bNL
+ F
(
m
1−m
)(
β/bS
m
− 1
)]}
.
The z˙N = 0 locus is determined by
(1− β) (zN − 1) + βλzN
β + (1− β)zN = (1− β)
(
1
bN
− 1
)
+ m+
ρFN
bNL
+ F
(
m
1−m
)(
β/bS
m
− 1
)
.
The slope of the z˙N = 0 locus is given by
dzN
dm
=
[β + (1− β)zN ]2
β2λ+ (1− β)[β + (1− β)zN ]2
[
1− F
(1−m)2 (1− β/b
S)
]
.
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We define m˜ ≡ 1 −
√
F (1− β/bS) > 0 with β/bS < 1, and where m˜ > 0 requires that
(1 − β/bS)−1 > F , which holds e.g. in the case of identical technology, i.e. F = 1. It
follows that dzN/dm > 0 if m < m˜, and vice versa. In other words, the z˙N = 0 locus is
decreasing for m ∈ (m˜, β/bS), and increasing for m ∈ (0, m˜) in the (zN ,m)-space. We note
that zN (m) → −∞ as m → 1 and zN (m) converges to a constant as m → 0. Eventually, it
follows that the dynamics for zN are given by
z˙N
zN

> 0, zN > z
∗
N
= 0, zN = z
∗
N
< 0, zN < z
∗
N .
Hence, we have a system of two differential equations in m (state variable) and zN (choice
variable), whose solution is saddle-path stable. Figure A.1 below shows the phase diagram. We
see that if m is below (above) its steady state value m∗ it converges monotonically towards the
steady state along the saddle-path.
!!!!
! !! !
!!0!1!
!̇! = 0! !̇ = 0!
Figure A.1: Phase diagram
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3.A.3 Budget Constraints
The intertemporal budget constraint of households in the North is in the steady state given by
N(t) {m+ (n−m) [β + (1− β) zN ] + (1− n) zN} = (r − g)aN (t) + wN (t)− TN (t)
where yN (t) = aN (t)+wN (t)/(r−g)−TN (t)/(r−g) denotes the lifetime income of a Northern
household. We observe that Northern households save only out of their capital income (note
that r − g = ρ), and consume all their labor income (and possible transfer income). In other
words, the marginal propensity to consume out of labor and transfer income is one. Similarly,
in the steady state the intertemporal budget constraint of households in the South becomes
N(t) {m+ (n−m) [β + (1− β) zN ]} = (r − g)aS(t) + wS(t) + TS(t)
where yS(t) = aS(t) +wS(t)/(r− g) +TS(t)/(r− g) denotes the lifetime income of a household
in the South. Similarly to Northern households, Southern households save only out of capital
income and consume all labor income. Hence, relative lifetime incomes per capita in the steady
state are (endogenously) determined by
yS(t)
yN (t)
=
ρaS(t) + w
S(t) + TS(t)
ρaN (t) + wN (t)− TN (t) .
Note that in the simulations we measure inequality with the Gini coefficient. If the South’s
income share equals its population share the Lorenz curve lies on the 45 degree line of perfect
equality, and the Gini coefficient is zero.
3.A.4 Balance of Payments
The intertemporal budget constraint of households in the South, the resource constraint in the
South, and the zero-profit condition in the South imply the balance of payments as stated in
the text. Due to Walras’ law, the intertemporal budget constraint of the North is redundant.
We drop the time index t where no confusion arises. The balance of payments in present value
form at t = 0 is given by
0 =
{∫ ∞
0
[
(1− β)LNSωNbN − βL (NS −NS) zS] exp(−∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt
}
+
∫ ∞
0
βLTS exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt
+
{
βLaS(0)−
∫ ∞
0
NS
[
piS − gSvS] exp(−∫ t
0
r(s)ds
)
dt
}
where we used βLN = N˙SFS + NSbSL from the resource constraint, vS = ωSFS from the
zero-profit condition, and a no-Ponzi game condition. The first two lines denote the current
account, which consists of the trade balance and net transfer payments. The third line denotes
net foreign asset holdings. In the steady state, we have that r and piS are constant, NS grows
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at a constant rate gS = g, and vS = piS/r. This implies that net foreign assets become{
βLaS(0)−NS(t)piS/r
}
. Hence, the balance of payments in the steady state is determined by
0 =
{
NS(t)(1− β)LωNbN − (NS(t)−NS(t)) zS(t)βL}+ βLTS(t) + {βLaS(t)−NS(t)piS/r}
which holds for all t in steady state, in particular at t = 0. Hence, it becomes obvious that
if we assume initial wealth at time t = 0 of households in the South βLaS(t) to be exactly
equal to the present discounted value of aggregate firm profits in the South NS(t)vS(t), net
foreign assets will remain zero in steady state. We see that if Southern households would inherit
sufficiently large asset holdings they could run a permanent trade deficit (even in the absence
of transfers from North).
3.A.5 Simulations
We choose the following parameter configuration for our baseline simulation: L = 1, FN =
FS = 5, bN = bS = 0.75, β = 0.5, ρ = 0.04, and T = 0.
Increase in Southern Labor Productivity
Figures A.2-A.4 show the comparative statics results of a change in labor productivity in
production in the South.
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Figure A.2: Effect on innovation rate and consumption share of the South
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Figure A.4: Effect on the stages of the product cycle
Figures A.5-A.7 show the comparative statics results of a change in labor productivity in
R&D in the South.
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Figure A.5: Effect on innovation rate and consumption share of the South
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Changes in Inequality across Regions
Figures A.8-A.10 depict the effects of an increase in inequality across regions due to a regressive
transfer, i.e. a transfer from poor South to rich North.
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Figure A.8: Effect on innovation rate and consumption share of the South
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Figure A.10: Effect on stages of the product cycle
Changes in Population Shares
Figures A.11-A.13 show the effects of an increase in Southern population share.
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4 Income Distribution, Market Size, and
Foreign Direct Investment
4.1 Introduction
Picture Mom, Dad, and the kids in an upper-middle-class Asian family in 10 years’
time: After loading up with cash at the corner Citibank, they drive off to Walmart
and fill the trunk of their Ford with the likes of Fritos and Snickers. On the way
home, they stop at the American-owned Cineplex to catch the latest Disney movie,
paying with their Visa card. In the evening, after putting the kids to bed, Mom and
Dad argue furiously about whether to invest in a Fidelity mutual fund or in a life
insurance policy issued by American International Group (The New York Times,
February 1, 1998).
Why do firms engage in foreign direct investment to serve a foreign market rather than
export? The economic literature on foreign direct investment (FDI) and international trade
regards the size of the market in the destination or host country to be a fundamental deter-
minant of investment and trade flows. The size-of-market hypothesis as proposed by Balassa
(1966), and later by Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969), argues that foreign direct investment will
take place if the market is large enough to capture economies of scale. Typically in the litera-
ture, market size is reflected by the host country’s aggregate income (see e.g. Markusen 2002;
Davidson 1980). However, as the quote from the New York Times illustrates it might be the
middle class in the host country that plays a major role in attracting FDI. In turn, this sug-
gests that the distribution of income within the host country may be important in determining
international investment and trade patterns. The business literature has long recognized that
aggregate income might not be an adequate measure for the size of the market:
The problem in using gross national product (or gross domestic product) is its failure
to show for some countries that a large number of people have very low incomes.
Hence, a seemingly sizable GNP might nevertheless represent a small market for
many U.S. goods (Stobaugh 1969, p. 131).
A very early example of FDI also highlights the role of the market size. In 1867 the
Singer Manufacturing Co., with headquarters in New York, opened a production facility for
sewing machines, the first mass marketed (complex) consumer good, in the UK (see Godley
2001). According to Godley (2001) Singer’s enterprise was driven by booming demand and lower
production costs in the UK. Browsing today’s business press confirms that the purchasing power
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and size of the middle class seem elemental aspects for investors in evaluating the attractiveness
of markets. For instance, in a survey on India the consultancy Ernst & Young writes: "The
fundamentals that make India attractive to investors remain intact. The high potential of the
domestic market driven by an emerging middle class . . . " (Ernst & Young 2012b, p. 2).1
Motivated by these observations, this chapter argues that the distribution of aggregate
income within the host country is important for its attractiveness of horizontal FDI because it
segments the market.2 Consider a situation where firms face a proximity-concentration trade-
off, i.e. they want to concentrate production to capture economies of scale, but at the same
time locate their production in the proximity of their consumers due to trade costs. In the
presence of a proximity-concentration trade-off the firm’s foreign market entry mode depends
on which market segment it serves. Firms serving a mass market in the foreign country engage
in FDI, whereas firms catering exclusively to the needs of a few rich abroad tend to export. In
other words, foreign direct investment will take place if the market is large enough to capture
economies of scale. This is the essence of the size-of-market hypothesis. Poor households are
likely to be irrelevant to a firm’s decision because they can often barely afford the level of
subsistence consumption, let alone consumer goods like cars etc. This implies that a country’s
middle class, in terms of per capita income and size, should be important in determining FDI
and trade patterns.
First, we formalize the market size theory in a simple general-equilibrium model with two
regions Home and Foreign, and low, middle and high income classes of consumers in both
regions. We think of Home as a wealthy region relative to Foreign, e.g. the U.S. compared
to the rest of the world. Consumers must satisfy a certain level of subsistence consumption
in terms of food before they can spend income on horizontally differentiated consumer goods.
We look at the case where consumers in the low income class in both regions cannot afford to
purchase differentiated goods. Food is produced under conditions of perfect competition and
sold only domestically. Monopolistic firms producing differentiated goods face a proximity-
concentration trade-off. Due to the presence of iceberg trade costs they want to produce near
their consumers while concentrate their production to take advantage of economies of scale. In
1There are numerous other examples. Ernst & Young (2012a) also emphasizes the importance of the middle
class in its survey on the attractiveness of Russia. The McKinsey Global Institute (2010) makes a similar point
in a report on African economies. In the World Investment Report 2012 prepared by the UNCTAD it is noted
that a growing middle class in emerging markets has attracted FDI in the manufacturing and service sectors
(UNCTAD 2012). Forbes Magazine (2012) writes that the consumer goods company Unilever built a factory
in the Chinese city of Anhui mainly to produce products for China’s growing middle class. In an article on
Indonesia the Wall Street Journal (2013) reports that Toyota Motor Corp., Honda Motor Co. and Nissan Motor
Co. invest several hundred million dollars to step up production at their plants in Indonesia as a response to
increasing car purchases from the growing middle class.
2Traditionally, the literature distinguishes between horizontal and vertical FDI. The former refers to the
duplication of a production facility abroad designed to serve customers in the foreign market, whereas the latter
refers to the segmentation of the production process (i.e. outsourcing or offshoring). Our theory complements
the literature on horizontal FDI. The motives for vertical FDI are usually explained by lower production costs
abroad (see e.g. Blonigen 2005; Caves 2007). Several studies indicate that the bulk of FDI is horizontal rather
than vertical (see e.g. Markusen and Maskus 2002; Ramondo et al. 2011). Recently, a literature concerned with
platform FDI, where the foreign affiliate’s output is sold in a third market rather than the host market, emerged
(see e.g. Ekholm et al. 2007). Although important, in our analysis we will abstract from that phenomenon, as
well as licensing (see e.g. Horstmann and Markusen 1996).
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this setting, ex-ante identical firms choose different pricing strategies supplying different market
segments (i.e. income classes) in equilibrium. Depending on their pricing strategy they opt for a
different mode to supply the foreign market. In equilibrium, firms serving the mass market (i.e.
middle and rich classes in both regions) engage in FDI whereas firms serving exclusively the
rich classes in both regions export. For firms supplying the mass market the cost of exporting
is higher than the cost of setting up a foreign production facility. Since they serve a large
market, economies of scale are high enough to compensate higher fixed costs associated with
FDI such that average costs are lower compared to exporting. Due to our assumptions about
the distribution of income within regions, products sold in the mass market are priced according
to the willingness to pay of the middle class in Foreign. This is the highest price a firm can
set, if it wants to sell on the mass market. Thus, taking the perspective of firms in Home, we
show that, ceteris paribus, redistributing income towards the middle class in Foreign increases
the number of multinational corporations (MNCs) with a production facility in Foreign and
headquarters (HQ) in Home. Expanding the size of the middle class in Foreign has, ceteris
paribus, ambiguous effects on the number of MNCs with HQ in Home, depending on whether
the poor or rich class contracts.
Second, we extend our model to differences in technologies across regions, and show that
the results of redistributing income between classes are the same as in the baseline model.
We further analyze the baseline model in the case of standard CES preferences, and argue
that it is meaningless to distinguish between different market segments in that case because
only aggregate income matters for the determination of FDI. Last, we show that the effects
of changing the income distribution is not isomorphic to changing the skill distribution in the
economy. Based on Markusen and Venables (2000), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005), we
study a simple model where differentiated goods producers combine different skills in their
production. In simulations we show that in contrast to the baseline model the relationship
between per capita income of Foreign’s middle class and the number of MNCs active in Home
is ambiguous.
Third, as an illustration we empirically investigate the model’s predictions regarding FDI
activity, and leave the analysis of trade flows for future work.3 We focus on the effect of
the middle class’ per capita income in the host country on FDI positions, using pooled data
on outward FDI positions from 1997-2007 of OECD countries from the OECD International
Direct Investment Statistics (OECD, 2012). Building on empirical work by Bernasconi (2013),
who uses inequality and income data from UNU-WIDER (2008) and Heston et al. (2012) to
construct empirical income distributions, we define global low, middle, and high income classes
by imposing common income thresholds across all countries in the sample. Applying different
3 In the trade literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the determinants of bilateral trade flows there has
been some renewed interest in countries’ similarity in per capita incomes or income distributions motivated by
the famous Linder hypothesis (Burenstam-Linder 1961), see e.g. Markusen (1986), Hunter (1991), Dalgin et al.
(2008), Fajgelbaum et al. (2009), Hallak (2010), Markusen (2010), Foellmi et al. (2011), Martinez-Zarzoso and
Vollmer (2011), Bernasconi (2013). However, this development has mainly been restricted to the trade literature,
and with the exception of Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) has not spilled over to the literature on foreign direct
investment. For a brief discussion on the problem of estimating FDI flows/stocks and trade flows simultaneously
see Section 4.6.4.
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definitions of a global middle class used in the literature, we find a positive relationship between
average income of the middle class in the host country and the amount of FDI it attracts from
OECD countries, controlling in particular for host GDP and GDP per capita.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The related literature is briefly reviewed
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 presents the baseline model, and looks at the effects of income
redistribution on FDI activity and international trade. In Section 4.5.1, we extend the model
to a North-South perspective allowing for differences in technology across regions. Sections
4.5.2 and 4.5.3 compare the baseline model to the standard model with constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) preferences, and a simple factor-proportions model incorporating different
skill levels. In Section 4.6, we illustrate the predictions of the baseline model with regard to
FDI activity using data on outward FDI stocks of OECD countries. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
This chapter is related to the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of FDI
and international trade. Excellent surveys of the literature can be found in Agarwal (1980),
and more recently, in Helpman (2006) or Caves (2007). A detailed treatment of multinational
firms in general-equilibrium theory is given in Markusen (2002).4
Even though market size is deemed an important determinant of FDI and trade the litera-
ture has, by and large, focused on supply side explanations. Often, consumption patterns for
consumers at different income levels are identical due to the assumptions on preferences. Thus,
implying that the relevant market size for all firms is reflected by aggregate income regardless
of the distribution of income.
For example, Brainard (1997) uses a simple model where consumers have homothetic pref-
erence and firms face a proximity-concentration trade-off to motivate an empirical assessment
of the proximity-concentration hypothesis. Due to the assumption of homothetic preferences
only aggregate GDP in the destination country matters, but not its distribution. Thus, in her
regressions explaining the share of export sales in total sales (i.e. export plus foreign affiliate
sales) Brainard (1997) includes aggregate GDP in the destination country to control for market
size effects. She finds that foreign affiliate relative to export sales increase the higher trade
costs are, and the lower are economies of scale at the plant relative to the firm level. Brainard
(1997) concludes that the proximity-concentration hypothesis is quite robust in explaining the
share of export sales in total sales.
Another example that focuses on the supply side is Helpman et al. (2004), which explores
the emergence of multinational corporations in the context of heterogeneous firms based on
Melitz (2003). They argue that only the most productive firms are internationally active, and
of those only the most productive engage in FDI. Using data on U.S. exports and foreign
4Most theories on the organization of the firm in an international context are based on the OLI (Ownership,
Location, Internalization) framework (see Dunning 1988, Dunning 2000). In this framework the existence of
multinational firms is explained with competitive advantages due to ownership structure, location abroad, and
internalization (net benefits from producing itself rather than licensing technology).
Chapter 4 95
affiliate sales Helpman et al. (2004) confirm the prediction of their model that foreign affiliate
sales relative to export sales are low in sectors where firm heterogeneity is high. Additionally,
they find evidence consistent with the proximity-concentration hypothesis.
A notable exception is Fajgelbaum et al. (2011). They propose a Linder-type explanation
for bilateral FDI activity, and stress that horizontal FDI is more likely to take place between
countries with similar per capita incomes. In particular, they present a multi-country general-
equilibrium model with vertically (quality) differentiated products. Preferences are such that
consumers with higher incomes choose higher quality varieties, and firms face a proximity-
concentration trade-off. They show that firms supply foreign markets that have a similar
demand structure to their domestic market via FDI rather than via exports.
Blonigen (2005) surveys the empirical literature on FDI determinants. A large part of
the literature investigates predictions on FDI decisions based on partial-equilibrium models.
Only recently has the literature started to test general-equilibrium models. Most empirical
models that employ modified versions of the gravity equation approximate market size by
GDP. However, Blonigen (2005) points out that contrary to the trade literature the gravity
equation lacks a theoretical foundation in the FDI literature. He concludes that the (empirical)
literature is still in its infancy and most hypotheses are still up for grabs.5
4.3 Model
We propose a simple general-equilibrium model with two regions, Home and Foreign, where dif-
ferent market sizes interact with a proximity-concentration trade-off. Producers manufacturing
horizontally differentiated products decide whether to serve a foreign market by exporting their
product or whether to duplicate production in the foreign country, depending on the market
segment they serve.
4.3.1 Environment
There are two regions, Home (H) and Foreign (F). The population size of region i = {H,F} is
denoted by Li. In each region i there are three groups of consumers k = {1, 2, 3}, where group
k in region i is of size sikL
i, with
∑
k s
i
k = 1 for all i. Each consumer in region i and group
k is endowed with θik (efficiency) units of labor, supplied inelastically. We make the following
assumption.
Assumption 4.1.
∑
k s
H
k θ
H
k >
∑
k s
F
k θ
F
k .
In equilibrium average income in Home is larger than in Foreign if Assumption 4.1 holds.
5Blonigen (2005) also mentions that most determinants of cross-country FDI are statistically rather fragile.
Blonigen and Piger (2011), using Bayesian statistics to gauge model selection, argue that traditional gravity
variables like parent and host GDP and GDP per capita should be included in a regression explaining bilateral
FDI positions. However, their analysis does not support the inclusion of many explanatory variables used in
previous studies like legal institutions and business costs (e.g. time to start business etc.).
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4.3.2 Consumers
Preferences follow Murphy et al. (1989). All consumers have the same non-homothetic pref-
erences defined over a homogeneous good x (e.g. food), and a continuum of indivisible and
horizontally differentiated products indexed by j ∈ J
U =
x, x ≤ xx+ ∫J c(j)dj, x > x (4.1)
where x denotes a level of subsistence consumption of the homogeneous good that must be sat-
isfied before consumers can start purchasing differentiated products, and c(j) is equal to one if
product j is purchased and zero otherwise. The homogeneous good x is a necessity in the sense
that consumers’ propensity to spend is one at low levels of income, and zero after the subsistence
amount x is purchased. Differentiated products enter the utility of consumers symmetrically,
i.e. no product is intrinsically better or worse than any other product. Indivisibility of differen-
tiated products combined with local satiation after one unit has been purchased, implies that
consumers choose their consumption only along the extensive margin but have no choice about
the intensive margin. This contrasts with standard constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES)
preferences where consumers choose only along the intensive margin but have no choice about
the extensive margin (see Appendix 4.A.3). Consumers maximize utility (4.1) subject to their
budget constraints
y = pxx+
∫
J
p(j)c(j)dj (4.2)
where y ≡ wθ + v denotes income, which consists of wage income wθ and shares in producer
profits v, which will be zero in an equilibrium with free entry; px is the price of food, and p(j) is
the price of differentiated product j. The first-order conditions to the consumer’s maximization
problem for x ≤ x are given by
1− λpx = 0
y − pxx = 0
and for x > x by
1− λp(j) ≥ 0, c(j) = 1
1− λp(j) < 0, c(j) = 0
y − pxx−
∫
J
p(j)c(j)dj = 0
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier, which can be interpreted as the marginal utility of
income. Aﬄuent consumers have a low marginal utility of income (low λ), whereas low-income
consumers have a high marginal utility of income (high λ). The first-order conditions implicitly
define an endogenous income threshold y ≡ pxx. Consumers with income above y can afford to
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buy differentiated products whereas below they cannot. From the first-order conditions we can
deduce individual demand for the homogeneous good and differentiated products. It follows
that individual demand for food is given by
xik =
yik/pix, yik ≤ yix, yik > yi. (4.3)
Individual demand for differentiated product j is determined by
c(j) =
0, p(j) > zik1, p(j) ≤ zik (4.4)
where zik ≡ 1/λik denotes the willingness to pay of a consumer in region i and group k for
product j. Note that c(j) = 0 for all j if y ≤ y, and c(j) = 1 for some j if y > y. In other
words, poor consumers with income below y buy only food. Wealthy consumers with income
above y, spend their residual income (y − y) on differentiated products. They purchase one
unit of a differentiated product if the price of that product does not exceed their willingness to
pay. With growing income they consume an expanding variety of products instead of increasing
consumption of the same products. Figure 4.1 below shows (a) individual demand (4.3) for
food and (b) individual demand (4.4) for differentiated product j.
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Figure 4.1: Individual demand for (a) food and (b) differentiated product j
4.3.3 Producers
Suppose there is a large number of producers in both regions, which employs (homogenous)
labor, the only production factor in the economy.
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Homogeneous Good
Food is produced under conditions of perfect competition with the following constant-return-
to-scale (CRS) technology. In region i, the production of 1 unit of output requires ai units of
labor. We assume that trade costs in the food sector are prohibitively high, and there is no
foreign direct investment.6
Differentiated Products
Technology in the differentiated product sector is based on Brainard (1997). Differentiated
products are produced under conditions of monopolistic competition with free market entry.
Producers have access to the following increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) technology, which might
differ across regions. A producer in region i needs to invest f iE units of labor to invent (differen-
tiate) a new product or blueprint. After investing in the creation of a new product a producer
in region i must incur f iD units of labor to set up a new production plant. The production of
1 unit of output requires bi units of labor. We assume that producers have a choice between
supplying a foreign market by exports or by setting up a foreign production facility, i.e. become
a multinational corporation (MNC). By assumption we rule out the possibility of selling or li-
censing the right to use a blueprint to foreign producers. Suppose that exporters incur all costs
in the country of production, whereas multinational producers incur all variable and fixed costs
in the foreign production plant in the host country. E.g. a producer with headquarters (HQ)
in Home has fixed costs wF fHD to set up a foreign production plant, and variable costs w
F bH
to produce output in the foreign plant. Note that technology is firm-specific and not region-
specific. Differentiated products can be traded across regions at iceberg trade costs τ ∈ (1,∞)
on each unit shipped. Hence, the model features the familiar proximity-concentration trade-off,
where producers would like to maximize the proximity to consumers due to iceberg trade costs,
while at the same time, they would like to concentrate their production in one location due to
increasing-returns-to-scale technology.
4.3.4 Integrated Equilibrium with FDI and Exports
We are interested in an equilibrium where some producers choose to export and others become
multinational corporations. In order to isolate the demand side channel we abstract from
heterogeneous technology across regions, i.e. f iE = fE , f
i
D = fD, b
i = b, and ai = a for all
i = {H,F}. For an extension discussing differences in technology see Section 4.5.1.
Market Demand
We make the following assumption about the distribution of income across regions and groups.
6According to Gibson et al. (2001) the global average tariff (ad valorem) on agricultural products is estimated
at 62 percent. See Davis (1998) for a comparison of tariff rates between homogeneous and differentiated goods.
FAO (1995) estimates that global agricultural exports account for less than 10 percent of total merchandise
exports in 1995. Mahlstein (2010) argues that during the 20th century foreign direct investment in the food
sector was negligible.
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Assumption 4.2.
(
θH1 − y
)
> τ
(
θF1 − y
)
> τ2
(
θH2 − y
)
> τ3
(
θF2 − y
)
> 0 >
(
θH3 − y
)
>
(
θF3 − y
)
.
This assumption has the following implications. First, the income distribution is such that
group 1 corresponds to the rich class, group 2 to the middle class, and group 3 to the poor
class in region i. Second, the poor class in both regions cannot afford to purchase differenti-
ated products. Third, income differences across regions and groups are sufficiently high such
that producers of differentiated products cannot perfectly price discriminate. For a detailed
discussion on the price setting behavior of monopolistic producers see below. Obviously, the
equilibrium structure depends crucially on Assumption 4.2. We think that this assumption
reflects reality well, and thus constitutes an interesting case worth investigating.
Given Assumption 4.2 aggregate demand is determined as follows. Market demand for food
in region i is equal to
Xi =
∑
k
xik = x
(
si1 + s
i
2
)
Li +
yi3s
i
3L
i
pix
(4.5)
where the first term denotes aggregate consumption of the middle and rich classes in region i,
and the second term total consumption of the poor class. Due to symmetry, market demand is
the same for all differentiated products j, and is given by
Ci =

0, pi > zH1
sH1 L
H , zF1 < p
i ≤ zH1
sH1 L
H + sF1 L
F , zH2 < p
i ≤ zF1(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + sF1 L
F , zF2 < p
i ≤ zH2(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH +
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF , pi ≤ zF2 .
(4.6)
If the price exceeds the willingness to pay of the rich class in Home demand for a differentiated
product is zero. If the price is between the willingness to pay of the rich class in Foreign and
the rich class in Home demand is equal to the size of the rich class in Home, and so forth.
Demand is equal to the size of the middle and rich classes in both regions if the price is equal
to or less than the willingness to pay of the middle class in Foreign. Market demand for any
product j is depicted in Figure 4.2 below.
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Figure 4.2: Market demand for product j
Aggregate Supply
Perfect competition in the non-traded food sector implies that prices are equal to marginal
costs. Hence, the price of the homogeneous good in region i is determined by
pix = w
ia. (4.7)
Price setting in the differentiated product market is non-trivial. Monopolistic competition
implies that producers have price setting power, and charge a markup on marginal costs.
In general, producers maximize profits subject to their market demand (4.6) by setting a
price where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Hence, producers would like to sell to
all consumers, and perfectly price discriminate by charging prices equal to the willingness to
pay of each group of consumers. However, the imminent threat of arbitrage opportunities,
i.e. the threat of parallel imports, imposes a price setting restriction on producers. If income
differences across groups and regions are sufficiently pronounced the price setting restriction
becomes binding.7 Assumption 4.2 implies that income differences are sufficiently large such
that producers’ price setting is restricted. In particular, Assumption 4.2 implies that zH1 ≥ τzF1
holds in equilibrium. Hence, producers supplying the rich class in Home and Foreign cannot
perfectly price discriminate. For illustration, suppose that producer j would set a price equal
to zH1 in Home and equal to zF1 in Foreign. However, since by Assumption 4.2, zH1 ≥ τzF1 holds,
it is a profitable enterprise for arbitrageurs to purchase product j at a low price zF1 in Foreign
7We assume that producers can never perfectly price discriminate within region i since they cannot distinguish
between consumers belonging to different groups or storage of such information is prohibitively expensive.
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and ship it to Home at costs τ > 1. There it could be sold with a profit at a price marginally
below zH1 . This threat of parallel imports induces the original producer to set a limit price equal
to τzF1 in Home. Similarly, zF1 ≥ τzH2 implies that producers selling to both middle and rich
classes in Home and the rich class in Foreign cannot perfectly price discriminate, and set prices
equal to zH2 in Home and τzH2 in Foreign. Likewise, zH2 ≥ τzF2 means that producers that sell
to both middle and rich classes in Home and Foreign cannot perfectly price discriminate, and
charge prices equal to τzF2 in Home and zF2 in Foreign. Only producers that serve exclusively
the rich class in Home can perfectly price discriminate and set prices corresponding to zH1 .
Pricing strategy
Assumption 4.2 further implies that some producers must exclude the middle class in Foreign,
some the middle class in Home, and some the rich class in Foreign. For example, consider the
case where all producers serve both the middle and rich classes in both regions. In that case,
consumers in the middle and rich classes in Home pay prices τzF2 and consumers in the middle
and rich classes in Foreign pay prices zF2 for all differentiated products. This implies that
consumers in the middle and rich classes in Home and consumers in the rich class in Foreign
would not exhaust their budget constraints. Since they spend all additional income above yi on
differentiated products their (marginal) willingness to pay would become infinitely large. This
would induce some producers to deviate and exclude the middle class in Foreign. A similar
argument applies for the exclusion of the middle class in Home, and the rich class in Foreign.
Hence, ex-ante identical producers will choose different pricing strategies in equilibrium, serving
different segments of the market. Note that if Assumption 4.2 does not apply, some producers
can perfectly price discriminate across regions, and might not exclude some groups. In the
extreme case, where income differences across regions and groups are sufficiently small all
differentiated products might be available on the world market to all consumers with income
above the income threshold yi. In the following, we stick with Assumption 4.2 since we believe
that it reflects a more interesting and realistic situation.
Location
Let us take the organizational decision, i.e. whether a firm sets up a foreign production facility
or exports, as given for the moment, and look at the location decision. First, consider a producer
who decides to serve the middle and rich classes in both regions. Due to Assumption 4.2 she
sets prices equal to τzF2 in Home and zF2 in Foreign. Suppose this producer decides to engage
in FDI and locate her HQ in Home. In that case, she earns profits equal to
piHM =
(
τzF2 − bwH
) (
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH +
(
zF2 − bwF
) (
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF − [wH (fE + fD) + wF fD]
where the first term denotes profits (i.e. revenue minus variable costs) from sales in the domestic
market, the second term profits from foreign affiliate sales, and the last term are fixed costs.
Similarly, profits of a producer who chooses to serve the market in Home through foreign affiliate
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sales and set up her HQ in Foreign are given by
piFM =
(
zF2 − bwF
) (
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF +
(
τzF2 − bwH
) (
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH − [wF (fE + fD) + wHfD] .
It is straightforward to show that piHM > pi
F
M if and only if w
H < wF , and vice versa. In
an equilibrium where multinational firms locate in both regions, profits must equalize, i.e.
piHM = pi
F
M . Hence, wages must be equalized across regions, i.e. w
H = wF . Let us choose labor
in Home as the numeraire and set wH equal to one. Second, consider a producer who chooses
to sell her product to the middle and rich classes in Home but only to the rich class in Foreign.
Assumption 4.2 implies that she offers her product at prices zH2 in Home and at τzH2 in Foreign.
Suppose this producer decides to locate in Home and export to Foreign. That way she makes
profits given by
piHX,2 =
(
zH2 − bwH
) (
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH +
(
τzH2 − τbwH
)
sF1 L
F − wH (fE + fD) .
Suppose that such a producer located in Foreign opts to serve the market in Home by engaging
in FDI. This producer collects profits equal to
piFM,2 =
(
τzH2 − bwF
)
sF1 L
F +
(
zH2 − bwH
) (
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH − [wF (fE + fD) + wHfD] .
At equalized wage rates normalized to 1 it can be shown that piHX,2 > pi
F
M,2 if and only if
fD/s
F
1 L
F > (τ − 1)b. In that case, all producers who choose this pricing strategy locate
in Home. Third, consider a producer who supplies only the rich class in both regions. If
Assumption 4.2 holds this producer puts her product up for sale at prices τzF1 in Home and zF1
in Foreign. Suppose that this producer locates in Home and exports to Foreign. In doing so,
she makes profits given by
piHX,1 =
(
τzF1 − bwH
)
sH1 L
H +
(
zF1 − τbwH
)
sF1 L
F − wH (fE + fD) .
Similarly, such a producer who decides to locate in Foreign and export to Home obtains profits
equal to
piFX,1 =
(
zF1 − bwF
)
sF1 L
F +
(
τzF1 − τbwF
)
sH1 L
H − wF (fE + fD) .
Having the U.S. in mind as Home and less aﬄuent regions as Foreign, we make the assumption
that the size of the middle and rich class, respectively, is larger in Home than in Foreign.
Assumption 4.3. sH1 L
H > sF1 L
F , and sH2 L
H > sF2 L
F .
If Assumption 4.3 holds, it is straightforward to show that piHX,1 > pi
F
X,1, with wage rates
equalized across regions. Hence, Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3 jointly imply that all producers opting
for this pricing strategy locate in Home. Eventually, consider a producer who sells exclusively
to the rich class in Home. This producer can perfectly price discriminate, and market her
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product at a price equal to zH1 . If she locates in Home she receives profits given by
piH1 =
(
zH1 − bwH
)
sH1 L
H − wH (fE + fD) .
At equal wage rates across regions one can show that in the presence of iceberg trade costs
τ > 1 this producer locates in Home.
Organization
Now, we show that no producer has an incentive to deviate from the organizational form
we conjectured above. Given there is a large number of producers the behavior of a single
producer has no impact on aggregate variables. Comparing profits from different strategies, it
is straightforward to show that no producer has an incentive to deviate from its chosen mode
to serve the foreign market if and only if the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.1. Given the following condition holds for all i = {H,F}, all producers serving
both the rich and middle classes (i.e. groups 1 and 2) in region i become MNCs whereas all
producers supplying only the rich class (i.e. group 1) in region i export:
fD
si1L
i
> (τ − 1)b > fD(
si1 + s
i
2
)
Li
. (4.8)
Proof. The proof follows from comparing producers’ profits under alternative forms of organi-
zation.
Condition (4.8) has a simple economic intuition. It balances the benefit of engaging in FDI
against the cost of that choice. The term (τ − 1)b denotes the cost reduction per unit sold if
a producer engages in FDI instead of exporting her product, due to lower variable costs since
no transportation costs incur (opportunity cost of FDI). The term fD/
(
si1 + s
i
2
)
Li, fD/si1Li,
respectively, denotes the cost increase per unit sold of engaging in FDI due to the fixed cost
associated with setting up a foreign production facility. We note that, ceteris paribus, producers
choose FDI over exports if variable costs are high, or fixed costs to set up a foreign production
factory are low relative to the number of units sold (market size in terms of consumers). For a
detailed discussion about how condition (4.8) compares to the condition in the case of standard
CES preferences see Section 4.5.2 and Appendix 4.A.3.
In particular, Proposition 4.1 implies that in equilibrium no producer has an incentive to set
up only "headquarters-services" in Home, i.e. create a new product in Home, and produce all
output in Foreign. For example, a situation where producers serving the middle and rich classes
in both regions incur fE in Home, i.e. locate their "headquarters-services" in Home, produce
all output only in Foreign (i.e. incur fD only once in Foreign), and ship it back to Home at
trade costs τ > 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. Furthermore, together with Assumption 4.3 no
producer serving the middle and rich classes in Home and the rich class in Foreign, or the rich
classes in both regions, respectively, has an incentive to locate only her "headquarters-services"
in Home, and produce all output in Foreign.
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At this point, a brief remark about the assumption of indivisible differentiated products is
appropriate. While this assumption makes the model tractable it comes at the cost of shutting
down the intensive margin of consumption. To better understand its implications suppose for
the moment that consumers had a choice about the extensive and intensive margin. This would
be the case with e.g. quadratic preferences over differentiated products of the following form∫
J
(
sc(j)− 12c(j)2
)
dj, where 0 < s <∞ denotes a local satiation level.8 In that case, wealthy
consumers would not only purchase a larger variety of products but also a larger amount of
each product relative to less aﬄuent consumers. That would increase the incentives to engage
in FDI relative to exporting for all producers, in particular, also those serving the rich market
segment. Hence, the parameter space for which condition (4.8) is fulfilled contracts but does
not collapse entirely, such that an equilibrium where some producers engage in FDI and others
export is still feasible.
Equilibrium Structure
Given Assumptions 4.1-4.3 and Proposition 4.1 the equilibrium structure looks as follows. Non-
homothetic consumer demand segments the market for differentiated products in the sense that
it makes ex-ante identical producers choose different pricing strategies to supply different market
segments. Differentiated products that are sold to the middle and rich classes in both regions
are manufactured in both regions. All products which are sold to all consumers above income
threshold yi in region i except the middle class in Foreign are produced in Home.9 Figure 4.3
below summarizes the equilibrium structure, where the number of MNCs with headquarters in
region i are denoted by M i, the number of exporters located in Home that sells to the middle
and rich classes in the domestic market and to the rich class in Foreign by NHX,2, the number
of exporters located in Home that serves only the rich class in both regions by NHX,1, and the
number of producers located in Home which is not internationally active and sells only to the
rich in Home by NH1 . To close the model, we use the resource and consumer budget constraints.
See Appendix 4.A.1 for details and the formal solution to the model.
8With s < ∞ consumption of an infinitesimal amount of some product j does not yield infinite utility, and
therefore generates a non-trivial extensive margin of consumption.
9In Appendix 4.A.1 we show that Foreign’s trade deficit is accommodated by a surplus in net factor payments.
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Figure 4.3: Equilibrium structure
4.4 Income Distribution, Market Size, and FDI vs. Exports
We now analyze in detail how market segmentation determined by the income distribution
affects foreign direct investment and exports. We will take the viewpoint of Home, and ask
how varying market sizes in Foreign, affect the incentive to engage in FDI for producers in Home.
In particular, we will focus our analysis on the following two experiments. First, we change
the size of the market by changing per capita incomes θF2 of consumers in the middle class in
Foreign, and second we change the size sF2 of the middle class in Foreign. In both experiments
we hold aggregate income Y i ≡ ∑k sikLiθik, and average income Y i/Li for all i, k constant.
We assume that Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3, and Proposition 4.1 holds in all experiments. The
intuition for the first case is discussed in some detail, whereas the discussion for the remaining
cases is kept short as the intuition is similar.
4.4.1 Changing Per Capita Income of the Middle Class in Foreign
Let us start by considering an increase in per capita income of the middle class θF2 , where we
(i) decrease per capita income of the rich class θF1 , and (ii) decrease per capita income of the
poor class θF3 , holding everything else constant.
Case (i): Redistribution from Rich to Middle Class
We transfer incomes from the rich class to the middle class. One can show that this increases the
number of MNCs with HQ in Home, MH , whereas the number of MNCs with HQ in Foreign,
MF , decreases. However, the total number of MNCs in the world,
∑
iM
i, unambiguously
increases. The number of exporters NHX,2 serving the middle and rich classes in Home and only
the rich class in Foreign decreases, whereas the number of exporters NHX,1 serving only the rich
classes in both regions, and the number of non-exporters NH1 might increase or decrease.
The intuition is the following. A higher θF2 implies that the willingness to pay of consumers
belonging to the middle class in Foreign, and therefore prices for products sold in the mass
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market (i.e. to middle and rich classes in both regions) rises. This creates a disequilibrium
in the product market. At higher prices producers who sell in the mass market make positive
profits, ceteris paribus. Hence, some producers decide to enter that market segment. Ceteris
paribus, this implies that expenditures on mass products increase, depressing expenditures on
exported and non-exported products made in Home. This further implies that labor demand
in Foreign increases more than labor demand in Home so that relative wages wH/wF fall below
one. At relative wage rates wH/wF < 1 profits of MNCs with HQ in Home exceed profits of
those with HQ in Foreign, i.e. piHM > pi
F
M . Hence, producers that enter the mass market set up
their HQ in Home. This ameliorates the disequilibrium in the labor market by increasing labor
demand in Home. However, at the same time labor demand in Foreign also increases since
MNCs absorb resources in the host region. Because labor supply in Foreign has not changed,
MNCs with HQ in Foreign start exiting the market. In other words, MNCs with HQ in Home
crowd out MNCs with HQ in Foreign. Nevertheless, in equilibrium more MNCs enter in Home
than exit in Foreign. Note that exit and entry is such that prices for products sold in the mass
market are the same in the old and new equilibrium. In other words, competition intensifies to
such a degree that prices fall to the old equilibrium level.
Next, consider the changes induced by the income transfer in the number of exporters and
non-exporters. Notice that expenditures on mass products have increased for all consumers
above the income threshold y. First, consider the budget constraint of the middle class in
Home, which are the decisive consumers for products sold by producers NHX,2 to middle and
rich classes in Home and the rich class in Foreign. Since their income has not changed but
their expenditures on mass products has increased they must decrease their expenditures on
products sold by producers NHX,2. Hence, some of those producers exit the market, i.e. N
H
X,2
decreases. Next, consider the budget constraint of a consumer belonging to the rich class in
Foreign. She is the decisive consumer for products sold exclusively to the rich classes in both
regions. On the one hand, her expenditures for mass products increase by 1, and on the other
hand, decrease by τ2, for products sold to the middle and rich classes in Home and the rich
class in Foreign. The net change in her expenditures on those products is negative and equal to(
τ2 − 1). This tends to increase her expenditure on products sold exclusively to the rich classes
in both regions. At the same time, her income θF1 falls by sF2 /sF1 , which tends to decrease her
expenditures on exclusive products sold only to the rich classes. Hence, if
(
τ2 − 1) < sF2 /sF1
total expenditure on products which are sold only to the rich classes falls, and the number of
producers, NHX,1, catering to that market segment decreases in equilibrium. Last, looking at
the budget constraint of rich consumers in Home reveals that if their expenditures on products
sold exclusively to the rich classes falls, their expenditures on products sold exclusively to them
must increase, and vice versa. In that case, the number of producers, NH1 , serving that market
segment rises. We conclude that the effect on the trade volume, i.e. the value of exports from
Home to Foreign, given by
(
NHX,2τz
H
2 +N
H
X,1z
F
1
)
sF1 L
F , is ambiguous. Of course, producers
exit and enter the different market segments across the two regions until the equilibrium is
restored at relative wage rates wH/wF = 1.
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Case (ii): Redistribution from Poor to Middle Class
We redistribute income from the poor to the middle class. It can be shown that the number
of MNCs with HQ in Home, MH , increases and with HQ in Foreign, MF , decreases. However,
the total number of MNCs
∑
iM
i again increases. At the same time, the number of exporters,
NHX,2, that sell to the middle and rich classes in Home and solely to the rich class in Foreign
decreases, the number of exporters, NHX,1, catering exclusively to the rich classes in both regions
increases, and the number of non-exporters NH1 selling only to the rich class in Home falls.
The intuition is similar to case (i) above. Thus, we keep the discussion short and emphasize
the difference. First, the intuition for the change in the number of MNCs is the same as
before.10 However, the number of exporters, NHX,1, that sell exclusively to the rich classes
in both regions unambiguously increases in equilibrium since the income of the rich class in
Foreign does not decrease in case (ii). Thus, because their expenditures on mass products
and products sold to the middle and rich classes in Home and the rich class in Foreign falls,
they increase their expenditures on products sold by producers NHX,1. This implies that N
H
X,1
increases. However, the rich class now spends more on all products sold at least to two classes
above income threshold y, and therefore has less income to spend on products sold exclusively
to them. Hence, the number of non-exporters, NH1 , serving that market segment decreases.
Again, the effect on the trade volume is ambiguous.
We summarize our main results in the following proposition
Proposition 4.2. An increase in per capita incomes θF2 of the middle class in Foreign leads
to an increase in the number of MNCs with HQ in Home, and has an ambiguous effect on the
volume of exports from Home to Foreign.
Proof. The proof follows from writing θFk =
(
Y − θF2 sF2 LF − θFl 6=ksFl 6=kLF
)
/sFk L
F for k, l =
{1, 3}, where we hold aggregate income Y constant, and differentiating the solutions for the
number of producers in Appendix 4.A.1 with respect to θF2 .
4.4.2 Changing the Size of the Middle Class in Foreign
Next, consider a decrease in the (relative) size sF2 of the middle class in Foreign where we (iii)
adjust per capita income θF1 and the size sF1 of the rich class in Foreign, and (iv) change per
capita income θF3 and the size sF3 of the poor class such that aggregate income Y i and class
sizes
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
,
(
sF2 + s
F
3
)
, respectively, are constant. In other words, in this experiment we
hold per capita income of the middle class in Foreign constant and change the number of people
in the middle class by changing the number of (iii) rich consumers and (iv) poor consumers
and their corresponding per capita incomes, holding everything else constant.
10Note that the change in demand for food from the poor class has no effect on the wage rate within Foreign.
The reason is that wage rates across food and differentiated product sector are equalized because labor within
Foreign is perfectly mobile, and aggregate labor supply is constant.
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Case (iii): Increasing the Size of the Middle Class, and Decreasing the Size of the
Rich Class
Let us start with the case where we decrease the size of the rich class in Foreign and increase
the size of the middle class, holding their per capita income constant. We want to hold aggre-
gate and average incomes constant, so we have to adjust per capita income of the rich class
accordingly. It can be shown that the number of MNCs in both regions, MH and MF , do
not change, whereas the number of exporters NHX,2 decreases, N
H
X,1 might increase or decrease,
and the number of non-exporters NH1 decreases. The intuition is similar to case (i). However,
now total market size for multinational producers does not change. The reason is that on the
one hand, prices for their products do not change since per capita income of the middle class
is constant, and on the other hand, the size of the market in terms of the number of people
that consume their product does not change because the number of people in the middle and
rich class is constant. Next, consider the market for products sold to the middle and rich class
in Home and the rich class in Foreign. Since the size of the rich class in Foreign decreases
less exporters enter that market segment in Home, so that NHX,2 decreases.
11 Whether the
number of exporters serving only the rich classes in both regions increases or decreases depends
on whether the decrease in the size of the market in terms of customers (since sF1 decreases)
served outweighs the increase in terms of prices (since θF1 increases). However, in equilibrium
expenditures of the rich class in Home on products sold exclusively to them unambiguously
decrease. This implies that NH1 falls.
Case (iv): Increasing the Size of the Middle Class, and Decreasing the Size of the
Poor Class
Now, we increase the size of the middle class in Foreign while at the same time we decrease the
size of the poor. Again, since we hold aggregate and average incomes constant, we must adjust
per capita income of the poor. In that case, one can show that assuming a price elasticity of zF2
with respect to the population size sF2 greater than one is sufficient for the number of MNCs
with HQ in Home to increase, with HQ in Foreign to decrease, and the total number of MNCs
that are active in the world to increase. The number of exporters and non-exporters in Home
is unaffected.
The intuition behind the result is best understood with the following argument. The num-
ber of exporters and non-exporters are not affected because aggregate expenditures on their
products do not change. However, aggregate spending on mass products changes because the
size sF2 LF of the mass market in terms of customers has increased. This induces producers
to enter the mass market. If the price elasticity of products marketed on the mass market
with respect to population size sF2 exceeds one, labor demand in Foreign increases more than
in Home. This implies that relative wages wH/wF fall below one, so that MNCs set up their
HQ in Home. The rest of the argument is the same as in case (i). However, entry and exit
11Notice that a decrease in the market size in terms of the number of customers induces some producers to
exit. Due to less intense competition prices rise such that aggregate expenditures are constant.
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of MNCs is such that in equilibrium prices zF2 are lower in the new equilibrium due to more
intense competition.
We summarize our main results in the following proposition
Proposition 4.3. Enlarging the size of the middle class sF2 L
F by increasing its population
share has an ambiguous effect on the number of MNCs with HQ in Home, and the volume of
exports from Home to Foreign.
Proof. The proof follows from writing θFk =
(
Y − θF2 sF2 LF − θFl 6=ksFl 6=kLF
)
/sFk L
F for k, l =
{1, 3}, where we hold aggregate income Y and (sFk + sF2 ) constant, and differentiating the
solutions for the number of producers in Appendix 4.A.1 with respect to sF2 .
4.5 Extensions
The baseline model is very stylized, and thus helps us understand the role of the demand side
by isolating it from other factors like e.g. technology. In this section, we discuss extensions of
the baseline model with regard to technology and preferences. First, we extend the baseline
model towards heterogeneity in technology by arguing that producers in Foreign might not
have access to foreign direct investment (e.g. they do not have the managerial know-how
to provide headquarter services). The second extension compares the baseline model to the
standard model with CES preferences, and highlights the differences. Last, we confront the
objection that a factor endowment model, where the skill distribution is reflected in the income
distribution, might be observationally equivalent to our baseline model.
4.5.1 Technological Differences: A North-South Perspective
In this section, we look at a simple extension by assuming that firms in Foreign have no access
to foreign direct investment. If they want to serve the foreign market they have to do so by
exports. That puts the model into a North-South context where we think of Home as North,
and Foreign as South.
For comparison’s sake, we assume that parameters are such that the equilibrium structure
is similar to the one discussed in the baseline model. To preserve space, we refer the reader
to Appendix 4.A.2 for the formal model including its solution. The equilibrium which emerges
looks as follows. Producers which supply both the middle and rich classes still locate in both
regions. However, those located in the South can only serve the foreign market through exports
whereas producers in the North set up headquarters there and engage in FDI in the South.
Relative wage rates ω ≡ wH/wF are such that producers with that pricing strategy break even,
regardless of whether they choose to locate in North or South. In the equilibrium we consider,
relative wages ω exceed one. This is the case if labor in the North is more productive than
in the South, which we think is a reasonable assumption in this context. In other words, if a
North producer’s amount of labor used to supply the foreign market, fE+fD+b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH ,
falls short of a South producer’s labor input, fE + τb
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH , to supply the market in
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the North. In sum, ω > 1 if and only if (τ − 1)b > fD/
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH , which is identical to
condition (4.8) for i equal to H. In the baseline model, labor productivity is the same for all
producers. Therefore, in an equilibrium where MNCs are present in both regions (relative)
wages are equalized. Note that relative labor productivity, and therefore the relative wage
rate, is determined by the inverse of relative labor requirements given above. Furthermore, we
assume that relative wages are such that all producers excluding the middle class in the South
choose to locate in the North. This is identical to the equilibrium structure in the baseline
model. However, this implies that there is an upper bound φ2 on relative wage rates, where
φ2 is defined as the labor productivity of a producer located in the North selling to the rich
class in both regions relative to such a producer located in the South. For a formal definition
see Appendix 4.A.2. Hence, if φ2 > ω > 1 holds, no producer has in equilibrium an incentive
to locate in a different region. Similar to the baseline model, no producer in the North has an
incentive to deviate from its chosen mode to serve the foreign market if and only if
fD
sF1 L
F
> (τω − 1) b > fD(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
where ω is endogenously determined by
[
fE + τb
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH
]
/
[
fE + fD + b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH
]
.
The condition above is the equivalent to condition (4.8) in the baseline model. By assumption,
producers in the South have no choice but to export. In sum, we get a similar equilibrium
structure in the North-South context as in the baseline model, except that now there are no
Southern MNCs by assumption. Notice that the same equilibrium structure would emerge if
we assumed identical technologies across countries but modified condition (4.8) such that all
producers located in the South that sell to the middle and rich classes in both regions choose
exports over FDI. A Southern producer pursuing that pricing strategy would do so if and only
if fD/
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH >
(
τω−1 − 1) b, which means that the cost of serving the foreign market
through exports, i.e. wF τ
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH , is lower than the cost of serving it through a foreign
production facility, i.e. wHfD + wF b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH . This implies together with the deviation
incentive of Northern producers that relative wages ω must be larger than one in equilibrium.
We conclude that if labor in the South is sufficiently unproductive relative to labor in the
North, engaging in foreign direct investment is less profitable for Southern producers serving
the middle and rich classes in both regions compared to exporting.
Again, let us take the viewpoint of producers in the North. The effects of market size
on the decision of Northern producers to engage in FDI versus exporting are identical to the
baseline model. Thus, we keep the discussion brief and just summarize the results. For the
formal treatment refer to Appendix 4.A.2. We start with case (i) and (ii), where we increase
per capita income of the middle class in the South and decrease per capita income of the rich,
respectively the poor in the South, holding South’s aggregate income constant. In both cases,
the results and their intuition are exactly the same as in the baseline model. In particular,
the number of MNCs with HQ in the North increases in both cases. Remember, in cases
(iii) and (iv) we expand the size of the middle class in the South and reduce the size of the
rich, respectively, the poor class in the South, while holding aggregate and average income
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in the South constant. Both, case (iii) and case (iv) are also identical to the baseline model.
Hence, we conclude that the results of the baseline model are robust with respect to the type
of technological heterogeneity discussed in this section.
4.5.2 Homothetic Consumer Preferences
In this section, we briefly compare the baseline model discussed above to the standard model
with homothetic preferences, see e.g. Brainard (1997). We restrict the discussion to the basic
intuition and refer to Appendix 4.A.3 for the formal model. Consider homothetic preferences
given by U = xβC1−β , where C =
(∫
J c(j)
σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1 with σ > 1. In other words, consumers have
Cobb-Douglas preferences over food and differentiated products, and a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (CES) subutility, which aggregates differentiated products into a composite good
C. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that consumers spend a constant share β of their income
on food, and the rest on differentiated products. One can show that with CES subutility all
consumers in both regions purchase all differentiated products available, even in the presence
of (finite) trade costs. Consumers with different income levels differ only with respect to the
amount they buy of each product. In this sense, the CES utility function restricts a consumers
choice to the intensive margin of consumption, leaving her no choice about variety. In Appendix
4.A.3, we show that due to the assumption of homothetic preferences the distribution of income
within regions has no effect on aggregate demand, and therefore on the number of exporters
and MNCs, respectively. Aggregate demand only depends on aggregate income of a region.
Furthermore, we argue that a mixed equilibrium where some producers export and others
engage in FDI exists only under a knife-edge condition. Hence, the number of exporters and
multinationals is indeterminate. In sum, in the standard model it is meaningless to distinguish
between different market segments since the income distribution is irrelevant.
4.5.3 Skill vs. Income Distribution
We argued in our baseline model that demand side effects lead to the emergence of MNCs.
In equilibrium, the distribution of income affects a producer’s decision to serve a particular
segment of the (foreign) market either by engaging in FDI or by exporting. We showed in the
previous section that such an equilibrium only exists under knife-edge conditions if we shut
down the demand channel in the baseline model by assuming homothetic preferences.
However, one could argue that the income distribution reflects the distribution of skills in
the economy, i.e. there is a mapping of the skill to the income distribution. Thus, we construct a
simple factor proportions model with homothetic consumer behavior where producers combine
low, medium, and high-skilled labor in the production of goods, so that (relative) differences
in the skill distribution of regions determines the emergence of multinationals versus exporters.
Changes in the skill, and therefore income distribution have no effect on aggregate demand but
affect aggregate supply by changing (relative) production costs. The question is whether the
link between skill, respectively, income distribution is different from our baseline model in a
way that could be taken into account if we go to the data. Our model is based on Markusen and
112 Foreign Direct Investment
Venables (2000), and Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005). See Appendix 4.A.4 for the formal model.
Markusen and Venables (2000) argue in a similar model with skilled and unskilled labor that
MNCs are more common when countries are similar in absolute and relative factor endowments.
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005) discuss a model similar to Markusen and Venables (2000) but
with three different production factors (skilled and unskilled labor, and physical capital). They
show that an increase in the endowment of skilled labor and capital, respectively, of country i
relative to country l leads to an increase, and a decrease, respectively, in the number of MNCs
relative to exporters in country i. One key result of their analysis is that whereas exports
and foreign affiliate sales increase with the similarity in country size, FDI (defined as capital
exports) increase with the size of the source country.
Nevertheless, both do not discuss the association between changes in the host country’s
income distribution induced by changes in its skill distribution, and its effect on the number
of multinationals, respectively exporters, active in the parent country. In Appendix 4.A.4
we simulate and discuss in detail the same experiments (i)-(iv) as in the baseline model. To
preserve space, we only state the comparative statics results. Our simulations show that in case
(i) there is a positive correlation between per capita income of the middle class in Foreign and
the number of MNCs with HQ in Home, whereas in case (ii) there is a negative correlation.
Remember, our baseline model predicts a positive association between per capita income of
the middle class in Foreign and the number of MNCs with HQ in Home in both case (i) and
(ii). The simulations also reveal a positive relationship between the size of the middle class in
Foreign and the number of MNCs with HQ in Home for both case (iii) and (iv), whereas the
baseline model predicted no effect, and also a positive relationship, respectively. We conclude
that the predictions of the two models diverge with respect to the relationship between the
market size of the middle class in the host country and FDI activity in the host country.
4.6 Empirics
This section illustrates the market size theory with regard to its predictions about FDI activity.
In particular, we focus on the market size of the middle class in the host country and its
effect on FDI activity in the host country as predicted by cases (i)-(iv), which are summarized
in Proposition 4.2 and 4.3. Based on the theory, we would expect a positive relationship
between per capita income of the middle class in the host country and FDI activity in the data.
Furthermore, the theory suggests either no association between the size of the middle class in
the host country and FDI activity, or a positive one.
4.6.1 Data
We use data on outward FDI positions from the OECD (2012) FDI statistics database. The
database covers bilateral outward FDI positions, measured in nominal USD, of all OECD
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countries in 235 countries (including all OECD countries) over the time period of 1985-2011.12
In 2011, OECD countries held around 80 per cent of the global outward FDI stock (OECD
2013). To approximate FDI positions in real PPP terms we use a GDP deflator from the World
Bank (2012), and a PPP conversion factor from Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 2012).
In the model, FDI activity is reflected in the number of MNCs setting up production plants
in the foreign country designed to serve local consumers (horizontal FDI), whereas in the data,
we proxy FDI activity with outward FDI positions. First, in the data recorded foreign direct
investment is defined as obtaining a lasting interest in an entity resident in an economy other
than that of the investor. Usually, the lasting interest is defined as obtaining at least 10 per
cent of ordinary or voting stock (OECD 1999). Second, it is impossible to distinguish e.g.
vertical from horizontal, or greenfield from brownfield investment in the data. Of course, this
approximation of FDI activity is far from perfect. However, due to the availability and quality
of aggregate data it is still a reasonable choice.
The construction of the market size measures is based on empirical income distributions
kindly provided by Bernasconi (2013). She uses data on deciles and quintiles from the World
Income Inequality Database UNU-WIDER (2008) and GDP per capita from Heston et al.
(2012), to compute empirical income distributions without making parametric assumptions.
In particular, Bernasconi (2013) assigns an average income level to each decile (quintile), and
redistributes the corresponding area uniformly on an income interval. The resulting densities
are then divided into common income intervals on USD 1, 5000, . . . , 145000, 150000. We define
global income classes by imposing a common lower y and upper threshold y on each country’s
income distribution, where y > y. This creates a low income class with per capita incomes
y ≤ y, a middle income class with y ≥ y > y, and a high income class with y > y. We
measure the size of the different market segments in the host country as aggregate income Yk
and number of people Pk in each income class k = {low,middle, high}. For a more detailed
description see Appendix 4.A.5 and Bernasconi (2013).
Data on control variables are obtained from various sources. Data on regional trade agree-
ments, customs union, and (relative) skill levels are provided by Blonigen and Piger (2011), on
schooling by Barro and Lee (2010), on corporate tax and urban concentration by the World
Bank Development Indicators (World Bank 2012), on GDP and GDP per capita, trade open-
ness (exports plus imports divided by GDP), and remoteness (distance of country j from all
other countries in the world weighted by those other countries’ share of world GDP excluding
country j) by Heston et al. (2012), on (geodesic) distance by Mayer and Zignago (2001), and
on common language and colonial relationship by Helpman et al. (2008).13
Due to limited availability of data on the market size measure and control variables, we
finally use data on the outward FDI positions of 29 OECD countries in 66 host countries from
12The OECD (1999) recommends market value as the conceptual basis for both the valuation of direct
investment stocks (i.e. equity and debt instruments) and flows. Note that the inclusion of inter-company
debt and of loans from subsidiaries to parent companies may result in some cases in negative values of direct
investment stocks. In the sample this concerns less than 2 per cent of observations, which we drop.
13For the following variables yearly data is not available, and we average over the time periods data is available:
regional trade agreements, customs union, skill levels, schooling, corporate taxes, and urban concentration.
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1997 to 2007. The OECD reports whether a FDI position is missing, zero or confidential. Since
we use only data on FDI positions reported either positive or zero, we are left with 11,817
observations. The outward FDI position is zero for about 25 percent of all observations in the
sample. In Appendix 4.A.5, the list of countries is given in Table A.1, and summary statistics
are provided in Tables A.2 and A.3.
4.6.2 Empirical Model
We estimate the following model with Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML)
log (FDIijt) = α+ β1 log (Ymiddle,jt) + β2 log (Pmiddle,jt) + β3 log (Yk,jt) + β4 log (Pk,jt)
+ Xijtγ +Ai +At + εijt, k ∈ {low, high} (4.9)
where FDIijt denotes parent country i’s FDI position in host country j at time t. In order to
include observations where FDI positions are zero, we estimate equation (4.9) with PPML as
proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) in the context of gravity equations for bilateral
trade flows. The different market segments are captured by aggregate income Yk,jt and num-
ber of people Pk,jt in income class k = {low,middle, high}.14 We run equation (4.9) either
excluding the high or low income class, respectively. The coefficient β1 can be interpreted as
the marginal effect of increasing per capita income of the middle class in the host country (by
increasing the middle class’ total income), simultaneously decreasing per capita income of the
rich or poor class, respectively, such that aggregate and average income in the economy are
constant. This corresponds to the experiments in cases (i) and (ii) discussed in Section 4.4.
The sum of the coefficients β1 and β2 can be interpreted as the marginal effect of increasing the
size of the middle class in the host country and holding their per capita income constant, while
changing size and per capita income of the rich or poor class, respectively, such that aggregate
and average income in the economy remain constant.15 This corresponds to the experiments
in cases (iii) and (iv) discussed in Section 4.4.
The vectorX includes the following control variables: (log) host real GDP and real GDP per
capita, (log) host remoteness, (log) host urban concentration, (log) host trade openness, (log)
host corporate tax, (log) distance, (log) squared skill difference (proxy for relative skilled labor
endowments), and dummy variables on common official language, regional trade agreement,
customs union, colonial relationship, and host region. The inclusion of these control variables
14Note that we transform the data by taking logs. The market size as measured by the number of people
(measured in thousands) and their respective aggregate income (measured in millions) has zero incidents. To
preserve those information we proceed by adding 1 to each observation. Adding 1 to each observation has
some tradition in the literature, see e.g. Eichengreen and Irwin (1998), Limao and Venables (2001), Calderon
et al. (2007) or Bloom et al. (2011). We experiment adding 0.1, 0.5, 1.5, or 2 and the results are very similar.
However, if we add 1 to each observation for the number of people and the mean of the income class to each
observation for aggregate income the results are robust for the narrow definitions of the middle class (see below
for the definitions of the middle class) but not for the the broader definitions (wrong signs). Similarly, if we add
a dummy variable taking the value zero whenever {Yk, Pk} is zero, and 1 otherwise. Since there is no obvious
solution to the problem we decide to follow the literature.
15We can write β1 log (yP ) + β2 log (P ) where y = Y/P so that β1 log (y) + (β1 + β2) log (P ).
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is guided by Blonigen and Piger (2011). They use Bayesian statistical techniques (i.e. Bayesian
Model Averaging) to select from a large set of control variables used in the literature those
that are most likely determinants of FDI activity. From their specification using logged FDI
stocks in 2000 as a measure of FDI, we include those covariates with an inclusion probability
of 50 per cent or higher, excluding parent country covariates which we capture with a parent
country fixed effect Ai. That disciplines the empirical exercise since the baseline model does
not provide a structural equation. To address the concern that our market size measure might
reflect largely skill levels (see discussion Section 4.5.3), we additionally include the percent of
population that completed no schooling, primary, secondary, and tertiary education (in logs)
in the host country. We also add a host region fixed effect Ar and a year fixed effect At.16
We include a region fixed effect rather than a host country fixed effect because there is little
variation in the measure of market size over time due to its construction (see Appendix 4.A.5).
In other words, the identification of the effect of Yk,jt and Pk,jt comes mainly from its variation
across countries.
Definition of the Middle Class
There is no consensus in the literature on how to define a global middle class, and hence on
the choice of the income thresholds
{
y, y
}
. For a detailed discussion on the definition of the
middle class see e.g. Ravallion (2010). We apply three different definitions commonly used
in the literature. First, we choose the thresholds according to Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002),
see also World Bank (2007), which define the middle class as those individuals with per capita
incomes between USD 4,500 and USD 19,000 (PPP, 2005). The lower bound corresponds to
Brazil’s per capita income, and the upper bound to Italy’s per capita income. This is one of the
most widely used definitions of the middle class in the literature. Second, we construct a world
income distribution from Bernasconi’s (2013) country income distributions, which has median
income USD 5,000 and mean income ranging from USD 7,500 to USD 10,100 over the period
of 1997-2007. Defining the middle class as mean income ±25% yields a lower threshold of USD
5,000 and an upper threshold of USD 10,000. We use the mean rather than the median since
by construction we can vary income thresholds only in USD 5,000 steps. This definition has
some tradition in the literature, see e.g. Thurow (1987). Although arbitrary these thresholds
have some economic rationale. For example, Muhammad et al. (2011) estimate that households
below a per capita income of approximately USD 6,500 (PPP, 2005), which corresponds to a
real per capita income less than 15 per cent of the US level, spend on average between 50 and 60
per cent of their income on food and housing. The McKinsey Global Institute (2010) classifies
households in the income bracket of USD 10,000 - 20,000 (PPP, 2005) as the consuming middle
class, and those with incomes below USD 5,000 as satisfying basic consumer needs. Ali and
Dadush (2012) propose the number of passenger cars in circulation as a proxy for the number of
people in the middle class. They argue that the car ownership rate accelerates around the per
16The World Bank classification uses regions East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Central Asia, Latin America &
Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western Europe. We complement
Northern America, and Oceania.
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capita income threshold USD 3,400 and decelerates sharply once per capita income exceeds USD
25,000 (PPP, 2005). Ali and Dadush (2012) show that their ranking of the middle class across
countries is broadly in line with the ranking based on Milanovic and Yitzhaki’s (2002) definition.
Third, we estimate equation (4.9) for a set of possible combinations of income thresholds, i.e.
y ∈ {5000, 10000} and y ∈ {10000, . . . , 35000}, which includes the two definitions above. In
principle, we can then compare the R-squared across different definitions of the middle class.17
We choose the poverty threshold in the US defined by the US Census Bureau as an upper bound
on the lower threshold y. The United States Census Bureau (2013) considers individuals living
in the United States to be poor if their annual income is less than USD 10,160 (in 2005 USD).
As an upper bound on the income threshold y we choose the median GDP per capita across
the 29 OECD countries in the sample, which is equal to USD 34,133 in 2007. According to Ali
and Dadush (2012) this is one of the narrowest definitions used in the literature.
4.6.3 Results and Discussion
This section discusses the link between per capita income and the size of the middle class in
the host country, respectively, and FDI positions in the host country held by OECD countries.
Changing Income and Size of the Middle Class relative to the Rich Class
Table 4.1 below shows the results from estimating equation (4.9) with PPML, excluding the
rich class, and setting the lower threshold at (a) USD 5,000 or (b) USD 10,000, and varying
the upper threshold from USD 10,000 to 35,000.
To illustrate the results, consider column one in panel (a) of Table 4.1. First, we find
that a 1 per cent increase in per capita income of the middle class in the host country, while
simultaneously decreasing per capita income of the rich class, increases the FDI position in the
host country held by OECD countries by 2.478 per cent (β1) on average, holding in particular
income and size of the poor class, GDP per capita and GDP constant. Second, we find that
a 1 per cent increase in the size of the middle class in the host country, while simultaneously
decreasing the size of the rich class, decreases the FDI position in the host country held by
OECD countries by 0.575 per cent (β1 + β2) on average, again holding income and size of the
poor class, GDP per capita and GDP constant. We see that GDP per capita has no effect
whereas GDP has a significantly positive effect on outward FDI positions of OECD countries.
These results relate to cases (i) and (iii) discussed in Section 4.4 as follows. They lend
support to the prediction of case (i) that an increase in the per capita income of the middle
class in the host country, by decreasing per capita income of the rich class, leads to an increase
in FDI activity in the host country, which is measured here as the FDI position in the host
17We compute a pseudo R2 as the square of the correlation between the model’s predicted values and the
actual values, which ranges from 0 to 1 (see Wooldridge 2009). The greater the correlation between the predicted
values and the actual values, the greater the R2. We adjust the R2 for the number of regressors as follows
1− (1−R2) (n− 1)/(n− p− 1), where n denotes sample size and p the number of regressors. Even though the
pseudo R2 cannot be compared across datasets it is still valid and useful in evaluating multiple models predicting
the same outcome on the same dataset (see Introduction to SAS: UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group 2013).
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Table 4.1: Outward FDI positions (29 OECD countries 1997-2007, pooled, PPML)
(a) with lower threshold y = 5, 000
log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.478∗∗ 1.997∗∗ 2.930∗∗∗ 3.300∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ 2.555∗∗∗
(1.120) (0.980) (0.856) (0.828) (0.955) (0.792)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.053∗∗ -2.704∗∗ -3.790∗∗∗ -4.149∗∗∗ -4.098∗∗∗ -3.209∗∗∗
(1.316) (1.164) (1.036) (1.004) (1.074) (0.940)
log(Ylow,jt) -0.303 -0.256 -0.160 -0.094 -0.121 -0.229
(0.245) (0.230) (0.205) (0.204) (0.207) (0.222)
log(Plow,jt) 0.585 0.522 0.574 0.557 0.511 0.375
(0.385) (0.361) (0.359) (0.350) (0.345) (0.347)
log(host GDP pcjt) 0.850 0.669 0.737 0.815 0.824 0.552
(0.901) (0.832) (0.796) (0.759) (0.732) (0.775)
log(host GDPjt) 1.066∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.282∗∗∗ 1.215∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗ 1.338∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.444) (0.435) (0.418) (0.413) (0.438)
adj pseudo R2 0.794 0.802 0.811 0.815 0.816 0.809
#observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817
(b) with lower threshold y = 10, 000
log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.055∗∗∗ 2.202∗∗∗ 2.547∗∗ 3.152 1.694∗∗
(0.648) (0.696) (1.144) (3.915) (0.724)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.702∗∗∗ -2.862∗∗∗ -3.154∗∗ -3.482 -2.125∗∗
(0.802) (0.874) (1.246) (3.326) (0.893)
log(Ylow,jt) -0.042 -0.130 -0.223 -0.468 -0.584
(0.505) (0.526) (0.541) (0.526) (0.564)
log(Plow,jt) -0.258 -0.231 -0.142 0.276 0.224
(0.815) (0.877) (0.903) (1.097) (0.946)
log(host GDP pcjt) 0.159 0.077 0.150 0.672 0.398
(0.940) (1.020) (1.050) (1.624) (1.141)
log(host GDPjt) 1.752∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 1.769∗∗∗ 1.299 1.589∗∗
(0.535) (0.593) (0.623) (1.395) (0.645)
adj pseudo R2 0.818 0.816 0.814 0.815 0.806
#observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered (by host country) standard errors in parentheses.
Excluding rich class. Controls: host remoteness, host urban concentration, host trade openness,
host corporate tax, distance, squared skill difference, percent of population that completed no, pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary schooling, dummies for common language, regional trade agreement,
customs union, colonial relationship, parent country, host region, and year.
country held by OECD countries. According to case (iii) there should be no effect on FDI
activity if we increase the size of the middle class, and hold their per capita income constant
(adjusting income and size of the rich class such that aggregate and average income in the
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economy is constant). However, in the data we see a negative relationship between the size
of the middle class in the host country and its FDI positions held by OECD countries. We
think of the following possible explanation, which can be reconciled with our baseline model.
Suppose for the moment that consumers adjust their consumption not only along the extensive
but also the intensive margin. As the number of consumers in the middle class expands more
producers enter that market segment, ceteris paribus. However, since per capita income of the
middle class has not changed they reduce the units bought of each product in order to afford
the additional varieties offered in the market, ceteris paribus. It might be that the negative
effects on FDI (less units sold by each producer) outweigh the positive ones (more producers
active in the market). Nevertheless, in the data the magnitude of the effect of per capita income
of the middle class on the FDI position is about five times larger than the effect of its size.
Table 4.1 shows that these results are robust with respect to the definition of the middle
class. The results are similar with respect to estimating equation (4.9) for every year separately.
See Table A.4 in Appendix 4.A.5 for details.18 Of the control variables included in the main
specification shown in Table 4.1, remoteness, openness, common language and colonial ties have
a significantly positive effect, whereas distance, percentage in the population with completed
primary or secondary schooling have a significantly negative effect on outward FDI positions.19
The signs of the control variables are the same as in Blonigen and Piger (2011).
Changing Income and Size of the Middle Class relative to the Poor Class
Table 4.2 below shows the results from estimating equation (4.9) with PPML, excluding the
poor class, and setting the lower threshold at (a) USD 5,000 or (b) USD 10,000, and varying
the upper threshold from USD 10,000 to 35,000.
The results in Table 4.2 correspond to cases (ii) and (iv) discussed in Section 4.4. The
interpretation is similar to the one in Table 4.1. We see that increasing per capita income of
the middle class in the host country and simultaneously decreasing per capita income of the
poor, while holding aggregate and average income of the rich class, GDP per capita and GDP
constant, leads on average to an increase in the FDI position in the host country held by OECD
countries. The magnitude of the increase is between 2.072 per cent and 3.541 per cent for a
1 per cent increase in per capita income of the middle class, depending on the definition of
the middle class. This is in line with the prediction of case (ii) in the baseline model. Again,
we observe that an increase in the size of the middle class in the host country, holding their
per capita income constant, and adjusting income and size of the poor class such that GDP
per capita and GDP are constant, implies a decrease in the FDI position of the host country.
On average, a 1 per cent increase in the size of the middle class implies a decrease in the FDI
18We also estimate (4.9) including a parent country-year fixed effect Ait and the results are very similar with
respect to the size and significance levels of the coefficients. This is also the case if we exclude the poor class.
19Suppose we interpret primary and secondary schooling as medium-skilled labor. In the factor endowment
model discussed in Section 4.5.3 increasing the supply of medium-skilled labor decreases its relative price and
makes engaging in FDI relative to exporting cheaper, ceteris paribus. Thus, the number of producers engaging
in FDI should increase.
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Table 4.2: Outward FDI positions (29 OECD countries 1997-2007, pooled, PPML)
(a) with lower threshold y = 5, 000
log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.072 -1.322 2.394∗∗∗ 3.355∗∗∗ 3.488∗∗∗ 2.720∗∗∗
(1.311) (1.488) (0.831) (0.798) (0.865) (0.826)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.559∗ 0.569 -3.326∗∗∗ -4.339∗∗∗ -4.409∗∗∗ -3.451∗∗∗
(1.479) (1.544) (1.007) (0.983) (1.050) (1.009)
log(Yhigh,jt) 1.165∗∗ 0.482 0.315 0.718 1.012∗∗∗ 0.384∗
(0.582) (0.572) (0.862) (0.538) (0.352) (0.210)
log(Phigh,jt) -1.598∗∗ 0.495 -0.197 -0.978 -1.593∗∗∗ -0.742∗∗
(0.791) (1.059) (1.336) (0.795) (0.505) (0.319)
log(host GDP pcjt) -0.017 0.351 -0.201 -0.480 -0.280 0.433
(0.358) (0.347) (0.375) (0.311) (0.320) (0.362)
log(host GDPjt) 1.689∗∗∗ 0.579 1.656∗∗∗ 2.078∗∗∗ 2.292∗∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗
(0.325) (0.606) (0.553) (0.341) (0.331) (0.276)
adj pseudo R2 0.797 0.810 0.810 0.810 0.821 0.816
#observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817
(b) with lower threshold y = 10, 000
log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.578∗∗∗ 3.019∗∗∗ 3.541∗∗ 3.235∗∗ 2.324∗∗∗
(0.938) (0.743) (1.709) (1.408) (0.701)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.351∗∗∗ -3.732∗∗∗ -4.251∗∗ -3.971∗∗∗ -3.054∗∗∗
(1.076) (0.884) (1.670) (1.320) (0.895)
log(Yhigh,jt) -0.913 -0.771 0.209 0.623∗∗ 0.257
(0.646) (0.570) (0.533) (0.296) (0.215)
log(Phigh,jt) 1.253 0.869 -0.546 -1.131∗∗∗ -0.611∗
(0.838) (0.850) (0.787) (0.429) (0.330)
log(host GDP pcjt) 0.875∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗ 0.592 0.700∗ 1.063∗∗
(0.339) (0.346) (0.362) (0.378) (0.417)
log(host GDPjt) 1.255∗∗∗ 1.439∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗ 2.018∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.324) (0.364) (0.349) (0.284)
adj pseudo R2 0.821 0.819 0.815 0.824 0.818
#observations 11817 11817 11817 11817 11817
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered (by host country) standard errors in parentheses.
Excluding poor class. Controls: host remoteness, host urban concentration, host trade openness,
host corporate tax, distance, squared skill difference, percent of population that completed no, pri-
mary, secondary, and tertiary schooling, dummies for common language, regional trade agreement,
customs union, colonial relationship, parent country, host region, and year.
position between 0.532 per cent and 0.984 per cent. Again, this contradicts the prediction of
case (iv), which suggests a positive sign.
From Table 4.2 we see that these results are fairly robust with respect to the definition of the
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middle class. Only for the definition of the middle class with per capita incomes between USD
5,000 and USD 15,000 are the signs on the market size measures reversed, but not significant.
Again, the results are similar with respect to estimating equation (4.9) for every year separately.
For details, see Table A.5 in Appendix 4.A.5. The signs and significance levels of the control
variables are the same as in the case where we exclude the rich group.
4.6.4 Summary
In sum, we find a positive relationship between per capita income of the middle class in the host
country and its FDI stock held by OECD countries, changing per capita income of the rich,
respectively, poor class such that aggregate and average income in the economy are constant.
Furthermore, we find a negative link between the size of the middle class in the host country
and its FDI stock, holding per capita income of the middle class constant, while adjusting the
size and income of the rich, respectively, poor class such that GDP and GDP per capita remain
constant. This supports the predictions of the baseline model with respect to the effect of the
middle class’ per capita income in the host country but not with respect to the effect of the
size of the middle class. However, we observe that per capita income of the middle class in the
host country is a much more important determinant of FDI positions in the host country than
the size of the middle class.20
We interpret these results as suggestive rather than conclusive evidence for the predictions
about FDI activity of the baseline model. Obviously, the purpose of the empirical exercise
is to illustrate the baseline model, and cannot be interpreted as a rigorous test of the model.
Nevertheless, it is a first encouraging step towards empirically studying demand side effects
in the context of FDI determinants. A more serious attempt to test the theory would take
the firm’s decision to export into account. However, trade flows are clearly endogenous since
firms decide simultaneously whether to export or engage in FDI. A solution to this problem
would require a valid instrument, with no obvious candidate available. The estimation of
the baseline specification (4.9) follows the literature, which has largely ignored the issue (see
Blonigen 2005). Additional support for the theory might be found in firm-level data on export
and foreign affiliate’s sales by destination and host market, respectively. We think this could
be a promising avenue worth exploring in the future.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how the distribution of aggregate income in the host country affects
capital flows/stocks and international trade. Motivated by anecdotal evidence it provides a
simple general-equilibrium model where firms choose the foreign market entry mode depending
on the market segment they supply. Firms facing a proximity-concentration trade-off choose
20Our specification generates an adjusted pseudo R2 between 0.794 and 0.824 depending on the definition of
the middle class. Estimating equation (4.9) excluding the measures for market size yields a coefficient of 0.683
(0.424) on GDP per capita, and of 0.813 (0.134) on GDP, with p-values in parentheses. The adjusted pseudo
R2 is 0.773.
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to engage in FDI if they serve the mass market abroad, and decide to export if they sell
exclusively to a few rich abroad. For firms serving a large market abroad economies of scale are
large enough to compensate for higher fixed costs associated with FDI so that average costs
are lower compared to exporting. The analysis highlights the importance of the middle class
in the host country in terms of per capita income and size as a determinant of FDI activity in
the host country. A point that has been neglected in the previous literature, which attributed
no role to the distribution of GDP and approximated market size by GDP or GDP per capita.
Using data on outward FDI positions of OECD countries we illustrate the role of per capita
income of the middle class in the host country as a determinant of FDI positions in the host
country.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Baseline Model
This section presents the formal baseline model and its solution.
Resource and Budget Constraints, and the Balance of Payments
The resource constraint in Home, i.e. labor market clearing, is given by
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Similarly, the resource constraint in Foreign is given by
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Budget Constraints
Consumers’ budget constraints in Home are given by
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The budget constraints of consumers in Foreign are given by
θF1 w
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Note that wH = wF = 1 and vik = 0 for all i, k in equilibrium.
Balance of Payments
The balance of payments is implied by the resource constraint, the zero-profit conditions of pro-
ducers and the budget constraints of consumers. The balance of payments from the viewpoint
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of Foreign is given by
− (NHX,2τzH2 +NHX,1zF1 ) sF1 LF
+
[(
τzF2 − b
) (
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH − fD
]
MF − [(zF2 − b) (sF1 + sF2 )LF − fD]MH
= 0
where the first two lines denote the current account, which consists of the trade balance (first
line) and net factor payments (second line). Note that a static framework cannot account
for changes in net foreign asset holdings (due to free entry asset values are zero in a static
equilibrium). Thus, the balance of payments corresponds to the current account. The trade
balance reports that Foreign’s net exports are equal to
(
NHX,2τz
H
2 +N
H
X,1z
F
1
)
sF1 L
F , which are
negative in the case we consider. This trade deficit is accommodated by positive net factor
payments, which consist of (total) repatriated profits of MNCs with HQ in Foreign earned
from foreign affiliate sales in Home equal to
[(
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) (
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]
MF , minus (total)
repatriated profits of MNCs with HQ in Home earned from foreign affiliate sales in Foreign
equal to
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]
MH .
Solution
We solve for the integrated mixed equilibrium using the budget constraints of consumers and
the resource constraint of Foreign. It is easy to check that the resource constraint of Home is
redundant due to Walras’ law.
Prices
Since technology in the food sector is identical and wage rates equalize across regions the price
of food is the same in both regions, and is given by
pHx = p
F
x = a.
This implies that the income threshold is the same in both countries and equal to y = ax. From
the zero-profit conditions we solve for the willingness to pay of consumers, which are given by
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fE + fD + bs
H
1 L
H
sH1 L
H
zH2 =
fE + fD + b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + τbsF1 L
F(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + τsF1 L
F
zF1 =
fE + fD + bs
H
1 L
H + τbsF1 L
F
τsH1 L
H + sF1 L
F
zF2 =
fE + 2fD + b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
τ
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH +
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
.
124 Foreign Direct Investment
Assumption 4.2 implies that parameters are restricted such that zH1 ≥ τzF1 ≥ τ2zH2 ≥ τ3zF2
holds. Note that zF2 > b implies that (fE + 2fD) /
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH > (τ − 1) b, and ∂zF2 /∂sF2 < 0,
which is consistent with Proposition 4.1.
Number of Producers
The number of multinational producers who supply all groups above y in both regions with
headquarters in Home is determined by
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Similarly, the number of producers engaged in FDI with headquarters in Foreign is given
by
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The total number of producers engaged in FDI across both regions is determined by
∑
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which is increasing in θF2 , and increasing in sF2 if and only if ∂zF2 /∂sF2 < 0, and vice versa.
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Note that the following parameter restrictions apply in an equilibrium where M i > 0 for all i
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where the last inequality holds since repatriated profits of MNCs with headquarters in Home
from foreign affiliate sales
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are positive (this can also be seen from
the resource constraint of Home).
The number of exporters that supply the middle and rich classes in Home and only the rich
class in Foreign is given by
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which is decreasing in θF2 , and independent of sF2 .
Next, the number of exporters which sells only to the rich class in both regions is given by
NHX,1 =
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which is increasing in θF2 , and independent of sF2 .
Last, the number of those non-exporters that serve only the rich class in Home is determined
by
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which is decreasing in θF2 , and again independent of sF2 . Due to Assumption 4.2 the following
holds: NHX,2 > 0, N
H
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1 > 0. Note that substituting the solutions into Foreign’s
balance of payments shows that the trade deficit in the amount of − (θF1 − θF2 ) sF1 LF < 0 is
equalized by a surplus in net factor payments
(
θF1 − θF2
)
sF1 L
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4.A.2 Extension: Technological Differences
This section provides the formal appendix to the extension of differences in technologies across
regions. We keep all our assumptions except that producers in Foreign cannot engage in FDI.
We look at an equilibrium where all producers who sell to the middle and rich classes in both
regions locate in both regions whereas all producers who exclude at least the middle class in
Foreign locate in Home. Even though there is a homogeneous goods sector which demands
labor, for full employment in Foreign there must be some producers of differentiated products
located in Foreign if Assumption 4.2 holds.
126 Foreign Direct Investment
Zero-profit Conditions
Only the profits of a producer who sells to the middle and rich classes in both regions and
decides to locate in Foreign change. This producer has now only the option to export. In that
case, she makes profits equal to
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If relative wages fall short of the equilibrium wage rate ω we have piHM > pi
F
X,2, and vice versa.
Note that ω is larger than one if and only if (τ − 1)b > fD/
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of sF2 . Producers who choose to supply the middle and rich classes in Home but only the rich
class in Foreign locate in Home if and only if φ1 > ω, and vice versa. Similarly, all producers
who decide to serve the rich class in Home and Foreign locate in Home if and only if φ2 > ω,
and vice versa. Finally, all producers who sell only to the rich class in Home locate in Home if
and only if φ3 > ω, and vice versa. Note that the φ’s are defined as follows
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only if sH1 LH > sF1 LF , and φ3 exceeds one if and only if τ > 1. Note that Assumption 4.3
ensures that φ1 > 1 and φ2 > 1. One can show that φ3 > φ2 since fE +fD+(τ −1)bsH1 LH > 0,
and φ1 > φ2 since fE + fD + (τ − 1)bsF1 LF > 0. Hence, we assume that φ2 > ω holds, from
which then follows that φ1 > ω and φ3 > ω.
No producer located in Home has an incentive to deviate from its chosen mode of serving
the foreign market if and only if
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.
Due to our assumption producers located in Foreign have no choice but to export. Note that if
producers located in Foreign could in principle engage in FDI, they won’t do so if and only if
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which follows from comparing profits of Foreign producers from engaging in FDI with profits
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from exporting.
Resource and Budget Constraints
We have to modify the resource constraints as follows. The resource constraint in Home is now
given by
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Similarly, the resource constraint in Foreign is now determined by
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Note that the budget constraints do not change, except that wH = wF no longer holds.
Prices
The price of food now differs across regions, and is given by
pix = w
ia.
The willingness to pay of consumers is determined by
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Let us choose labor in Foreign as the numeraire, and set wF = 1. Again, Assumption 4.2
implies that parameters are restricted so that zH1 ≥ τzF1 ≥ τ2zH2 ≥ τ3zF2 holds. Notice that
zF2 > b holds since (fE + fD) > 0, and that ∂zF2 /∂sF2 < 0.
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Number of Producers
The number of producers that supply the middle class and the rich in Home and Foreign is
determined by
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The number of producers located in the Foreign that sells to all consumers above the income
threshold is given by
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fD + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
]
zF2
[
fE + τb
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH
]
which is decreasing in θF2 if and only if 1 >
[
fD + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
]
/zF2 s
F
2 L
F , and decreasing in
sF2 if the following sufficient (but not necessary) condition holds
εzs
[
fD + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
zF2 s
F
2 L
F
]
>
(
zF2 − b
)
zF2
where εzs > 1.
The total number of producers that serves the middle class and the rich in both regions can
be written as
MH +NFX =
(
θF2 − y
)
zF2
=
(
θF2 − y
) [
τ
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH +
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
]
fE + fD + τb
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
which is increasing in θF2 and sF2 . In an equilibrium, where MH > 0 and NFX > 0 the following
condition must hold
fE + fD + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF + τb
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH
zF2 s
F
2 L
F
>
(
θF1 − y
)
sF1 L
F +
(
θF2 − y
)
sF2 L
F(
θF2 − y
)
sF2 L
F
>
fD + b
(
sF1 + s
F
2
)
LF
zF2 s
F
2 L
F
> 1
where the last inequality holds since repatriated profits from MNCs with HQ in Home are
positive.
The number of producers who serve the middle and rich classes in Home and the rich class
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in Foreign is determined by
NHX,2 =
[(
θH2 − y
)
wH − τ (θF2 − y)] [(sH1 + sH2 )LH + τsF1 LF ]
wH
[
fE + fD + b
(
sH1 + s
H
2
)
LH + τbsF1 L
F
]
where wH is determined above and y = ax. We see that NHX,2 is decreasing in θ
F
2 , and
independent of sF2 since wH/wF is independent of sF2 .
Similarly, the number of producers that supplies only the rich class in both regions is given
by
NHX,1 =
{[(
θF1 − y
)− τ (θH2 − y)wH]+ (τ2 − 1) (θF2 − y)} (τsH1 LH + sF1 LF )
wH
[
fE + fD + bsH1 L
H + τbsF1 L
F
] .
We see that NHX,1 rises in θ
F
2 , and does not depend on sF2 .
Eventually, the number of producers that only sells to the rich class in Home is given by
NH1 =
{[(
θH1 − y
)
wH − τ (θF1 − y)]+ (τ2 − 1) [(θH2 − y)wH − τ (θF2 − y)]} sH1 LH
wH
[
fE + fD + bsH1 L
H
]
which is decreasing in θF2 , and also independent of sF2 . Assumption 4.2 guarantees that all
measures of producers are positive. Last, the balance of payments for Foreign is now given by
− (NHX,2τzH2 +NHX,1zF1 ) sF1 LF +NHX τzF2 (sH1 + sH2 )LH
− [(zF2 − b) (sF1 + sF2 )LF − fD]MH
= 0
where the first line denotes the trade balance, which now includes exports of the Foreign to the
Home, and the second line net factor payments.
4.A.3 Extension: Homothetic Preferences
This section follows partly Brainard (1997) and Antras and Nunn (2009) in describing the
baseline model with homothetic preferences. Consumer preferences are given by
U = xβC1−β
where C =
(∫
J c(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1 , where σ > 1, denotes the subutility which aggregates differ-
entiated products into a composite good C. Cobb-Douglas preferences between food x and
the composite good C imply that consumers spend a constant share β of their income y on
food, and the rest on differentiated products (note that these preferences allow for two-stage
budgeting).
Demand for differentiated product j can then be derived as follows. Consumers maximize
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subutility C subject to their budget constraint. The first-order conditions are determined by(∫
J
c(j)
σ−1
σ dj
) σ
σ−1−1
c(j)
σ−1
σ
−1 − λp(j) = 0
(1− β)y −
∫
J
p(j)c(j)dj = 0.
It is straightforward to show that if c(j) → 0, marginal utility ∂U/∂c(j) → ∞. Hence, con-
sumers will always purchase all differentiated products available on the market. We stick to our
assumptions about the distribution of endowments except that we will now assume aggregate
incomes to be the same across regions, i.e. Y i = Y for all i, l = {H,F}. The Marshallian
demand function of a consumer belonging to group k who resides in region i for product j is
given by
cik(j) = A
i
kp(j)
−σ
where Aik ≡ (1− β)yik/
(∫
J p(j)
−(σ−1)dj
)
is residual demand (which producers take as given).
Note that yik = θ
i
kw
i
k + v
i
k, with v
i
k = 0 for all k in equilibrium. From the Marshallian demand
curve it becomes evident that the distribution of income within region i does not matter for
aggregate demand of good j, only aggregate income Y i matters. To see this, sum individual
demand cik(j) over all groups k in region i, which yields
Ci(j) ≡
∑
k
sikL
icik = p(j)
−σAi =
p(j)−σ(1− β)Y i∫
J p(j)
−(σ−1)dj
where Y i ≡ ∑k sikLiyik denotes aggregate income in region i, and Ai ≡ ∑k sikLiAik aggregate
residual demand. This is a property of homothetic preferences. The price elasticity of aggregate
demand is given by σ > 1. The better substitutes products j and j′ are for each other, i.e.
σ → ∞, the more strongly relative demand reacts to changes in relative prices. We also
keep the assumptions about technology from the baseline model, and now turn to the profit
maximization problem of a producer located in region i. She sells her product to all groups in
both regions. If she decides to export, she makes profits equal to
piiX(j) =
[
pii(j)− bwi
]
Cii(j) +
[
pil(j)− τbwi
]
Cil(j)− wi (fE + fD) .
The first-order conditions imply that all differentiated products j ∈ J made region i are sold at
prices pii =
(
σ
σ−1
)
wib on the domestic market, and at prices pil =
(
σ
σ−1
)
τbwi on the foreign
market. Optimal profits can be written as follows
piiX = B
i + τ−(σ−1)Bl − wi (fE + fD)
where Bi ≡ (σ − 1)σ−1σ−σ (bwi)−(σ−1)Ai for i, l = {H,F}. If producer j chooses to set up a
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foreign production facility instead, she earns profits given by
piiM (j) =
[
pii(j)− bwi
]
Cii(j) +
[
pll(j)− bwl
]
Cll(j)−
[
wi (fE + fD) + w
lfD
]
.
The producer’s optimality conditions imply that all products j manufactured in region i are
sold at prices pii =
(
σ
σ−1
)
wib in the domestic market. Optimal profits are then determined by
piiM = B
i +Bl −
[
wi (fE + fD) + w
lfD
]
.
In a (symmetric) equilibrium with free entry all producers must earn zero profits, i.e. piHM =
piFM = 0. This implies that relative wages equalize so that w
H = wF = 1 if we choose labor
in Home as the numeraire. In both cases, if we impose symmetry, i.e. BH = BF = B.
In a symmetric equilibrium where all producers export, aggregate demand is equal to B =
(fE + fD) /
(
1 + τ−(σ−1)
)
, whereas in a symmetric equilibrium where all producers engage in
FDI, the aggregate demand level is determined by (fE + fD) /2. From the budget constraint
of consumers, the Marshallian demand functions, and the aggregate demand level B, follows
the number of producers in region i. In an equilibrium with pervasive exporting in each region,
the number of exporters is determined by
N i =
(1/σ)(1− β)Y
fE + fD
.
In an equilibrium with pervasive FDI, the number of multinationals is given by
M i =
(1/σ)(1− β)Y
fE + 2fD
.
It becomes apparent here that the distribution within regions has no effect on the number of
producers that export or are engaged in FDI. This is intuitive since with homothetic preferences
the distribution within regions has no effect on aggregate demand. The equilibrium with
pervasive exporting is an equilibrium if and only if no producer has an incentive to deviate and
serve the foreign market by engaging in FDI. Thus, profits from setting up a foreign production
plant, 2B−(fE + 2fD), must be negative. This implies that if and only if the following condition
holds, no producer has an incentive to deviate
fD
fE + fD
>
1− τ−(σ−1)
1 + τ−(σ−1)
.
This condition is the equivalent to condition (4.8) in the baseline model. We observe that
market size, i.e. aggregate demand (number of people times per capita consumption), is absent
in the condition above. The intuition is that higher aggregate demand induces more entry to
the point where the demand level of an individual producer becomes independent of market size
(see Antras and Nunn, 2009). In other words, a larger market has two opposing effects. On the
one hand, it increases market size, which means higher profits for producers. On the other hand,
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a larger market implies fiercer competition and therefore lower profits. With CES preferences
these two effects exactly offset each other in equilibrium (constant markups). Similarly, the
equilibrium with pervasive FDI is an equilibrium if and only if no producer has an incentive to
supply the foreign market through exports rather than engaging in FDI. It is straightforward
to show that this is the case if the inequality above is reversed. However, this implies that a
mixed equilibrium where some producers export and others engage in FDI only emerges if the
condition above holds with equality. In sum, a mixed equilibrium occurs only in a knife-edge
case where the number of exporters and multinationals is indeterminate (i.e. the parameter
space for which this equilibrium exists has measure zero).
4.A.4 Extension: Skill versus Income Distribution
This section presents the formal model discussing the effects of skill versus income distribution.
We will focus on a mixed equilibrium where both multinationals and exporters are active. It
follows in part the factor endowment models of Markusen and Venables (2000), and Egger and
Pfaffermayr (2005). We assume that the distribution of efficiency units of labor θik maps into a
distribution of skills. In particular, we now assume θik to reflect the skills of group k = {1, 2, 3}
and region i, l = {H,F}. Suppose that in both regions group 1 supplies high-skilled, group 2
medium-skilled, and group 3 low-skilled labor.
We keep the assumption about homothetic consumer preferences. Thus, aggregate demand
for food in region i is given by Xi = βY i/pix, where Y i =
∑
k s
i
kL
iθikw
i
k in equilibrium. Ag-
gregate demand for any differentiated product j produced and sold in region i is given by
Cii = (1− β)Y ip−σii /P i, and by Cil/τ = (1− β)Y l (τpll)−σ /P l if the product is sold in region
l, with P i = (Mi +Ni +Ml) p
−(σ−1)
ii +Nl (τpll)
−(σ−1).
However, on the production side we make the assumption that producers combine different
skills to produce using the same technology across regions. The differentiated product sector
is more skill-intensive combining medium and high-skilled labor than the food sector, which
uses only low-skilled labor. For simplicity, we assume that the food sector uses a units of low-
skilled labor to produce 1 unit of output. Food is not traded and produced under conditions of
perfect competition, which implies that its price is equal to marginal costs, pix = awi3. In the
differentiated sector, producers use fE units of high-skilled labor to create a new product, and
use fD, and b units of medium-skilled labor to set up a new production facility, and produce 1
unit of output, respectively. We assume that multinational producers employ high-skilled labor
in their region of origin, and medium-skilled labor in the region of production. They operate
under conditions of monopolistic competition. Optimal monopoly prices for all products made
and sold in region i are given by pii =
(
σ
σ−1
)
bwi2, and pil =
(
σ
σ−1
)
τbwi2 for exported products.
Optimal profits of multinational, and exporters, respectively, in region i are determined by
piiM = (σ − 1)−1
(
bwi2
)
Cii + (σ − 1)−1
(
bwl2
)
Cll − wi1fE − wi2fD − wl2fD
piiX = (σ − 1)−1
(
bwi2
)
Cii + (σ − 1)−1
(
τbwi2
)
Cil − wi1fE − wi2fD
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which must both be equal to zero in a free entry equilibrium where multinationals and exporters
co-exist. Consider for the moment a symmetric (mixed) equilibrium. Free entry and zero-profits
in equilibrium, i.e. piiX = pi
i
M = 0, imply
1− τ−(σ−1)
1 + τ−(σ−1)
=
w2fD
w1fE + w2fD
where the right-hand side is decreasing in w1/w2. Only multinationals are active in equilibrium
if and only if the left-hand side above exceeds the right-hand side, and vica versa. Thus, if
the relative wage rate w1/w2 is low, exporting is more attractive than engaging in FDI, ceteris
paribus. Notice that if the same type of labor is used to create new products and set up new
factories, i.e. if w1/w2 = 1, this condition reduces to the knife-edge condition of the previous
section. However, in this model the parameter space for which a mixed equilibrium exists has
non-zero measure. Finally, labor market clearing in region i demands that
si1L
iθi1 =
(
M i +N i
)
fE
si2L
iθi2 = M
i (fD + Ciib) +N
i (fD + Ciib+ Cilb) +M
l (fD + Ciib)
si3L
iθi3 = X
ia
holds. Note that the balance of payments is implied by the zero-profit conditions, labor market
clearing and budget constraints (this is an accounting identity). Due to Walras’ law we are
free to drop the market clearing condition for food in Foreign, and set its price equal to one,
i.e. pFx = 1. Hence, we have 23 (non-linear) equations in 23 unknowns (Cii, Cil), Y i, (pii, pll),
pix, P i,
(
wi1, w
i
2, w
i
3
)
,
(
M i, N i
)
, Xi for i, l = {H,F}, and where pFx = 1. It is not possible to
solve this model analytically. Thus, we simulate the model to perform comparative statics by
looking at small changes in parameters.
The simulations in Figure A.1 below illustrate how a decrease in the average labor endow-
ment θF2 of medium-skilled in Foreign affects the number of multinationals relative to exporters
in Home if we increase (i) θF1 , and (ii) θF3 so that the total skill endowment
∑
k s
F
k L
F θFk is con-
stant. The simulations in Figure A.2 show how the number of MNCs with HQ in Home changes
when we decrease the population share sF2 of the middle-skilled in Foreign, and increase (iii) sF1
and (iv) sF3 such that aggregate skill endowment in Foreign is constant. In our simulations we
choose parameters such that high/middle/low skills translate into high/middle/low per capita
incomes. Figure A.1 shows that in case (i) there is a positive link between per capita income
of the middle class in Foreign and the number of MNCs with HQ in Home, whereas in case (ii)
the link is negative. In Figure A.2 we see that a shrinking size of the middle class leads in both
case (iii) and (iv) to a decline in the number of MNCs with HQ in Home. The basic intuition
is that if the supply of medium-skilled labor is relatively low, the wage rate for medium-skilled
labor is high (i.e. w1/w2 is low), ceteris paribus. This means that exporting becomes more
attractive relative to engaging in FDI, ceteris paribus.
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Figure A.1: Effect of changes in Foreign’s skill distribution on MNCs with HQ in Home: case
(i) on left-hand side, case (ii) on right-hand side. Parameter values: β = 0.1, σ = 2, τ = 1.13,
a = b = 2, fE = 2.5, fD = 0.33, si1 = 0.2, si2 = 0.5, si3 = 0.3, Li = 1, and θik = 1 as starting
values, for all i, k.
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Figure A.2: Effect of changes in Foreign’s skill distribution on MNCs with HQ in Home: case
(iii) on left-hand side, case (iv) on right-hand side. Parameter values: β = 0.1, σ = 2, τ = 1.13,
a = b = 2, fE = 2.5, fD = 0.33, si1 = 0.2, si2 = 0.5, and si3 = 0.3 as starting values, Li = 1, and
θik = 1 for all i, k.
4.A.5 Empirics
This appendix provides detailed information on the income data used, summary statistics, and
some robustness checks.
Income Data
Bernasconi (2013) constructs discrete empirical income distributions for 94 countries for the
time period 1997-2007 using income shares of deciles and quintiles from UNU-WIDER (2008)
and GDP per capita from Heston et al. (2012). See Bernasconi (2013) for a detailed description
of how she transforms the inequality data into income distributions. In short, she assigns an
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average income level to each decile (quintile), and then redistributes the corresponding area
uniformly on an income interval. However, she does not make parametric assumptions about
the functional form of the income distribution across income intervals. Finally, the resulting
densities are divided into common income intervals on USD 1, 5000, . . . , 145000, 150000. Note
that Bernasconi (2013) assumes that the income shares do not change over time (i.e. the Lorenz
curve is constant over time). However, the income distributions change over time as average
incomes of deciles (quintiles) change. She selects data on the basis of consistency (e.g. income
versus expenditure inequality) and quality in order to increase data consistency (see Bernasconi,
2013). This assumption implies that there is less variation over time but makes the data useful
to study cross-section data.
Note that we adjust the empirical income distributions such that the aggregate income
computed from the distributions is close to GDP (Y ) from Heston et al. (2012). We calculate
the mean income of bin l as the generalized mean y˜l =
(
yθ
l
/2 + yθl /2
)1/θ
where y
l
denotes the
lower bound of bin i and yl the upper bound, and θ is a non-zero real number. For each country
(and year) we choose θ such that aggregate income, i.e. Y˜ =
∑
l y˜lPl where Pl denotes the
number of people in bin l, is at most 35 percent above or below Y . We compute Y˜ by iterating
θ = 1, 1/2, . . . , 1/1000 until our convergence criteria, i.e. 0.65 < Y˜ /Y < 1.35, is satisfied. In
less than 2 percent of all cases, a thousand steps are not enough to converge. In these cases the
last iteration step is taken. In general, the chosen θ is such that the computed mean incomes
deviate more from the simple arithmetic averages in low income bins than in high income bins.
This suggests that the discrepancy between Y˜ and Y is because Y˜ overestimates the mean
incomes in the lower income bins. Note that if θ = 1 the generalized mean collapses to the
simple arithmetic mean. However, since we control for GDP from Heston et al. (2012) in the
regressions this issue is of second order.
Summary Statistics and Robustness
The list of countries can be found in Table A.1. Summary statistics about the dependent and in-
dependent variables are given in Table A.2. As an example, Table A.3 shows the mean over 1997-
2007 of the log of the market size measure for the income thresholds
{
y, y
}
= {5000, 20000}
for all host countries in the sample. Table A.4 and A.5 show the estimation of equation (4.9)
separately for each year 1997-2007, with a lower threshold of USD 5,000. The results for a
lower threshold of USD 10,000 are similar.
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Table A.1: Country list
Parent countries Host countries
Australia Argentina Honduras Turkey
Austria Australia Hungary Uganda
Benelux Austria Indonesia United Kingdom
Canada Bangladesh Iran, Islamic Rep. United States
Chile Benelux Ireland Venezuela, Bolivar Rep.
Denmark Benin Israel Vietnam
Finland Bolivia Italy Yemen, Rep.
Fmr Czechoslovakia Brazil Jamaica Zambia
France Bulgaria Korea, Rep.
Germany Cambodia Mexico
Greece Canada Morocco
Hungary Chile Nepal
Iceland Colombia Netherlands
Ireland Costa Rica Nicaragua
Israel Denmark Norway
Italy Dominican Rep. Pakistan
Japan Ecuador Panama
Korea, Rep. Egypt, Arab Rep. Paraguay
Netherlands El Salvador Peru
New Zealand Finland Philippines
Norway Fmr Czechoslovakia Poland
Poland Fmr USSR Portugal
Portugal Fmr Yugoslavia Romania
Spain France South Africa
Sweden Germany Spain
Switzerland Greece Sri Lanka
Turkey Guatemala Sweden
United Kingdom Guyana Tanzania
United States Haiti Thailand
Notes: Australia includes external territories, Benelux includes Belgium and Luxembourg,
Denmark includes Faroe Islands, France includes Andorra and Monaco, Israel includes West
Bank, Italy includes San Marino and Vatical City, New Zealand includes Norfolk, Cocos
and Christmas Islands, Switzerland includes Liechtenstein, Indonesia includes Macao, South
Africa includes Rep. of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland.
We drop Mexico as a parent country from the sample since they report only 4 outward FDI
positions over 1997-2007.
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Table A.2: Summary statistics, 1997-2007
min p25 p50 mean p75 max sd N
FDI positionijt (m USD, PPP) 0 0 195 5910 2506 4.00e+05 22868 11817
log(Y [y|y ≤ 5, 000]jt) 5.637 7.698 8.909 8.924 10.120 12.831 1.667 11817
log(P [y|y ≤ 5, 000]jt) 4.726 7.010 8.399 8.443 9.981 11.914 1.885 11817
log(Y [y|y ≤ 10, 000]jt) 6.665 9.311 10.218 10.263 11.514 14.003 1.592 11817
log(P [y|y ≤ 10, 000]jt) 5.415 7.846 8.926 9.013 10.253 12.405 1.721 11817
log(Y [y|10, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 8.680 9.869 9.728 11.131 13.800 1.986 11817
log(P [y|10, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 6.688 7.854 7.755 9.141 11.786 1.864 11817
log(Y [y|15, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 9.249 10.998 10.558 11.705 14.326 1.952 11817
log(P [y|15, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 7.032 8.770 8.344 9.437 12.091 1.813 11817
log(Y [y|20, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 10.087 11.434 11.093 12.414 14.505 1.921 11817
log(P [y|20, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 7.616 9.015 8.703 9.897 12.185 1.757 11817
log(Y [y|25, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 10.570 11.620 11.430 12.646 14.652 1.945 11817
log(P [y|25, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 7.874 9.191 8.919 10.156 12.255 1.746 11817
log(Y [y|30, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 10.837 11.846 11.652 12.771 14.721 1.984 11817
log(P [y|30, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 8.118 9.270 9.051 10.259 12.269 1.752 11817
log(Y [y|35, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 10.942 12.002 11.799 12.956 14.996 2.013 11817
log(P [y|35, 000 ≤ y > 5, 000]jt) 0.000 8.217 9.330 9.133 10.298 12.284 1.758 11817
log(Y [y|15, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 8.743 10.099 9.726 11.229 13.643 2.249 11817
log(P [y|15, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 6.219 7.573 7.283 8.703 11.118 1.935 11817
log(Y [y|20, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 9.732 10.818 10.518 11.996 13.970 2.315 11817
log(P [y|20, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 7.025 8.118 7.916 9.341 11.361 1.962 11817
log(Y [y|25, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 10.325 11.322 10.952 12.243 14.271 2.387 11817
log(P [y|25, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 7.463 8.494 8.234 9.520 11.513 2.003 11817
log(Y [y|30, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 10.570 11.568 11.225 12.570 14.670 2.448 11817
log(P [y|30, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 7.730 8.685 8.419 9.624 11.671 2.038 11817
log(Y [y|35, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 10.786 11.759 11.402 12.697 14.958 2.487 11817
log(P [y|35, 000 ≤ y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 7.855 8.784 8.530 9.783 11.858 2.060 11817
log(Y [y|y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 11.553 12.490 12.077 13.560 16.392 2.668 11817
log(P [y|y > 10, 000]jt) 0.000 8.247 9.041 8.831 10.106 12.535 2.124 11817
log(Y [y|y > 15, 000]jt) 0.000 11.125 12.336 11.705 13.426 16.371 3.182 11817
log(P [y|y > 15, 000]jt) 0.000 7.656 8.809 8.351 9.764 12.455 2.461 11817
log(Y [y|y > 20, 000]jt) 0.000 10.845 12.194 11.247 13.288 16.334 3.791 11817
log(P [y|y > 20, 000]jt) 0.000 7.207 8.419 7.869 9.614 12.345 2.829 11817
log(Y [y|y > 25, 000]jt) 0.000 10.645 12.088 10.913 13.173 16.281 4.092 11817
log(P [y|y > 25, 000]jt) 0.000 6.918 8.194 7.501 9.322 12.211 2.969 11817
log(Y [y|y > 30, 000]jt) 0.000 10.253 11.909 10.547 12.997 16.213 4.320 11817
log(P [y|y > 30, 000]jt) 0.000 6.582 7.912 7.108 9.007 12.061 3.064 11817
log(Y [y|y > 35, 000]jt) 0.000 9.718 11.738 9.993 12.912 16.132 4.739 11817
log(P [y|y > 35, 000]jt) 0.000 5.834 7.626 6.621 8.722 11.897 3.274 11817
log(GDP pcjt) 6.507 8.554 9.162 9.193 10.295 10.855 1.109 11817
log(GDPjt) 3.188 7.101 7.796 7.789 8.870 11.785 1.581 11817
log(remotenessjt) 8.609 8.665 8.827 8.915 9.128 9.441 0.260 11817
log(urban popjt) 2.493 3.793 4.166 4.002 4.328 4.501 0.467 11817
log(opennessjt) 2.863 3.934 4.166 4.194 4.477 5.165 0.440 11817
log(tax ratejt) 2.795 3.628 3.842 3.827 4.003 4.683 0.321 11817
log(distancejt) 5.050 7.538 8.747 8.349 9.155 9.875 1.007 11817
log(squared skill diffjt) -12.296 0.946 2.718 2.085 3.769 5.153 2.280 11817
dummy common languageijt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.162 0.000 1.000 0.369 11817
dummy regional trade agreementijt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.000 1.000 0.286 11817
dummy customs unionijt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.219 0.000 1.000 0.414 11817
dummy colonial tiesijt 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.000 1.000 0.168 11817
log(percent no schoolingjt) -2.310 0.911 1.851 1.748 2.743 4.392 1.461 11817
log(percent primary schoolingjt) 0.453 2.382 2.945 2.701 3.234 3.806 0.756 11817
log(percent secondary schoolingjt) -0.066 2.643 3.075 2.948 3.481 3.927 0.731 11817
log(percent tertiary schoolingjt) -1.390 1.494 2.198 1.949 2.575 3.404 0.983 11817
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Table A.3: Mean of (log) market size measure by host country for
{
y, y
}
= {5000, 20000}
Country log(Ylow) log(Plow) log(Ymiddle) log(Pmiddle) log(Yhigh) log(Phigh)
South Africa 7.923 10.386 11.639 9.475 13.123 8.918
Morocco 10.143 9.892 11.253 9.006 11.524 8.194
Egypt, Arab Rep. 11.155 10.904 11.735 9.476 12.515 8.792
Benin 8.492 8.791 8.785 6.810 0.000 0.000
Uganda 9.763 10.113 10.006 7.744 0.000 0.000
Tanzania 10.187 10.486 5.769 4.422 0.000 0.000
Zambia 8.147 9.167 9.263 6.869 5.519 3.631
Canada 8.126 7.210 11.587 8.942 13.819 10.022
United States 10.468 9.551 13.715 11.107 16.212 12.258
Argentina 10.072 9.156 12.324 9.974 12.848 8.878
Bolivia 9.102 8.851 9.337 7.072 9.943 6.473
Brazil 11.123 11.546 13.072 10.848 14.269 10.205
Chile 9.273 8.357 11.322 9.000 12.237 8.043
Colombia 10.405 10.153 11.565 9.314 12.433 8.458
Ecuador 9.383 9.132 10.220 7.940 10.999 7.148
Mexico 11.523 10.606 12.987 10.735 13.676 9.706
Paraguay 8.624 8.373 9.384 7.157 9.748 6.207
Peru 10.064 9.813 11.039 8.812 11.544 7.824
Venezuela, Bolivar Rep. 9.920 9.003 11.714 9.413 12.124 8.285
Costa Rica 8.154 7.238 9.842 7.557 10.322 6.456
El Salvador 8.620 8.369 9.622 7.399 9.965 6.350
Guatemala 9.245 8.994 10.185 7.910 10.855 7.036
Honduras 8.879 8.627 9.081 6.827 9.366 6.034
Nicaragua 8.132 8.431 8.746 6.352 8.063 4.948
Dominical Rep. 9.263 8.347 10.440 8.186 10.783 6.942
Haiti 8.604 8.904 9.161 6.659 5.208 2.917
Jamaica 7.530 7.279 8.988 6.762 9.831 5.879
Guyana 6.229 6.424 7.462 4.976 1.308 0.615
Panama 7.671 7.420 9.183 6.932 9.840 5.955
Israel 7.025 6.109 10.605 8.063 11.689 7.938
Iran, Islamic Rep. 8.098 10.033 12.524 10.286 13.095 9.354
Turkey 10.457 10.443 12.324 10.117 12.774 9.263
Yemen, Rep. 10.145 9.894 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bangladesh 11.955 11.703 12.261 10.067 0.000 0.000
Cambodia 9.267 9.333 9.630 7.255 8.356 5.427
Sri Lanka 9.128 9.658 10.196 7.848 11.533 7.561
Indonesia 12.135 11.883 13.199 10.912 13.214 9.956
Korea, Rep. 9.254 8.337 12.593 10.029 13.510 9.894
Nepal 9.272 9.986 10.892 8.454 0.000 0.000
Pakistan 11.985 11.734 12.795 10.385 1.531 1.075
Philippines 11.354 11.103 11.712 9.471 12.131 8.701
Thailand 10.706 10.455 12.166 9.893 12.915 9.027
Vietnam 11.504 11.126 11.672 9.358 10.902 7.758
Benelux 6.831 5.916 10.364 7.677 12.769 9.015
Denmark 6.544 5.630 10.010 7.368 11.982 8.163
France 8.775 7.858 12.578 9.895 14.261 10.579
Germany 8.978 8.062 12.612 9.933 14.648 10.975
Greece 7.509 6.593 11.032 8.442 12.227 8.536
Ireland 5.867 4.955 9.331 6.670 11.768 7.968
Italy 8.926 8.010 12.524 9.882 14.214 10.470
Netherlands 7.145 6.229 10.491 7.823 13.156 9.480
Portugal 7.614 6.698 11.229 8.699 11.970 8.197
Spain 8.576 7.660 12.201 9.557 13.786 10.055
United Kingdom 8.809 7.892 12.522 9.852 14.283 10.539
Austria 6.461 5.547 9.802 7.136 12.474 8.797
Finland 6.135 5.222 9.904 7.198 11.822 8.189
Norway 5.722 4.810 8.606 6.036 12.210 8.293
Sweden 6.681 5.767 10.430 7.724 12.402 8.738
Bulgaria 8.703 7.787 10.586 8.384 9.818 6.396
Fmr Czechoslovakia 7.761 6.846 11.866 9.297 11.736 8.195
Hungary 7.503 6.588 11.426 8.907 11.053 7.529
Poland 9.568 8.652 12.564 10.204 12.262 8.632
Romania 9.736 8.820 11.695 9.508 10.702 7.363
Fmr Yugoslavia 8.450 7.534 11.575 9.300 10.544 7.138
Fmr USSR 12.276 11.360 14.230 12.006 13.733 10.207
Australia 7.956 7.040 10.921 8.330 13.477 9.567
Notes: low is y|y ≤ y, middle is y|y ≤ y > y, high is y|y > y. Y is in millions, and P in thousands.
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Table A.4: Outward FDI positions (29 OECD countries 1997-2007, PPML) with lower threshold
y = 5000
log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
1997 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.658 0.806 2.146 2.987∗∗ 2.846∗∗∗ 2.128∗∗
(1.517) (1.337) (1.347) (1.296) (1.053) (0.936)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.270 -1.375 -2.956∗ -3.874∗∗ -3.722∗∗∗ -2.863∗∗
(1.832) (1.658) (1.681) (1.583) (1.303) (1.173)
1998 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.644 1.396 2.626∗ 3.568∗∗∗ 3.059∗∗∗ 1.968∗
(1.632) (1.415) (1.373) (1.321) (1.119) (1.008)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.229 -2.071 -3.515∗∗ -4.543∗∗∗ -3.944∗∗∗ -2.652∗∗
(1.975) (1.765) (1.709) (1.587) (1.374) (1.270)
1999 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.428 1.862 2.904∗∗ 3.586∗∗∗ 3.271∗∗∗ 2.290∗∗
(1.730) (1.535) (1.333) (1.229) (1.142) (1.041)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.182 -2.675 -3.894∗∗ -4.629∗∗∗ -4.203∗∗∗ -3.057∗∗
(2.080) (1.883) (1.648) (1.503) (1.373) (1.281)
2000 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.914∗ 2.403∗ 3.173∗∗∗ 3.643∗∗∗ 3.615∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗
(1.623) (1.457) (1.216) (1.144) (1.206) (1.003)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.674∗ -3.254∗ -4.155∗∗∗ -4.637∗∗∗ -4.470∗∗∗ -3.298∗∗∗
(1.927) (1.758) (1.485) (1.400) (1.354) (1.213)
2001 log(Ymiddle,jt) 6.640∗∗∗ 5.535∗∗∗ 5.473∗∗∗ 6.480∗∗∗ 7.183∗∗∗ 4.864∗∗∗
(1.665) (1.303) (0.995) (1.817) (1.592) (1.802)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -8.093∗∗∗ -7.079∗∗∗ -6.888∗∗∗ -7.644∗∗∗ -7.496∗∗∗ -5.492∗∗∗
(2.022) (1.606) (1.232) (1.784) (1.357) (1.448)
2002 log(Ymiddle,jt) 3.495∗ 2.999∗ 3.640∗∗∗ 3.738∗∗∗ 3.569∗∗∗ 2.659∗∗∗
(1.855) (1.696) (1.246) (1.024) (1.056) (0.966)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -4.320∗∗ -3.925∗ -4.639∗∗∗ -4.664∗∗∗ -4.341∗∗∗ -3.340∗∗∗
(2.195) (2.027) (1.498) (1.237) (1.200) (1.148)
2003 log(Ymiddle,jt) 3.037∗∗ 2.078 3.122∗∗∗ 3.660∗∗∗ 3.589∗∗∗ 2.790∗∗∗
(1.320) (1.336) (1.116) (1.003) (1.159) (0.974)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.627∗∗ -2.711∗ -3.884∗∗∗ -4.384∗∗∗ -4.194∗∗∗ -3.351∗∗∗
(1.546) (1.558) (1.322) (1.182) (1.261) (1.140)
2004 log(Ymiddle,jt) 3.084∗ 2.401 3.466∗∗∗ 3.605∗∗∗ 3.523∗∗∗ 2.703∗∗∗
(1.601) (1.510) (1.290) (1.059) (1.083) (1.013)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.702∗ -3.128∗ -4.374∗∗∗ -4.452∗∗∗ -4.208∗∗∗ -3.323∗∗∗
(1.905) (1.814) (1.571) (1.302) (1.259) (1.222)
2005 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.541∗∗ 1.659 2.854∗∗∗ 2.984∗∗∗ 3.750∗∗ 2.540∗∗
(1.182) (1.204) (1.096) (0.934) (1.858) (1.061)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.975∗∗ -2.167 -3.555∗∗∗ -3.609∗∗∗ -4.047∗∗ -2.913∗∗
(1.405) (1.446) (1.345) (1.157) (1.654) (1.158)
2006 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.912 1.365 2.585∗∗ 2.650∗∗ 2.907∗∗∗ 2.345∗∗
(1.213) (1.288) (1.226) (1.085) (1.063) (0.987)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.216 -1.783 -3.246∗∗ -3.279∗∗ -3.419∗∗∗ -2.794∗∗
(1.430) (1.546) (1.502) (1.329) (1.245) (1.186)
2007 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.775 1.379 2.360∗ 2.619∗∗ 3.083∗∗∗ 2.518∗∗
(1.294) (1.285) (1.238) (1.185) (1.185) (1.031)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.120 -1.836 -3.052∗∗ -3.336∗∗ -3.706∗∗∗ -3.078∗∗
(1.521) (1.535) (1.510) (1.440) (1.363) (1.224)
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered (by host country) standard errors in parentheses. Omitting
rich class. Low is y|y ≤ y, middle is y|y ≤ y > y, high is y|y > y for j, t. Controls: host remoteness, host urban
concentration, host trade openness, host corporate tax, distance, squared skill difference, percent of population
that completed no, primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling, dummies for common language, regional trade
agreement, customs union, colonial relationship, parent country, and host region. Sample sizes (year): 661
(1997), 781 (1998), 832 (1999), 895 (2000), 992 (2001), 1013 (2002), 1175 (2003), 1278 (2004), 1264 (2005), 1424
(2006), 1493 (2007).
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Table A.5: Outward FDI positions (29 OECD countries 1997-2007, PPML) with lower threshold
y = 5000
log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt) log(FDIijt)
y = 10, 000 y = 15, 000 y = 20, 000 y = 25, 000 y = 30, 000 y = 35, 000
1997 log(Ymiddle,jt) 3.046 -5.684∗∗ 1.638 3.568∗∗ 5.763∗∗∗ 2.821∗∗∗
(4.483) (2.621) (1.343) (1.480) (1.338) (0.847)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.796 5.315∗ -2.269 -4.579∗∗ -7.469∗∗∗ -3.801∗∗∗
(4.738) (2.755) (1.616) (1.793) (1.682) (1.083)
1998 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.975 -3.885∗ 2.723∗∗ 5.686∗∗∗ 4.410∗∗∗ 2.998∗∗∗
(5.466) (2.313) (1.267) (1.335) (1.038) (0.910)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.821 3.380 -3.520∗∗ -7.168∗∗∗ -5.884∗∗∗ -4.073∗∗∗
(5.737) (2.461) (1.552) (1.583) (1.346) (1.174)
1999 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.499 -1.871 3.388∗∗∗ 6.074∗∗∗ 4.827∗∗∗ 4.040∗∗∗
(5.204) (2.244) (1.221) (1.209) (0.973) (1.058
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.439 1.076 -4.510∗∗∗ -7.760∗∗∗ -6.423∗∗∗ -5.416∗∗∗
(5.454) (2.402) (1.492) (1.467) (1.249) (1.353)
2000 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.639 -0.749 3.719∗∗∗ 5.713∗∗∗ 4.639∗∗∗ 4.789∗∗∗
(5.655) (2.160) (1.171) (1.031) (0.878) (1.126)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.709 -0.237 -4.906∗∗∗ -7.270∗∗∗ -6.002∗∗∗ -6.291∗∗∗
(5.882) (2.300) (1.389) (1.260) (1.118) (1.446)
2001 log(Ymiddle,jt) 7.944∗ 3.133∗ 5.501∗∗∗ 7.439∗∗∗ 5.967∗∗∗ 5.546∗∗∗
(4.078) (1.702) (0.955) (1.493) (0.645) (0.900)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -9.643∗∗ -4.702∗∗ -6.929∗∗∗ -8.795∗∗∗ -7.574∗∗∗ -7.094∗∗∗
(4.348) (1.885) (1.143) (1.474) (0.796) (1.141)
2002 log(Ymiddle,jt) 3.471 1.651 3.866∗∗∗ 4.513∗∗∗ 4.301∗∗∗ 4.032∗∗∗
(3.681) (2.503) (1.084) (0.918) (0.839) (1.019)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -4.377 -2.737 -4.971∗∗∗ -5.715∗∗∗ -5.531∗∗∗ -5.138∗∗∗
(3.897) (2.690) (1.324) (1.153) (1.031) (1.260)
2003 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.316∗ 0.258 2.624∗∗∗ 3.698∗∗∗ 3.898∗∗∗ 3.303∗∗∗
(1.208) (2.378) (0.940) (0.911) (0.957) (0.987)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.918∗∗ -1.144 -3.570∗∗∗ -4.605∗∗∗ -4.845∗∗∗ -4.049∗∗∗
(1.451) (2.559) (1.188) (1.108) (1.107) (1.185)
2004 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.648∗ 0.480 3.479∗∗∗ 3.965∗∗∗ 3.588∗∗∗ 2.733∗∗∗
(1.561) (2.316) (1.275) (1.114) (0.972) (1.022)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -3.161∗ -1.347 -4.562∗∗∗ -5.067∗∗∗ -4.549∗∗∗ -3.446∗∗∗
(1.837) (2.482) (1.592) (1.389) (1.161) (1.256)
2005 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.022∗ -1.655 2.454∗∗ 2.338∗∗∗ 2.800∗∗∗ 2.278∗∗∗
(1.225) (1.851) (1.094) (0.892) (0.900) (0.875)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.323∗ 1.066 -3.204∗∗ -2.979∗∗∗ -3.504∗∗∗ -2.939∗∗∗
(1.412) (1.955) (1.355) (1.099) (1.047) (1.068)
2006 log(Ymiddle,jt) 2.131∗ -1.178 2.462∗∗ 2.314∗∗ 2.711∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗
(1.225) (2.234) (1.148) (0.955) (0.995) (1.024
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.302 0.606 -3.253∗∗ -3.009∗∗ -3.363∗∗∗ -2.791∗∗
(1.404) (2.324) (1.450) (1.201) (1.175) (1.263)
2007 log(Ymiddle,jt) 1.953 -1.304 1.122 1.693 3.214∗∗∗ 2.669∗∗
(1.286) (2.704) (1.527) (1.044) (1.178) (1.098)
log(Pmiddle,jt) -2.096 0.709 -1.969 -2.392∗ -4.075∗∗∗ -3.490∗∗∗
(1.469) (2.723) (1.722) (1.276) (1.401) (1.331)
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Clustered (by host country) standard errors in parentheses. Omitting
poor class. Low is y|y ≤ y, middle is y|y ≤ y > y, high is y|y > y for j, t. Controls: host remoteness, host urban
concentration, host trade openness, host corporate tax, distance, squared skill difference, percent of population
that completed no, primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling, dummies for common language, regional trade
agreement, customs union, colonial relationship, parent country, and host region. Sample sizes (year): 661
(1997), 781 (1998), 832 (1999), 895 (2000), 992 (2001), 1013 (2002), 1175 (2003), 1278 (2004), 1264 (2005), 1424
(2006), 1493 (2007)
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